On 30 Oct 2012, at 18:46, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 30, 2012 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> So you were not answering the question in my post, which can be
sum up: are you OK with step 3, and what about step 4?
I don't even remember what step 2 was, I found a blunder in your
proof so I didn't find it very memorable.
This confirms my feeling that you just avoid the study of the reasoning.
People from the list did already debunk them.
> You are the one pretending seeing a problem, and as many notice,
you just keep not answering the question. You did understand well
the 1-3 distinction, so it is utterly not understandable why you
remain stuck on this.
I do remember that in one of the steps in your proof you made a big
deal about "1P view", that is to say the first person view, but you
don't make it at all clear exactly who is the person that is having
this view,
The reasoning is precisely constructed so as to avoid the personal
identity question, even if he eventually put some light on its
difficulty.
the you before the duplication or the you after the duplication?
All the you after, are the you before, by definition of comp. That's
is why we interview all of them, or some good sample of them.
In the iterated movie-duplication experience, they all assess having
seen only one movie, and the vast majority assess to never been able
to predict the next picture at any point. Then if they count
themselves, it is clear that the number of balck opixels, and white
pixels, and their positions, distribute exactly like the Newton
Binômial coefficients, etc.
And this is supposed to be a valid mathematical proof as rigorous as
that discipline demands, but it is not.
You just have not yet shown to get the point, by misidentifying the
question asked, which concerns what you will live, as a first person.
You know by comp that you will live a unique things (as all the one
doing it will assess), and it is trivial you can predict which one you
will be, in the sense that if you do that, all the other John Clarks
will get the point that such a prediction is wrong.
Before the duplication the you is the Helsinki man, after the
duplication the you is the Helsinki man and the Washington man and
the Moscow man. What is the probability the Helsinki man will write
in his diary that he sees Washington? 0%.
The guy reconstituted in Washington will say: "Gosh I was wrong".
What is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his diary he
sees Moscow? 0%.
The guy reconstituted in Moscow will say: "Gosh I was wrong".
What is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his diary he
sees Helsinki? 100%.
No. In the protocol that I have described to you many times, the
probability here is 0%, as he is cut and pasted. Not copy and pasted.
And it is not "he sees" but what will he see. And the protocol assures
that he will only see washington, or Moscow.
What is the probability the Washington man will write in his diary
he sees Washington? 100%.
The question was asked to the Helsinki man.
What is the probability the Washington man will write in his diary
he sees Moscow? 0%. And if the duplicating process destroys the
Helsinki man then the probability the Helsinki man will write
anything at all in his diary is 0%.
Then comp is false. You are saying that classical teleportation would
not work, but step one is that comp entails that classical
teleportation works, as it is equivalent with the acceptance of a
digital brain.
If there is any indeterminacy in all this, that is to say if there
are many potential correct answers, it's just because you are asking
a incomplete question; if you don't specify exactly who "you" is
then asking for a probability number involving "you" is like asking
"How long is a piece of string?" or "How much is 2 + anything?"; any
number is as good a answer as any other.
The question is about your first person experience. It does not
involve personal identity question. It involves you, well defined at
the start, pushing on a button, and what you, before pushing on the
button can expect to live, as comp makes you not dying, and not living
a superposition of many experiences.
As Quentin said, it is implicit in the Everett understanding of QM.
> I can ask you another question: how do you predict what you will
subjectively see, when doing an experience of physics
In most physics experiments, even very advanced ones at CERN, the
experimenter himself is not duplicated so in the question "What
particle do you expect to see?" it's clear who "you" is;
Only if you assume that the universe does not contain Boltzman brains,
or a universal dovetailer, as it will generate your current
computational state, along with computations going through it, in
infinity of exemplars. You are using an implicit limitation axiom. If
the physical universe is big enough, "you" is no more that clear too.
In a quantum multiverse either. And with step 8, the arithmetical
reality is enough for distributing you in infinitely many virtual
reconstitution. This follows not directly by the 1p-indeterminacy, but
by its invariance for a bunch of transform. Step tackles the first one.
Here you make the move "let us assume that the physical universe is
primary and little". This cut the reasoning at step seven, but then
step 8 put a big doubt as it will introduce in matter and mind non
Turing emulable element, different from those Turing recoverable by
the 1p - indeterminacy.
but in your thought experiment who is "you" is not obvious because
YOU have been duplicated.
Correct, but irrelevant. The question is not about you, but about the
most probable result of an experiment that you can do. You push on a
button, and you localize your directly accessible body.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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