The unavoidable speculative nature of neumena makes existence uncertain to the most deep level. All we have is the phenomena, that are mental. So certainty of existence has meaning within an space of shared conscience of believers that have, by various mental processes, "certainty" of existence of somethig.
2012/9/24 Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com> > Hi Stephen, > Any idea about whatever is outside of the mind (noumena, thing it itself > as Kant named it) before it is experienced as phenomena is and will > remain speculative forever. By definition. But this does not prohibit our > speculations... > > > 2012/9/23 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> > > On 9/23/2012 6:18 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >> >> This is my schema. >> >> Can you complete/ammend it? >> >> Things in themselves (noumena) -> - Have a computational nature >> (Bruno) : few components: numbers, + * >> - Is just a >> mathematical manyfold(Me), few components: equations >> - Are Monadic >> (Roger). many components >> - Are phisical: >> includes the "phisical world" with: space, time persons, cars. >> (physicalists) >> >> Things perceived (phenomena) -> - Relies on the architecture of the >> mind, the activity of the brain (a local arangement that >> keep entropy >> constant along a direction in space-time, the product of natural selection >> Therefore, >> existence is selected (Me) >> - The mind is a >> robust computation -and therefore implies a certain selection- (Bruno) >> - Are created by >> the activity of the supreme monad (Roger) >> - Does not matter >> (physicalists) >> >> >> Hi Alberto, >> >> As I see it, the idea that the noumena are specific and definite >> without being given in association with phenomena is false as it implies >> that the "things in themselves"" have innate properties for no reason >> whatsoever... >> >> >> >> 2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> >> >>> >>> On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote: >>> >>> >>> With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and >>> their arithmetical epistemological version, like ExP(x), or >>> <>Ex<>P(x), etc. >>> >>> >>> Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence >>> contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human >>> whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through you here. >>> >>> >>> Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such existence >>> does not makes such existence contingent at all. Only the stipulation is >>> contingent, not its content, which can be considered as absolute, as we >>> work in the standard model (by the very definition of comp: we work with >>> standard comp (we would not say "yes" to a doctor if he propose a non >>> standard cording of our brain). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains >>> the physics as a subpart). >>> >>> >>> Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must >>> flow from pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for >>> this task. >>> >>> >>> First our model is not finite, only our theories and machines are. And >>> the AUDA illustrates clearly that theology's shape (the hypostases) follows >>> pure necessity, even if all machine will define a particular arithmetical >>> content for each theology, but this is natural, as it concerns the private >>> life of individual machine (it is the same for us by default in all >>> religion). >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> Onward! >> >> Stephen >> http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > > > -- > Alberto. > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.