On 30 Oct 2012, at 18:46, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Oct 30, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> So you were not answering the question in my post, which can be sum up: are you OK with step 3, and what about step 4?

I don't even remember what step 2 was, I found a blunder in your proof so I didn't find it very memorable.

This confirms my feeling that you just avoid the study of the reasoning.
People from the list did already debunk them.

> You are the one pretending seeing a problem, and as many notice, you just keep not answering the question. You did understand well the 1-3 distinction, so it is utterly not understandable why you remain stuck on this.

I do remember that in one of the steps in your proof you made a big deal about "1P view", that is to say the first person view, but you don't make it at all clear exactly who is the person that is having this view,

The reasoning is precisely constructed so as to avoid the personal identity question, even if he eventually put some light on its difficulty.

the you before the duplication or the you after the duplication?

All the you after, are the you before, by definition of comp. That's is why we interview all of them, or some good sample of them.

In the iterated movie-duplication experience, they all assess having seen only one movie, and the vast majority assess to never been able to predict the next picture at any point. Then if they count themselves, it is clear that the number of balck opixels, and white pixels, and their positions, distribute exactly like the Newton BinĂ´mial coefficients, etc.

And this is supposed to be a valid mathematical proof as rigorous as that discipline demands, but it is not.

You just have not yet shown to get the point, by misidentifying the question asked, which concerns what you will live, as a first person. You know by comp that you will live a unique things (as all the one doing it will assess), and it is trivial you can predict which one you will be, in the sense that if you do that, all the other John Clarks will get the point that such a prediction is wrong.

Before the duplication the you is the Helsinki man, after the duplication the you is the Helsinki man and the Washington man and the Moscow man. What is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his diary that he sees Washington? 0%.

The guy reconstituted in Washington will say: "Gosh I was wrong".

What is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his diary he sees Moscow? 0%.

The guy reconstituted in Moscow will say: "Gosh I was wrong".

What is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his diary he sees Helsinki? 100%.

No. In the protocol that I have described to you many times, the probability here is 0%, as he is cut and pasted. Not copy and pasted. And it is not "he sees" but what will he see. And the protocol assures that he will only see washington, or Moscow.

What is the probability the Washington man will write in his diary he sees Washington? 100%.

The question was asked to the Helsinki man.

What is the probability the Washington man will write in his diary he sees Moscow? 0%. And if the duplicating process destroys the Helsinki man then the probability the Helsinki man will write anything at all in his diary is 0%.

Then comp is false. You are saying that classical teleportation would not work, but step one is that comp entails that classical teleportation works, as it is equivalent with the acceptance of a digital brain.

If there is any indeterminacy in all this, that is to say if there are many potential correct answers, it's just because you are asking a incomplete question; if you don't specify exactly who "you" is then asking for a probability number involving "you" is like asking "How long is a piece of string?" or "How much is 2 + anything?"; any number is as good a answer as any other.

The question is about your first person experience. It does not involve personal identity question. It involves you, well defined at the start, pushing on a button, and what you, before pushing on the button can expect to live, as comp makes you not dying, and not living a superposition of many experiences.

As Quentin said, it is implicit in the Everett understanding of QM.

> I can ask you another question: how do you predict what you will subjectively see, when doing an experience of physics

In most physics experiments, even very advanced ones at CERN, the experimenter himself is not duplicated so in the question "What particle do you expect to see?" it's clear who "you" is;

Only if you assume that the universe does not contain Boltzman brains, or a universal dovetailer, as it will generate your current computational state, along with computations going through it, in infinity of exemplars. You are using an implicit limitation axiom. If the physical universe is big enough, "you" is no more that clear too. In a quantum multiverse either. And with step 8, the arithmetical reality is enough for distributing you in infinitely many virtual reconstitution. This follows not directly by the 1p-indeterminacy, but by its invariance for a bunch of transform. Step tackles the first one.

Here you make the move "let us assume that the physical universe is primary and little". This cut the reasoning at step seven, but then step 8 put a big doubt as it will introduce in matter and mind non Turing emulable element, different from those Turing recoverable by the 1p - indeterminacy.

but in your thought experiment who is "you" is not obvious because YOU have been duplicated.

Correct, but irrelevant. The question is not about you, but about the most probable result of an experiment that you can do. You push on a button, and you localize your directly accessible body.



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