Hi Bruno Marchal  

Yes, in Leibniz's metaphysics, the only active agent 
is the supreme monad (the One),
who essentially does everything-- but performs 
actions needed or requested by its submonads.
One might think of the supreme monad as creating
all actions. As universal mind. 

The actions themselves appear "as if" they
would in Newton's physics.

Hmmm. I've never considered that there might be
comparable submonads in Plato's realm.  


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/31/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-30, 10:45:12 
Subject: Re: Computationalism -- Leibniz's new paradigm for science 




On 30 Oct 2012, at 13:07, Roger Clough wrote: 


Computationalism and downward causation -- Leibniz's new paradigm for science 

The new, strictly logical, Leibnizian view of the universe is 
that the new paradigm- computationalism-- is thoroughly 
logically based, while conventional science is based on appearances, 
not that the appearances are wrong.  

In a previous email I explained how all of today's science is based 
on the logical error that mind and matter can directly 
interact, which is false, because they are two different 
substances, completely foreign to one another.  

The more strictly logical view, as Leibniz showed, is that 
the interaction only appears to happen. 
But the strictly logical Leibnizian view is that upward  
causation is only an appearance. All true causation is  
actually downward (Platonic). 

This new understanding not only allows today's scientific  
results to be apparently true, but opens the door to  
previously unexplainable phenomena such as gravity.  

Another way to say this is that, although they may 
appear to be a posteriori (in the world), all causes  
are actually theoretical (a priori). Numbers being  
a priori (given), this gives a completely new  
solidity to computationalism. 





This would make Leibniz closer to Plato and Plotinus. I can only be happy with 
this. There is a lot in Leibiz which announces comp, from the binary (taken in 
the Yi-King) to the universal language, and also by its general philosophy. I 
agree, but I know that some fan of Leibniz are not so happy with this, but I 
guess they have a materialist conception of comp (which is inconsistent). 


Bruno 





Roger Clough 



--  
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group. 
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. 
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. 



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to