I don't think there is much in the way of "common sense" if you want an explanation of consciousness from comp. I think it is fairly non-intuitive. The mainstream account which holds both comp and materialism doesn't address it. The only account I know of that explains consciousness from comp is Bruno's - and that is probably the polar opposite to "common sense"!
Terren On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 7:10 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > I think that comp is almost true, except for when applied to consciousness > itself, in which case it is exactly false. I wasn't asserting it so much as > I was illustrating exactly why that is the case. Does anyone have any common > sense analogy or story which makes sense of comp as a generator of > consciousness? > > Craig > > > On Monday, September 17, 2012 6:37:39 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: >> >> On 9/17/2012 5:41 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: >> > On Mon, Sep 17, 2012 at 4:26 PM, Stephen P. King <[email protected]> >> > wrote: >> >> On 9/17/2012 1:20 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: >> >>> Stephen - the Matrix video is a faithful interpretation of comp, but >> >>> Craig's story is not, unless he includes the crucial narrative - that >> >>> of the simulated Craig eating the simulated meal. I expect Craig to >> >>> say that the simulated Craig, the one making the yummy noises, is a >> >>> zombie, and has no actual experience or inner narrative. He is >> >>> entitled of course to that position. He is just saying no to the >> >>> doctor. >> >>> >> >>> Terren >> >> Dear Terren, >> >> >> >> You are completely missing his point. He is highlighting the fact >> >> that >> >> there is a difference that makes a difference between the case of "of >> >> the >> >> simulated Craig eating the simulated meal" and "of the "real" Craig >> >> eating >> >> the "real" meal". There has to be a "grundlagen" level at which there >> >> is not >> >> a "simulation", there has to be a "real thing" that the simulations are >> >> some >> >> deformed copy of. I have postulated, following an idea from Stephen >> >> Woolfram, that a physical system (in its evolution) in the "real word" >> >> *is* >> >> the best possible "simulation" and thus it is literally the "real >> >> thing" >> >> that all images that we might have of it in our minds are mere >> >> simulations. >> >> Craig is diving deep into this idea and looking at it "from the >> >> inside" >> >> and reporting to us his observations. >> > Craig is just asserting that comp is false. The Matrix video only >> > makes sense if you assume comp. The fact that you called that video >> > the "matrix version of Craig's story" was confusing to me because the >> > two rest on different assumptions. The movie shows us the character >> > eating and enjoying the simulated steak. In Craig's story he has no >> > experience of it. >> > >> > If you assume comp then there is no "primary real" version of anything >> > (by the movie graph argument). Real is only phenomenological, like a >> > dream. You can never know, not even in principle, whether you are the >> > "real" version, it doesn't even make sense to ask the question. Below >> > the substitution level, there are an infinite ocean of universal >> > machines that instantiate your current state. >> > >> > Terren >> > >> Hi Terren, >> >> "Comp is false" is too strong. He is explaining how comp is >> "incomplete". The movie graph argument is flawed. >> >> -- >> Onward! >> >> Stephen >> >> http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/SNzEvkmgMbwJ. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
