On Sunday, September 16, 2012 2:42:20 PM UTC-4, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> According to Strawson, what exists as a thing is
> SUBJECT OF EXPERIENCE-AS-SINGLE-MENTAL-THING
> for short SESMET.
> Hence no contradiction.
I think the word 'exists' can be confusing. I reserve the term 'insist' for
phenomenological subjects. Through my mental participation, I can insist
that Bugs Bunny's dog is a 'thing', but to say that this is a single thing
that now exists in the universe is misleading. I try to reserve 'exist' for
the contents of exterior public realism.
Subjects then, are never a single anything, but rather neither single nor
multiple experiential potentials. They are trans-rational and
a-mereological diffractions which vary and resist varying to different
extents in different contexts of perception and participation. Subjects are
the opposite of things. They have no location or appearance, but they also
do not lack a location or appearance. They are qualia.
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