Hi Jason Resch 

No, the artificial man does not have a conscious self (subjectivity)  to
experience (to feel) the world. You could show a movie of happenings 
in his mind, but there'd be nobody there to watch it.  

Only a monad can do that.


Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012 
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Jason Resch 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-11, 15:01:41
Subject: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model


Roger,


You say computers are quantitative instruments which cannot have a self or 
feelings, but might you be attributing things at the wrong level?  For example, 
a computer can simulate some particle interactions, a sufficiently big computer 
could simulate the behavior of any arbitrarily large amount of matter.  The 
matter in the simulation could be arranged in the form of a human being sitting 
in a room.


Do you think this simulated human made of simulated matter, all run within the 
computer not have a self, feelings, and intuition?  After all, we are made up 
of material which lacks feelings, nonetheless, we have feelings.  Where do you 
believe these feelings originate?


Jason


On Sat, Aug 11, 2012 at 5:47 AM, Roger <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:

Hi Alberto G. Corona
 
Agreed. Computers are quantitative instruments and so cannot have a self or
feelings, which are qualitative. And intution is non-computable IMHO.
 
 
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/11/2012 
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Alberto G. Corona 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-11, 04:08:29
Subject: Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ?


The Dennet conception is made to avoid an agent in the first place because i 
so, it whould be legitimate to question what is the agent made of an thus going 
trough an infinite regression.
The question of the agent is the vivid intuition for which there are ingenious 
evolutionary explanations which i may subscribe. But a robot would implement 
such computations and still I deeply doubt about his internal notion oof self, 
his quialia etc. The best response to many questions for the shake of avooiding 
premature dogmatic closeness is to say "we don't know"
El 11/08/2012 07:57, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> escribi :
>
> Hi Roger,
>
> ? I have noticed and read your posts. Might you write some remarks about 
> Leibniz' concept of pre-established harmony?
>
>
>
> On 8/10/2012 8:53 AM, Roger wrote:
>>
>> Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say
>> contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your
>> monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling
>> agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and
>> neurophilosophy.
>
>
>
> -- 
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." 
> ~ Francis Bacon
>
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