On 7/15/2012 11:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

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On 14 Jul 2012, at 18:48, Stephen P. King wrote:On 7/14/2012 5:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 14 Jul 2012, at 11:16, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:On 14.07.2012 11:00 Bruno Marchal said the following:On 14 Jul 2012, at 10:42, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:...If to speak about your theorem, it is unclear to me, how the first person view accesses numbers and mathematical objects.Like a digital machine, which can access numbers encoded in their memory, through logical gates, and so one. More details are given currently on the FOAR list, but the idea is simple, with comp our bodies are statistical first person constructs related to infinities of number relations, so we access to them a bit like a fish can access water. The price of this is that we have to abandon physicalism eventually.I am not sure if I understand. I would like to have an explanationfor a phenomenon, for example1) I see a cat; 2) I see a piece of paper with 2 + 2 = 4. Yet, when you start explaining, the phenomenon seems to disappear.1) I see a cat. This is explained by the fact that your currentcomputational state belongs to an infinity of computations makingyou singling out some stable patterns that you recognize, by accessto your previous experience as being cat. The qualia itself isexplained by the fact that when you refer to the cat, you are reallyreferring to yourself (with the implicit hope that it corresponds tosome relatively independent pattern), and the math shows that such aself-reference involves some true but non rationally communicablefeature. The math explained why, if this justification is correct,machines/numbers will not be entirely satisfied by it, for the firstperson is not a machine from its own first person view.Hi Bruno,No, the reverse is the case. The "belongs to an infinity ofcomputations making you singling out some stable patterns" requiresthe prior existence of the "you" to select it.With comp, you, the dreamer's bodies, and its soul, already exist (indifferent modal sense) in arithmetic. Provably so, even in Robinsonarithmetic, for the 3-view.

`Is the selection made on the entities defined by the arithmetic?`

`How are these entities given such that they are simultaneous for the`

`selection function? Do they form a set of some kind? If so, what kind of`

`set is it?`

The observer (you here) effectively is the measure via aself-selection rule.This makes no sense.

`Are you familiar with Bostrom's SSA`

`<http://meteuphoric.wordpress.com/anthropic-principles/>? I am merely`

`assuming that any observer can experience a universe compatible with its`

`existence. This would hold even for Boltzmann brains that might happen`

`to occur in universes with physical laws that are hostile to life. Such`

`would experience a world that is compatible with their experience`

`(qualia), even if such is completely a fiction. But these are almost`

`solipsistic as their is a vanishing probability that other Bolztman`

`brains would have experiences that would have events what would be`

`bisimilar to each other.`

I cannot discount my own existence given the immediate fact that I amexperiencing myself as existing.You cannot discount the first person experience. But comp does notdiscount it. It explains how it arises from the ability of numbers toobserve themselves and extrapolate, etc.

`I cannot discount it, it is the one thing that cannot be denied`

`without contradiction. This was deeply examined by Descartes that lead`

`to his famous "cogito ergo sum".`

Descartes' Cognito ergo Sum is a pointed statement of thisunassailable fact. We cannot put the observer on a level that isemerging from the computations if the observer is the one that isselecting the class of computations that are generating said observer.? You refute Darwin too?

`How would you imagine that I would "refute Darwin"? I see mutation`

`and selection as a basic principle at work here, e.g. Darwin rit large.`

A possible escape from this is to allow for non-well founded sets andsuch things as non-principle ultrafilters<http://mathoverflow.net/questions/15872/non-principal-ultrafilters-on>,but I don't know your stand on their existence.Good tools.Our observation of the cat is a symmetric (within bounds)relationship, otherwise we fall into solipsism.?

`If I observe a cat, for example, and the cat cannot observe me,`

`then it follows that for the cat, I do not exist.`

My claim is that the same thing follows for mathematical entities. Wecannot claim that mathematical (or any other "abstract" entity!) issuch that we (the observers and understanders thereof) are emergingfrom them.Prove that claim. Then by UDA, you refute comp.

`The fact that the only efficient simulation of a physical system of`

`sufficient complexity is the evolution of that system itself is my`

`proof. This was explained well by Stephen Wolfram in this article:`

`http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/physics/85-undecidability/2/text.html`

The proof already exists for you to inspect.

This would require that the "independence" is not and cannot be anunbridgeable gap at all, but a analytic continuum connecting theparticular instance of a physical system with the knowledge andmeaning of the abstraction. Maths do not refer explicitly to thephysical media that they are represented upon by patterns, but thisdoes not allow us to imagine them as completely independent and thusseverable from the physical instances.So many implicit assumption. You seem again to assume the physical.

