On 27 Oct 2012, at 19:27, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> your eyes are sending signals to your brain of the White House
and not of the Kremlin, and there is nothing more profound about it.
> But the eyes of the copy get also the signals from Moscow.
Yes, so the guy in Moscow feels like the guy in Moscow because he's
the guy in Moscow. Big deal.
> So your explanation does not help to predict what will happen if
the experience is reitired.
True, it can't predict what will happen because what will happen is
a function of the external environment and how it stimulates the
eyes and it has nothing to do with the original or either copy. Your
entire philosophy is built on top of the question "Why is the guy in
Washington the guy in Washington?" and the answer of course is
"because he's the guy in Washington". With such a foundation its no
wonder it can't do much.
> The correct comp explanation, deep or not, explains why we cannot
make a better prediction
Then I no longer know what "comp" means because the real reason we
can't do better is the same reason we can't do better at predicting
next weeks weather, its too complicated.
Predicting is hard, especially the future.
Predicting the weather is hard, but in principle possible. predicting
the personal outcome of the self-duplication is easily show impossible
in theory, even for a god, and this without physical assumption
(unlike QM). That's the difference.
But if you agree that the self-duplication leads to indeterminacy, you
could tell me if you agree with the step 4 of the UDA:
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