Hi Stephen P. King  

What's in a name ?

If you have a better word for what I have been calling
physical existence, please say it.

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 

----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Stephen P. King  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-22, 14:05:04 
Subject: Re: What is 'Existence'? 

On 9/22/2012 5:25 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 

ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal  

I think we should only use the word "exists" only when we are  
referring to physical existence.  

Dear Roger, 

    I think the exact opposite. We should NEVER use the word exists in 
reference to what is merely the subject of human perception, aka "physical 

BRUNO: Hmm.... That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human 

    Just a tad... 

ROGER: Why ? Naturalist and materialist entities are extended and so physically 

    Why might wish to consider that that "extension" is the result of 
observation and not independent of it. What I just wrote will be controversial, 
as it seems to make "what exists" subject to human whim, but I am trying to 
make a more subtle point. The physical world has properties that we can observe 
by performing observations and we have learned, from very careful experiment 
and logical analysis, that those properties cannot be "definite" prior to the 
measurements. This is not to say that measurements "cause" properties, no. 
Measurements "select" properties. "Objects" prior to measurement have a 
spectrum of "possible properties" and not "definite properties. This is the 
lesson of QM that must be understood. To claim otherwise is to claim that 
nature has a preference for some basis. 
    We to understand that every single act of interaction that occurs in the 
universe is, at some level, an act of measurement. If we consider that there 
are a HUGE number of measurements occurring all around us continuously, that 
this and this alone is responsible for the appearance of a "definite" physical 
world that has properties "objectively". It does this in the sense that that 
definiteness does not depend on the actions of any one individual observations 
or interaction; it depends on the sum over all of the acts of interaction. 

What I say here is how I think Leibniz would respond.  

Thus I can truthfully say,  
for example, that God does not exist.  
Wikipedia says, "In common usage, it [existence]  
is the world we are aware of through our senses,  
and that persists independently without them."  

BRUNO: But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you 
observe the moon, it is not "really" there.  

ROGER: Yes it is. Although I observe the moon phenomenologically, it still has 
physical existence in spacetime  
because it is extended.  

    You are not the only observer of the moon! There is a subtle 
passive-aggressive solipsism in this idea that "the moon exists without me" , 
as if to imply the possibility of the converse: "the moon would not exist 
without me". 

    No, By Leibniz' Monadology, all extensions are an "appearance" and not 
inherent or "innate". The definiteness of the Moon follows from the mutual 
consistency required to occur between the percepts of each and every monad such 
that an "incontrovertible" (empty of inconsistency) relation can exist between 
them. This in the language of computer science is known as "Satisfiability". 

At least that's Leibniz' position, namely that phenomena, although illusions,  
still have physical presence. Leibniz refers to these as "well-founded 
phenomena." You can still stub your toe on  
phenomenological rocks.  

    Yes, but Leibniz' position was that phenomenological appearance flowed 
strictly from the Pre-Established Harmony between monads and had no existence 
or "reality" otherwise. 


"Existence has been variously defined by sources. In common usage, it is the 
world we are aware of through our senses, and that persists independently 
without them. Others define it as everything that is, or simply everything." 

    I am one of those "others". We cannot conflate the definiteness of 
properties that we perceive with the bundling together of those properties in 
some particular location that results because of the requirement of mutual 
consistency of our physical universe. Existence, qua innate possibility to be, 
cannot be constrained by any a prior or contingent upon any a posteriori. It 
must simply be. So leave it alone. 

On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz,  
take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas  
and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space,  
anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out  
there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz,  
I would say of such things that they live, since life has  
such attributes.  

    But Leibniz did not give us a complete and consistent ToE. His P.E.H. is 
deeply flawed and his explanation of the world that logically follows from the 
synchronization of the monad's perceptions  was woefully pedantic and flawed. I 
suspect that he simply did not want to try to speculate on the subject but his 
hand was forced by his need to defend his ideas against the savage attacks from 
the likes of Voltaire and others. 

    I believe that Leibniz' Monadology can be rehabilitated and that it 
presents us with the general outline of a way of thinking that is consistent 
with the message of QM, that there is no preferred basis and that all 
appearances of a physical world are purely phenomenological. Convincing the 
classicists and the substance monists that this is the case, well, not so easy. 

BRUNO: Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian 
numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living.  
You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer 
that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that  
a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible.  

    Of course! It has God, the supreme monad to do this. In QM terms we have 
the idea of the entire universe as a QM system, and we have the mysterious 
Wheeler-Dewitt equation describing its timeless Hamiltonian. 

Plato's One is a special case, since it is a monad of monads, 

    Yes, it was the Completion of all possible monads. It must be complete for 
obvious reasons and it must be Consistent for logical reasons, but if we 
examine this idea carefully, we find that there is a problem. It cannot be both 
simultaneously and be effective. 

And more esoteric thinking treats numbers more as beings:  


BRUNO:  The person and its body. OK. For the term "exist" I think we should 
allow all reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the 

With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their 
arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc.  

    Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence contingent 
upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human whim? It is the 
tool-maker and user that is talking through you here. 

That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the 
physics as a subpart).  

    Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must flow from 
pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for this task. 


ROGER: You lost me, except I believe that a main part of confusion and 
disagreement on this list 
comes because of multiple meanings of the word "exists", 
which brings me back to where I started: 

I think we should only use the word "exists" only when we are  
referring to physical (extended) existence. 


    We agree, Roger, in our disagreement. 




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