On 30 Oct 2012, at 13:07, Roger Clough wrote:
Computationalism and downward causation -- Leibniz's new paradigm
for science
The new, strictly logical, Leibnizian view of the universe is
that the new paradigm- computationalism-- is thoroughly
logically based, while conventional science is based on appearances,
not that the appearances are wrong.
In a previous email I explained how all of today's science is based
on the logical error that mind and matter can directly
interact, which is false, because they are two different
substances, completely foreign to one another.
The more strictly logical view, as Leibniz showed, is that
the interaction only appears to happen.
But the strictly logical Leibnizian view is that upward
causation is only an appearance. All true causation is
actually downward (Platonic).
This new understanding not only allows today's scientific
results to be apparently true, but opens the door to
previously unexplainable phenomena such as gravity.
Another way to say this is that, although they may
appear to be a posteriori (in the world), all causes
are actually theoretical (a priori). Numbers being
a priori (given), this gives a completely new
solidity to computationalism.
This would make Leibniz closer to Plato and Plotinus. I can only be
happy with this. There is a lot in Leibiz which announces comp, from
the binary (taken in the Yi-King) to the universal language, and also
by its general philosophy. I agree, but I know that some fan of
Leibniz are not so happy with this, but I guess they have a
materialist conception of comp (which is inconsistent).
Bruno
Roger Clough
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