2012/10/30 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> > On Tue, Oct 30, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > > So you were not answering the question in my post, which can be sum >> up: are you OK with step 3, and what about step 4? >> > > I don't even remember what step 2 was, I found a blunder in your proof so > I didn't find it very memorable. > > > You are the one pretending seeing a problem, and as many notice, you >> just keep not answering the question. You did understand well the 1-3 >> distinction, so it is utterly not understandable why you remain stuck on >> this. >> > > I do remember that in one of the steps in your proof you made a big deal > about "1P view", that is to say the first person view, but you don't make > it at all clear exactly who is the person that is having this view, the you > before the duplication or the you after the duplication? And this is > supposed to be a valid mathematical proof as rigorous as that discipline > demands, but it is not. > > Before the duplication the you is the Helsinki man, after the duplication > the you is the Helsinki man and the Washington man and the Moscow man. What > is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his diary that he sees > Washington? 0%. What is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his > diary he sees Moscow? 0%. What is the probability the Helsinki man will > write in his diary he sees Helsinki? 100%. What is the probability the > Washington man will write in his diary he sees Washington? 100%. What is > the probability the Washington man will write in his diary he sees Moscow? > 0%. And if the duplicating process destroys the Helsinki man then the > probability the Helsinki man will write anything at all in his diary is 0%. > > If there is any indeterminacy in all this, that is to say if there are > many potential correct answers, it's just because you are asking a > incomplete question; if you don't specify exactly who "you" is then asking > for a probability number involving "you" is like asking "How long is a > piece of string?" or "How much is 2 + anything?"; any number is as good a > answer as any other. > > > I can ask you another question: how do you predict what you will >> subjectively see, when doing an experience of physics >> > > In most physics experiments, even very advanced ones at CERN, the > experimenter himself is not duplicated so in the question "What particle do > you expect to see?" it's clear who "you" is; but in your thought experiment > who is "you" is not obvious because YOU have been duplicated. >
Yet in MWI... YOU have been duplicated too *but* the probabilities of each *you* version seeing the particle in a specified state are not the same... hence the expectation question of the *you* before is meaningful. Quentin > > John K Clark > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.