Hi Bruno,

With components I mean a neutral enumeration of entities. perhaps
lebnitzian monads would be more appropriate.

Besides numbers + and * I think that is necessary  machines or any kind of
instruction set + an execution unit? . It isn't?

2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>

>
> On 23 Sep 2012, at 12:18, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>
> This is my schema.
>
> Can you complete/ammend it?
>
> Things in themselves (noumena) ->  - Have a computational nature (Bruno) :
> few components: numbers, + *
>
>
> OK, for the chosen basic ontology. Numbers, and theor additive and
> multiplicative laws. That is enough, as is any Turing complete ontology.
> I would not described the numbers has components, though, because this
> could lead to the misleading idea that that what exists might be made of
> numbers, and that is a physicalist non correct view of how what exist
> epistemologically emerges (through complex number relations and their
> epistemological content which can be shown to exists once we assume
> computationalism).
> Also, if the things in themselves have a computational nature (addition
> and multiplication are computable, the whole thing is not, as arithmetical
> truth is not computable at all, and will play an important role in the
> emergence of the epistemological reality. In particular, the internal
> epistemological realities will have many non computable features, like
> machines and programs have too).
>
>
>
>
>                                                          - Is just a
> mathematical manyfold(Me),  few components: equations
>                                                          - Are Monadic
> (Roger). many components
>                                                          - Are phisical:
> includes the "phisical world" with: space, time persons, cars.
> (physicalists)
>
> Things perceived (phenomena) -> - Relies on the architecture of the mind,
> the activity of the brain (a local arangement that
>                                                          keep entropy
> constant along a direction in space-time,  the product of natural selection
>                                                         Therefore,
> existence is selected (Me)
>
>
> Is not a brain something perceived? Is that not circular? I can understand
> "relies on the architecture of the mind" (the dreams of the universal
> number), but what is a brain? what is time, space, nature?
>
>
>                                                       - The mind is a
> robust computation -and therefore implies a certain selection- (Bruno)
>
>
> The 1-mind is not a computation, but a selection of a infinity of
> computation among an infinity of computations.
>
>
>
>                                                        - Are created by
> the activity of the supreme monad (Roger)
>                                                       - Does not matter
> (physicalists)
>
>
>
> Hmm... Many physicalists, notably when computationalist, believe that the
> mind is real, and can matter. Only, when they use comp to justify this, or
> to pretend the mind-body problem is solved by comp, they are inconsistent
> (as shown normally by the UD Argument).
>
> I am not sure if your theory take or not the first person indeterminacy
> into account. Do you agree(*) with UDA 1-4 ?
>
> Bruno
>
> (*)
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>
>
>
>
>
> 2012/9/23 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>
>>
>> On 22 Sep 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>
>>
>> With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and
>> their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or
>> []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc.
>>
>>
>>     Can not you see, Bruno, that this stipulation makes existence
>> contingent upon the ability to be defined by a symbol and thus on human
>> whim? It is the tool-maker and user that is talking through you here.
>>
>>
>> Confusion of level. The stipulation used to described such existence does
>> not makes such existence contingent at all. Only the stipulation is
>> contingent, not its content, which can be considered as absolute, as we
>> work in the standard model (by the very definition of comp: we work with
>> standard comp (we would not say "yes" to a doctor if he propose a non
>> standard cording of our brain).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains
>> the physics as a subpart).
>>
>>
>>     Testable, sure, but theology should never be contingent. It must flow
>> from pure necessity and our finite models are simply insufficient for this
>> task.
>>
>>
>> First our model is not finite, only our theories and machines are. And
>> the AUDA illustrates clearly that theology's shape (the hypostases) follows
>> pure necessity, even if all machine will define a particular arithmetical
>> content for each theology, but this is natural, as it concerns the private
>> life of individual machine (it is the same for us by default in all
>> religion).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>
>
>
> --
> Alberto.
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