Le 17-juil.-12, à 19:23, Stephen P. King a écrit :

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On 7/15/2012 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 14 Jul 2012, at 18:48, Stephen P. King wrote:On 7/14/2012 5:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 14 Jul 2012, at 11:16, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:On 14.07.2012 11:00 Bruno Marchal said the following:On 14 Jul 2012, at 10:42, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:...If to speak about your theorem, it is unclear to me, how thefirstperson view accesses numbers and mathematical objects.Like a digital machine, which can access numbers encoded in their memory, through logical gates, and so one. More details are given currently on the FOAR list, but the idea is simple, with comp ourbodies are statistical first person constructs related toinfinitiesof number relations, so we access to them a bit like a fish can access water. The price of this is that we have to abandon physicalism eventually.I am not sure if I understand. I would like to have anexplanation for a phenomenon, for example1) I see a cat; 2) I see a piece of paper with 2 + 2 = 4. Yet, when you start explaining, the phenomenon seems to disappear.1) I see a cat. This is explained by the fact that your currentcomputational state belongs to an infinity of computations makingyou singling out some stable patterns that you recognize, by accessto your previous experience as being cat. The qualia itself isexplained by the fact that when you refer to the cat, you arereally referring to yourself (with the implicit hope that itcorresponds to some relatively independent pattern), and the mathshows that such a self-reference involves some true but nonrationally communicable feature. The math explained why, if thisjustification is correct, machines/numbers will not be entirelysatisfied by it, for the first person is not a machine from its ownfirst person view.Hi Bruno,No, the reverse is the case. The "belongs to an infinity ofcomputations making you singling out some stable patterns" requiresthe prior existence of the "you" to select it.With comp, you, the dreamer's bodies, and its soul, already exist (indifferent modal sense) in arithmetic. Provably so, even in Robinsonarithmetic, for the 3-view.Is the selection made on the entities defined by the arithmetic?

Defined? yes. Decided? No.

How are these entities given such that they are simultaneous for theselection function?

`By the axioms of addition and multiplication. I would not talk of`

`"selection function", but first person selection, which cannot be`

`defined in arithmetic, nor in any theory, except at the metalevel`

`(comp).`

Do they form a set of some kind? If so, what kind of set is it?

`You can map them on their set of Gödel number description, but that set`

`is highly complex (not decidable, nor semi-decidable).`

The observer (you here) effectively is the measure via aself-selection rule.This makes no sense.Are you familiar with Bostrom's SSA?

`We have discuss this a lot, even before Bostrom, on the everything`

`list.SSA is a case of fist person indeterminacy. We have debated on the`

`Relative SSA and Absolute SSA dilemma a lot. Comp favors the RSSA`

`(relative SSA).`

I am merely assuming that any observer can experience a universecompatible with its existence. This would hold even for Boltzmannbrains that might happen to occur in universes with physical laws thatare hostile to life. Such would experience a world that is compatiblewith their experience (qualia), even if such is completely a fiction.But these are almost solipsistic as their is a vanishing probabilitythat other Bolztman brains would have experiences that would haveevents what would be bisimilar to each other.

`How do you associate a consciousness with a universe? This is what UDA`

`shows impossible when assuming comp.`

I cannot discount my own existence given the immediate fact that Iam experiencing myself as existing.You cannot discount the first person experience. But comp does notdiscount it. It explains how it arises from the ability of numbers toobserve themselves and extrapolate, etc.I cannot discount it, it is the one thing that cannot be deniedwithout contradiction. This was deeply examined by Descartes thatlead to his famous "cogito ergo sum".

Indeed.

Descartes' Cognito ergo Sum is a pointed statement of thisunassailable fact. We cannot put the observer on a level that isemerging from the computations if the observer is the one that isselecting the class of computations that are generating saidobserver.? You refute Darwin too?How would you imagine that I would "refute Darwin"? I seemutation and selection as a basic principle at work here, e.g. Darwinrit large.

