On Wed, Oct 31, 2012 at 2:21 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>> the you before the duplication or the you after the duplication?
> > All the you after, are the you before, by definition of comp.

OK, but the you before is not the you after. The Helsinki man knows nothing
about Moscow or Washington, not even if he still exists after the
duplication, but both the Moscow man and the Washington man know all about
Helsinki even if they don't know about each other.

> what you will live, as a first person.

If your mind works deterministically then what you will live to think you
see will depend on the external environment. If your mind does NOT work
deterministically then what you will live to think you see will depend on
absolutely nothing, in other words it is random. There is no new sort of
indeterminacy involved just the boring old sort, and how you expect to draw
profound philosophical  conclusions from such a flimsy foundation is a

> You know by comp that [...]

I don't know anything by "comp". At one time I thought I knew what you
meant by the term, but then you say consciousness was there before
Evolution produced brains and that "the owner [of a brain] itself must
attach his consciousness to all states existing in arithmetic". So I was
wrong, I don't know what "comp" means.

>> Before the duplication the you is the Helsinki man, after the
>> duplication the you is the Helsinki man and the Washington man and the
>> Moscow man. What is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his
>> diary that he sees Washington? 0%.
> > The guy reconstituted in Washington will say: "Gosh I was wrong".

That's the problem, you're not clear who "I" is. The Washington man made no
error because he made no predictions of any sort, only the Helsinki man did
that. The Washington man and Helsinki man have identical memories up to the
point of duplication but after that they diverge.

> >> What is the probability the Helsinki man will write in his diary he
> sees Helsinki? 100%.
> > No. In the protocol that I have described to you many times, the
> probability here is 0%, as he is cut and pasted. Not copy and pasted.

If the Helsinki man had never seen Helsinki then he's not the Helsinki man,
if he has seen that city then he wrote so in his diary.

> And it is not "he sees" but what will he see. And the protocol assures
> that he will only see washington, or Moscow.

Who is "he"?

> >> What is the probability the Washington man will write in his diary he
> sees Washington? 100%.
> > The question was asked to the Helsinki man.

But you said the Helsinki man was destroyed, if so then he's got a rather
severe case of writers block and is writing very little in his diary.

> >>  And if the duplicating process destroys the Helsinki man then the
> probability the Helsinki man will write anything at all in his diary is 0%.
> > Then comp is false.

OK if you say so, its your invention so whatever "comp" means its false;
although I am a little surprised that you expect a man who no longer exists
to write stuff in his diary.

> The question is about your first person experience. [...]The question is
> not about you, but about the most probable result of an experiment that you
> can do. You push on a button, and you localize your directly accessible
> body.

Your? You? John Clark believes that when considering matters of identity if
Bruno Marchal stopped using so many pronouns without considering what they
refer to then Bruno Marchal's thinking would be less muddled.

>As Quentin said, it is implicit in the Everett understanding of QM.

In Everett a world does not split until there is a difference between them
and neither does consciousness. And the same is true in the thought
experiment, If Bruno Marchal's body is duplicated and sent to Washington
and Moscow but inside identical boxes then Bruno Marchal's consciousness
has not been duplicated and will not be until the boxes are opened and
different things are observed by the Brunos, at that point they will no
longer be each other but both will still be    Bruno Marchal

>> In most physics experiments, even very advanced ones at CERN, the
>> experimenter himself is not duplicated so in the question "What particle do
>> you expect to see?" it's clear who "you" is;
> > Only if you assume that the universe does not contain Boltzman brains,
> or a universal dovetailer,

It doesn't matter if Boltzman brains exist or not. In physics experiments
not involving self duplications which "you" is involved is obvious, and it
can be proven to be correct by observing that when "you" predicts what
"you" will see using physical laws the prediction usually proves to be
true, so all the yous must have been assigned correctly.

  John K Clark

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