On 23 Sep 2012, at 12:18, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

This is my schema.

Can you complete/ammend it?

Things in themselves (noumena) -> - Have a computational nature (Bruno) : few components: numbers, + *

OK, for the chosen basic ontology. Numbers, and theor additive and multiplicative laws. That is enough, as is any Turing complete ontology. I would not described the numbers has components, though, because this could lead to the misleading idea that that what exists might be made of numbers, and that is a physicalist non correct view of how what exist epistemologically emerges (through complex number relations and their epistemological content which can be shown to exists once we assume computationalism). Also, if the things in themselves have a computational nature (addition and multiplication are computable, the whole thing is not, as arithmetical truth is not computable at all, and will play an important role in the emergence of the epistemological reality. In particular, the internal epistemological realities will have many non computable features, like machines and programs have too).




- Is just a mathematical manyfold(Me), few components: equations - Are Monadic (Roger). many components - Are phisical: includes the "phisical world" with: space, time persons, cars. (physicalists)

Things perceived (phenomena) -> - Relies on the architecture of the mind, the activity of the brain (a local arangement that keep entropy constant along a direction in space-time, the product of natural selection Therefore, existence is selected (Me)

Is not a brain something perceived? Is that not circular? I can understand "relies on the architecture of the mind" (the dreams of the universal number), but what is a brain? what is time, space, nature?


- The mind is a robust computation -and therefore implies a certain selection- (Bruno)

The 1-mind is not a computation, but a selection of a infinity of computation among an infinity of computations.



- Are created by the activity of the supreme monad (Roger) - Does not matter (physicalists)


Hmm... Many physicalists, notably when computationalist, believe that the mind is real, and can matter. Only, when they use comp to justify this, or to pretend the mind-body problem is solved by comp, they are inconsistent (as shown normally by the UD Argument).

I am not sure if your theory take or not the first person indeterminacy into account. Do you agree(*) with UDA 1-4 ?

Bruno

(*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html




2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>

On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote:


With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc.

Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through you here.

Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such existence does not makes such existence contingent at all. Only the stipulation is contingent, not its content, which can be considered as absolute, as we work in the standard model (by the very definition of comp: we work with standard comp (we would not say "yes" to a doctor if he propose a non standard cording of our brain).






That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart).

Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must flow from pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for this task.

First our model is not finite, only our theories and machines are. And the AUDA illustrates clearly that theology's shape (the hypostases) follows pure necessity, even if all machine will define a particular arithmetical content for each theology, but this is natural, as it concerns the private life of individual machine (it is the same for us by default in all religion).

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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