`Then you argument above cannot work. For in Darwin the observer emerges`

`from computations too, even is physical.`

A possible escape from this is to allow for non-well founded setsand such things as non-principle ultrafilters, but I don't know yourstand on their existence.Good tools.Our observation of the cat is a symmetric (within bounds)relationship, otherwise we fall into solipsism.?If I observe a cat, for example, and the cat cannot observe me,then it follows that for the cat, I do not exist.

`The cat does not need to believe that you don't exist, which need to be`

`the case for making it solipsist. He is just agnostic by lacking`

`information. You confuse ~Bp and B~p.`

My claim is that the same thing follows for mathematical entities.We cannot claim that mathematical (or any other "abstract" entity!)is such that we (the observers and understanders thereof) areemerging from them.Prove that claim. Then by UDA, you refute comp.The fact that the only efficient simulation of a physical systemof sufficient complexity is the evolution of that system itself is myproof.

`As I said, this is already true in arithmetic. With your definition of`

`physical here, physics is already in arithmetic.`

This was explained well by Stephen Wolfram in this article:http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/physics/85-undecidability/2/text.htmlThe proof already exists for you to inspect.

`This is very well know by logicians, and is not original in Wolfram,`

`and has absolutely nothing to do with physics.`

This would require that the "independence" is not and cannot be anunbridgeable gap at all, but a analytic continuum connecting theparticular instance of a physical system with the knowledge andmeaning of the abstraction. Maths do not refer explicitly to thephysical media that they are represented upon by patterns, but thisdoes not allow us to imagine them as completely independent and thusseverable from the physical instances.So many implicit assumption. You seem again to assume the physical.For the sake of this interaction between you and I via email (orby any other means!) one must assume the physical.

`Like Quentin told you a lot, we do assume the physical in comp. We do`

`not assume the primitively physical. Neither primitive matter, nor`

`physicalism.`

That is exactly the point that I have been trying to get you tounderstand. Without the physical, there is no way for interaction tooccur between computations. Computations, ala Church-Turing machineare strictly closed system. This is well known, except to you, itseems.Even Plato's idea of the Forms as "casting shadows on the wallof the cave" tacitly assumes continuity between the Forms and whatwe the ideas in our individual minds. If I am not mistaken the ideaof conic sections where used to argue the idea. Shadow orprojections cannot be severed from the object casting them!Which can be N, +, *.How? Where in {N, +, *} is there a action potential? You have bydefinition eliminated all forms of action in step 8, therefore anyappeal to actions is a gross contradiction.

`But this is false. "IN" arithmetic, as seen from inside, computations`

`can interact. Indeed the UD dovetails on all possible interaction. For`

`you to be correct, you need non Turing emulable interaction, and that`

`would make comp false.`

You cannot expect the results of physical behavior to occur when thephysical has been eliminated.

`The physical is not eliminated. On the contrary the mind-body problem`

`is reduced to the problem of justifying the physical from the`

`arithmetical.`

2) The same with "2+2=4 written on some paper". It is also astable pattern in the computations going through your state. Hereyou might just refer to what you have learned in school, and youmight considered that the truth referred by that sentence on apaper is more stable than a cat, but the conscious perception ofcat or ink on paper admits the same explanation: some universalnumber reflect a pattern belonging to almost all computations goingthrough your state. You have to take the first person indeterminacyinto account, and keep in mind that your immediate future isdetermined by an infinity of computations/universal number, goingthrough your actual state. For example, all the Heisenberg matricescomputing the state of the galaxy at some description level forsome amount of steps. They all provably exist independently of usin a tiny part of elementary arithmetic, and admit at least as manyvariants as there are possible electron location in their energylevel orbitals.This paragraph 2) gets dangerously close to my criticism ofyour scheme and so it might help us come to some mutualunderstanding. For me, the "truth of the sentence 2+2=4" (i willdenote this as X) is not the same thing as the "piece of paper withthe symbols '2+2=4' on it" (I will denote this as Y).That's part of my point.OK, what is it that is making the distinction between them?

I was explaining that. See below.

