Hi Bruno Marchal 

Well, I feel like Daniel must have felt when before the Giant. 
And I can't even find a rock to sling.

Nevertheless, as I see it, computers are imprisoned by language (computer code).
Like our social selves.  But like Kierkegaard, I believe that ultimate truth
is subjective (can, like meaning, only be experienced).  Life
cannot truly be expressed or experienced in code.





Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012 
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-12, 05:13:01
Subject: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model




On 11 Aug 2012, at 12:47, Roger wrote:


Hi Alberto G. Corona

Agreed. Computers are quantitative instruments and so cannot have a self or
feelings, which are qualitative. And intution is non-computable IMHO.


Computer have a notion of self. I can explain someday (I already have, and it 
is the base of all I am working on).


Better, they can already prove that their self has a qualitative components. 
They can prove to herself and to us, that their qualitative self, which is the 
knower, is not  nameable.  Machines, like PA or ZF,  can already prove that 
intuition is non-computable by themselves.


You confuse the notion of machine before and after G del, I'm afraid. You might 
study some good book on theoretical computer science. Today we have progressed 
a lot in the sense that we are open to the idea that we don't know what machine 
are capable of, and we can prove this if we bet we are machine (comp).


Bruno










Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/11/2012 
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Alberto G. Corona 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-11, 04:08:29
Subject: Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ?


The Dennet conception is made to avoid an agent in the first place because i 
so, it whould be legitimate to question what is the agent made of an thus going 
trough an infinite regression.
The question of the agent is the vivid intuition for which there are ingenious 
evolutionary explanations which i may subscribe. But a robot would implement 
such computations and still I deeply doubt about his internal notion oof self, 
his quialia etc. The best response to many questions for the shake of avooiding 
premature dogmatic closeness is to say "we don't know"
El 11/08/2012 07:57, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> escribi :
>
> Hi Roger,
>
> ? I have noticed and read your posts. Might you write some remarks about 
> Leibniz' concept of pre-established harmony?
>
>
>
> On 8/10/2012 8:53 AM, Roger wrote:
>>
>> Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say
>> contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your
>> monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling
>> agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and
>> neurophilosophy.
>
>
>
> -- 
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." 
> ~ Francis Bacon
>
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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