# Re: Against Mechanism

```2012/10/30 John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com>

> On Tue, Oct 30, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>
>  > So you were not answering the question in my post, which can be sum
>> up: are you OK with step 3, and what about step 4?
>>
>
> I don't even remember what step 2 was, I found a blunder in your proof so
> I didn't find it very memorable.
>
> > You are the one pretending seeing a problem, and as many notice, you
>> just keep not answering the question. You did understand well the 1-3
>> distinction, so it is utterly not understandable why you remain stuck on
>> this.
>>
>
> I do remember that in one of the steps in your proof you made a big deal
> about "1P view", that is to say the first person view, but you don't make
> it at all clear exactly who is the person that is having this view, the you
> before the duplication or the you after the duplication? And this is
> supposed to be a valid mathematical proof as rigorous as that discipline
> demands, but it is not.
>
> Before the duplication the you is the Helsinki man, after the duplication
> the you is the Helsinki man and the Washington man and the Moscow man. What
> is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his diary that he sees
> Washington? 0%.  What is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his
> diary he sees Moscow? 0%. What is the probability the Helsinki man will
> write in his diary he sees Helsinki? 100%. What is the probability the
> Washington man will write in his diary he sees Washington? 100%. What is
> the probability the Washington man will write in his diary he sees Moscow?
> 0%. And if the duplicating process destroys the Helsinki man then the
> probability the Helsinki man will write anything at all in his diary is 0%.
>
> If there is any indeterminacy in all this, that is to say if there are
> many potential correct answers, it's just because you are asking a
> incomplete question; if you don't specify  exactly who "you" is then asking
> for a probability number involving "you" is like asking "How long is a
> piece of string?" or "How much is 2 + anything?"; any number is as good a
>
> > I can ask you another question: how do you predict what you will
>> subjectively see, when doing an experience of physics
>>
>
> In most physics experiments, even very advanced ones at CERN, the
> experimenter himself is not duplicated so in the question "What particle do
> you expect to see?" it's clear who "you" is; but in your thought experiment
> who is "you"  is not obvious because YOU have been duplicated.
>```
```
Yet in MWI... YOU have been duplicated too *but* the probabilities of each
*you* version seeing the particle in a specified state are not the same...
hence the expectation question of the *you* before  is meaningful.

Quentin

>
>   John K Clark
>
>
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