What is the "pattern belonging to almost all computations goingthrough [one observers] state" generating in your thinking? Both Xand Y?X is far more general than Y. Y is not even well defined, only "thetruth that some numbers observe something like Y". Y belongs only tothe extension of human-like numbers belonging to stable extension infront of piece of paper-like objects. X belongs to all consistentextensions.I really don't understand this remark. I can only speculate aboutit. At some point you need to deal with how "truth" is defined. Youseem to be using something like Kant's "a priori synthetic" idea. Iwould like to better understand how "truth" is defined in thePlatonist picture.

`I use the common truth theory by Tarski, which is, for arithmetic, the`

`same as used in high school and by laymen.`

My understanding of "truth" follows a Kripkean definition; somethinglike: X is true if there is at least one accessible (by theevaluator) world that has a model of X.

`This defined consistency, not truth. As you know I used Kripke for the`

`epistemologies, not the ontology.`

This implies that for X to be true there must exist a condition thatcould make X false, otherwise truth is a meaningless concept

Of course. No problem with that.

For me, X and Y are duals that are related by the fact that thereexists at least one physical instance (experienced by multipleobservers in a incontrovertible way) that implements arepresentation of "2+2=4". Similarly by the duality relation as I amusing it, the particular abstract statement, "2+2=4" is true becausethere exists multiple observers that agree on its truth.That is idealism.Please elaborate!

`To believe that "2+2=4" needs observers is an idealist conception of`

`arithmetic. It makes comp wrong at the start. Church thesis is`

`meaningless with such a conception of arithmetic. You can't defined the`

`meaning of a "a program which does not stop without anyone being able`

`to prove that it does not stop".`

Truths are conditional in my accounting. They are only absoluteif they are incontrovertible over *all possible* observers. Truthsdo not exist independent of observers, they are not severable fromthe possibility of observation of instances of their physicalimplementation.That is shown the case, in some sense, for physical truth. But weneed some theory to start. You have not presented one, and this makesmany of your statement philosophically or metaphysically, ortheologically ambiguous. This is troubling when you present them asmaking invalid a derivation, which should be theory independent. Comp-> non physicalism is valid independently of comp.Physical truths are instances of physical systems that are exactmodels of themselves in the sense of Wolfram (explained above).

`Give a precise quote please. In any case, nothing can model itself per`

`se, in the comp sense of modeling, and Wolfram point has noting to do`

`with physics. Complex process needing to be computed to get an`

`emulation abounds in arithmetic.`

I cannot be sure if this helps you as it relies to somefamiliarity with the first person indeterminacy and the fact thatour comp states are distributed in an infinity of distinct, from athird person pov, computations (existing in arithmetic).Bruno?1p indeterminancy requires the evaluation of the diary entriesfor a 3p definition of the differences between, say "Being in Moscow"contra "Being in Helsinki".

This is fuzzy. I can agree, but see no problem there.

One's theory must postulate the prior possibility of multiplicity oflocations or instances that are distinguishable and that is notpossible if there is not an observer (up to functionalequivalence!). Does this help you understand my claim?The theory is arithmetic. You can prove in arithmetic the existenceof the multiple instances and their relative situations. And thisleads to a problem, indeed. An interesting problem in math andphysics capable of testing the comp idea, or of challenging theclassical theory of knowledge.Arithmetic is not a single unique entity (there exist manyself-non-contradictory models of arithmetic)

`Yes, but all what you can prove in arithmetic theory like PA will be`

`true in all those models, by Gödel's completeness result.`

and is not primitive (as it is not neutral).

It is primitive, as choice of an easy starting theory.

`It is primitive, as being not definable in any theory assuming less or`

`equivalent.`

`And it is neutral, in the philosophy of mind sense of being neutral`

`with respect to mind and matter.`

`This post was entitled "contra-step 8", and does not address at all the`

`step 8. You did not answer my question on the 323 principle, as I have`

`restate it for you. You continue to avoid the reasoning to just explain`

`that somehow you want to keep comp and physicalism from philosophical`

`conviction, instead of using that conviction to find a flaw in the`

`proof.`

Bruno

`PS I have a connection problem, and I might take some time to reply. It`

`is an opportunity to search the MGA posts (Movie Graph Argument) and`

`try to find the flaw.`

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