Roger,

You say computers are quantitative instruments which cannot have a self or
feelings, but might you be attributing things at the wrong level?  For
example, a computer can simulate some particle interactions, a sufficiently
big computer could simulate the behavior of any arbitrarily large amount of
matter.  The matter in the simulation could be arranged in the form of a
human being sitting in a room.

Do you think this simulated human made of simulated matter, all run within
the computer not have a self, feelings, and intuition?  After all, we are
made up of material which lacks feelings, nonetheless, we have feelings.
 Where do you believe these feelings originate?

Jason

On Sat, Aug 11, 2012 at 5:47 AM, Roger <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  Hi Alberto G. Corona
>
> Agreed. Computers are quantitative instruments and so cannot have a self or
> feelings, which are qualitative. And intution is non-computable IMHO.
>
>
> Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
> 8/11/2012
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-08-11, 04:08:29
> *Subject:* Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of
> stuff ?
>
>   The Dennet conception is made to avoid an agent in the first place
> because i so, it whould be legitimate to question what is the agent made of
> an thus going trough an infinite regression.
>
> The question of the agent is the vivid intuition for which there are
> ingenious evolutionary explanations which i may subscribe. But a robot
> would implement such computations and still I deeply doubt about his
> internal notion oof self, his quialia etc. The best response to many
> questions for the shake of avooiding premature dogmatic closeness is to say
> "we don't know"
>
> El 11/08/2012 07:57, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> escribi�:
> >
> > Hi Roger,
> >
> > 牋� I have noticed and read your posts. Might you write some remarks
> about Leibniz' concept of pre-established harmony?
> >
> >
> >
> > On 8/10/2012 8:53 AM, Roger wrote:
> >>
> >> Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say
> >> contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your
> >> monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling
> >> agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and
> >> neurophilosophy.
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Onward!
> >
> > Stephen
> >
> > "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
> > ~ Francis Bacon
> >
> > --
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
> Groups "Everything List" group.
> > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> > For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to