You may want to look at

Galen Strawson, Selves: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics

He proves that selves exist. Interestingly enough he does it based on the materialist framework.

p. 11 “For the moment, though, the brief is to show that selves exist, and that they’re things or objects or ‘substances’ of some sort, and hence, given materialism, physical objects. One possibility is that there are in fact no better candidates for the title of ‘physical object’ than selves – even if there are others that are as good.”

p. 11 “This last suggestion is likely to strike many as obviously false, but this reaction may stem in part from a failure to think through what it is for something to be physical, on a genuine or realistic materialist view, and, equally, from a failure to think through what it is for something to be a thing or object.”


On 08.09.2012 15:10 Craig Weinberg said the following:
Here I present another metaphor to encapsulate by view of the
relation between consciousness, information, and physicality by
demonstrating the inadequacy of functionalist, computationalist, and
materialist models and how they paint over the hard problem of
consciousness with a choice of two flavors of the easy problem.

I came up with this thought exercise in response to this lecture:

 Consider "Alice in Wonderland"

Let's say that Alice is trying to decide whether she can describe
herself in terms of being composed of the syntax of the letters,
words, and sentences of the story from which she emerges, or whether
she is composed of the bleached and pressed wood pulp and ink that
are considered page parts of the whole book.

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at

Reply via email to