ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal 

I think we should only use the word "exists" only when we are 
referring to physical existence. 

BRUNO: Hmm.... That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human 
penchant. 

ROGER: Why ? Naturalist and materialist entities are extended and so physically 
exist. 
What I say here is how I think Leibniz would respond. 

Thus I can truthfully say, 
for example, that God does not exist. 
Wikipedia says, "In common usage, it [existence] 
is the world we are aware of through our senses, 
and that persists independently without them." 

BRUNO: But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you 
observe the moon, it is not "really" there. 

ROGER: Yes it is. Although I observe the moon phenomenologically, it still has 
physical existence in spacetime 
because it is extended. At least that's Leibniz' position, namely that 
phenomena, although illusions, 
still have physical presence. Leibniz refers to these as "well-founded 
phenomena." You can still stub your toe on 
phenomenological rocks. 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence 


On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz, 
take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas 
and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space, 
anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out 
there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz, 
I would say of such things that they live, since life has 
such attributes. 

BRUNO: Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian 
numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living. 
You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer 
that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that 
a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible. 

Plato's One is a special case, saince it is a monad of monads,

And more esoteric thinking treats numbers more as beings: 

http://supertarot.co.uk/westcott/monad.htm

BRUNO:  The person and its body. OK. For the term "exist" I think we should 
allow all reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the 
use. 


With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their 
arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc. 


That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the 
physics as a subpart). 


Bruno 

ROGER: You lost me, except I believe that a main part of confusion and 
disagreement on this list
comes because of multiple meanings of the word "exists",
which brings me back to where I started:


I think we should only use the word "exists" only when we are 
referring to physical (extended) existence.

============================================================================================


----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-21, 04:10:52 
Subject: Re: Numbers in Space 




On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote: 


On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: 



On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: 




It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already 
there. The problem is learning their results. 

The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do 
anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. 
We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without 
something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it 
makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant 
to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed 
non-locally. Why 'do' anything? 


Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia. 



Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, 
nothing is done. The computations are already "done" in it. "doing things" is a 
relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives. 


Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to 
Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to 
the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings. 


Bruno 











-- 
Onward! 

Stephen 

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html 


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ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal 

I think we should only use the word "exists" only when we are 
referring to physical existence. 

BRUNO: Hmm.... That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human 
penchant. 

ROGER: Why ? Naturalist and materialist entities are extended and so physically 
exist. 
What I say here is how I think Leibniz would respond. 

Thus I can truthfully say, 
for example, that God does not exist. 
Wikipedia says, "In common usage, it [existence] 
is the world we are aware of through our senses, 
and that persists independently without them." 

BRUNO: But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you 
observe the moon, it is not "really" there. 

ROGER: Yes it is. Although I observe the moon phenomenologically, it still has 
physical existence in spacetime 
because it is extended. At least that's Leibniz' position, namely that 
phenomena, although illusions, 
still have physical presence. Leibniz refers to these as "well-founded 
phenomena." You can still stub your toe on 
phenomenological rocks. 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence 

On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz, 
take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas 
and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space, 
anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out 
there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz, 
I would say of such things that they live, since life has 
such attributes. 

BRUNO: Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian 
numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living. 
You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer 
that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that 
a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible. 

ROGER: I'm not sure, but I think you're probably right and I was wrong. Living 
things change, numbers do not change. 

ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal 

I think we should only use the word "exists" only when we are 
referring to physical existence. 

BRUNO: Hmm.... That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human 
penchant. 

ROGER: Why ? Naturalist and materialist entities are extended and so physically 
exist. 
What I say here is how I think Leibniz would respond. 

Thus I can truthfully say, 
for example, that God does not exist. 
Wikipedia says, "In common usage, it [existence] 
is the world we are aware of through our senses, 
and that persists independently without them." 

BRUNO: But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you 
observe the moon, it is not "really" there. 

ROGER: Yes it is. Although I observe the moon phenomenologically, it still has 
physical existence in spacetime 
because it is extended. At least that's Leibniz' position, namely that 
phenomena, although illusions, 
still have physical presence. Leibniz refers to these as "well-founded 
phenomena." You can still stub your toe on 
phenomenological rocks. 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence 

On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz, 
take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas 
and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space, 
anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out 
there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz, 
I would say of such things that they live, since life has 
such attributes. 

BRUNO: Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian 
numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living. 
You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer 
that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that 
a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible. 

ROGER: I'm not sure, but I think you're probably right and I was wrong. Living 
things change, numbers do not change. 
f man as a mental or 
living being. 



The person and its body. OK. For the term "exist" I think we should allow all 
reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the use. 


With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their 
arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc. 


That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the 
physics as a subpart). 


Bruno 







----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-21, 04:10:52 
Subject: Re: Numbers in Space 




On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote: 


On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: 



On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: 




It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already 
there. The problem is learning their results. 

The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do 
anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. 
We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without 
something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it 
makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant 
to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed 
non-locally. Why 'do' anything? 


Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia. 



Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, 
nothing is done. The computations are already "done" in it. "doing things" is a 
relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives. 


Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to 
Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to 
the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings. 


Bruno 











-- 
Onward! 

Stephen 

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html 


-- 
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



The person and its body. 

BRRUNO: OK. For the term "exist" I think we should allow all reading, and just 
ask people to remind us of the sense before the use. 


With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their 
arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc. 


That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the 
physics as a subpart). 


Bruno 







----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-21, 04:10:52 
Subject: Re: Numbers in Space 




On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote: 


On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: 



On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: 




It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already 
there. The problem is learning their results. 

The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do 
anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. 
We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without 
something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it 
makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant 
to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed 
non-locally. Why 'do' anything? 


Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia. 



Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, 
nothing is done. The computations are already "done" in it. "doing things" is a 
relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives. 


Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to 
Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to 
the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings. 


Bruno 











-- 
Onward! 

Stephen 

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html 


-- 
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



ROGER: I'm not sure, but I think you're probably right and I was wrong. Living 
things change, numbers do not change. 
f man as a mental or 
living being. 



The person and its body. OK. For the term "exist" I think we should allow all 
reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the use. 


With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their 
arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc. 


That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the 
physics as a subpart). 


Bruno 







----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Bruno Marchal 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-21, 04:10:52 
Subject: Re: Numbers in Space 




On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote: 


On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: 



On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote: 




It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already 
there. The problem is learning their results. 

The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do 
anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. 
We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without 
something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it 
makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant 
to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed 
non-locally. Why 'do' anything? 


   Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt 
Olympia. 



Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, 
nothing is done. The computations are already "done" in it. "doing things" is a 
relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives. 


Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to 
Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to 
the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings. 


Bruno 











-- 
Onward! 

Stephen 

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html 


-- 
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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 

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