`For the sake of this interaction between you and I via email (or by`

`any other means!) one must assume the physical. That is exactly the`

`point that I have been trying to get you to understand. Without the`

`physical, there is no way for interaction to occur between computations.`

`Computations, ala Church-Turing machine are strictly closed system. This`

`is well known, except to you, it seems.`

Even Plato's idea of the Forms as "casting shadows on the wall ofthe cave" tacitly assumes continuity between the Forms and what wethe ideas in our individual minds. If I am not mistaken the idea ofconic sections where used to argue the idea. Shadow or projectionscannot be severed from the object casting them!Which can be N, +, *.

`How? Where in {N, +, *} is there a action potential? You have by`

`definition eliminated all forms of action in step 8, therefore any`

`appeal to actions is a gross contradiction. You cannot expect the`

`results of physical behavior to occur when the physical has been`

`eliminated.`

2) The same with "2+2=4 written on some paper". It is also a stablepattern in the computations going through your state. Here you mightjust refer to what you have learned in school, and you mightconsidered that the truth referred by that sentence on a paper ismore stable than a cat, but the conscious perception of cat or inkon paper admits the same explanation: some universal number reflecta pattern belonging to almost all computations going through yourstate. You have to take the first person indeterminacy into account,and keep in mind that your immediate future is determined by aninfinity of computations/universal number, going through your actualstate. For example, all the Heisenberg matrices computing the stateof the galaxy at some description level for some amount of steps.They all provably exist independently of us in a tiny part ofelementary arithmetic, and admit at least as many variants as thereare possible electron location in their energy level orbitals.This paragraph 2) gets dangerously close to my criticism of yourscheme and so it might help us come to some mutual understanding.For me, the "truth of the sentence 2+2=4" (i will denote this as X)is not the same thing as the "piece of paper with the symbols '2+2=4'on it" (I will denote this as Y).That's part of my point.

OK, what is it that is making the distinction between them?

What is the "pattern belonging to almost all computations goingthrough [one observers] state" generating in your thinking? Both Xand Y?X is far more general than Y. Y is not even well defined, only "thetruth that some numbers observe something like Y". Y belongs only tothe extension of human-like numbers belonging to stable extension infront of piece of paper-like objects. X belongs to all consistentextensions.

`I really don't understand this remark. I can only speculate about`

`it. At some point you need to deal with how "truth" is defined. You seem`

`to be using something like Kant's "a priori synthetic" idea. I would`

`like to better understand how "truth" is defined in the Platonist`

`picture. My understanding of "truth" follows a Kripkean definition;`

`something like: X is true if there is at least one accessible (by the`

`evaluator) world that has a model of X. This implies that for X to be`

`true there must exist a condition that could make X false, otherwise`

`truth is a meaningless concept`

For me, X and Y are duals that are related by the fact that thereexists at least one physical instance (experienced by multipleobservers in a incontrovertible way) that implements a representationof "2+2=4". Similarly by the duality relation as I am using it, theparticular abstract statement, "2+2=4" is true because there existsmultiple observers that agree on its truth.That is idealism.

Please elaborate!

Truths are conditional in my accounting. They are only absoluteif they are incontrovertible over *all possible* observers. Truths donot exist independent of observers, they are not severable from thepossibility of observation of instances of their physical implementation.That is shown the case, in some sense, for physical truth. But we needsome theory to start. You have not presented one, and this makes manyof your statement philosophically or metaphysically, or theologicallyambiguous. This is troubling when you present them as making invalid aderivation, which should be theory independent. Comp -> nonphysicalism is valid independently of comp.

`Physical truths are instances of physical systems that are exact`

`models of themselves in the sense of Wolfram (explained above).`

I cannot be sure if this helps you as it relies to some familiaritywith the first person indeterminacy and the fact that our compstates are distributed in an infinity of distinct, from a thirdperson pov, computations (existing in arithmetic).BrunoAs I see it, 1p indeterminacy is strictly an a posteriori condition.?

`1p indeterminancy requires the evaluation of the diary entries for`

`a 3p definition of the differences between, say "Being in Moscow" contra`

`"Being in Helsinki".`

One's theory must postulate the prior possibility of multiplicity oflocations or instances that are distinguishable and that is notpossible if there is not an observer (up to functional equivalence!).Does this help you understand my claim?The theory is arithmetic. You can prove in arithmetic the existence ofthe multiple instances and their relative situations. And this leadsto a problem, indeed. An interesting problem in math and physicscapable of testing the comp idea, or of challenging the classicaltheory of knowledge.

`Arithmetic is not a single unique entity (there exist many`

`self-non-contradictory models of arithmetic) and is not primitive (as it`

`is not neutral).`

-- Onward! Stephen "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.