Hi Richard Ruquist There is not really any problem between free will and pre-determinism as long as the men did what they wanted to do.
Roger Clough, [email protected] 11/5/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-05, 07:31:59 Subject: Re: The supreme monad is the only actor, the only agent On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 7:06 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Bruno Marchal > > Man's soul, being a monad, includes the physical man, as > the physical man must remain associated to its monad. > > But man-and-his-monad is not an actor, it is a puppet of the > supreme monad. You seem to be claiming that men do not have free will and that it is not because of predeterminism. > > So there is but one actor, the Supreme monad. > Which is why we give thanks before a meal. > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > 11/5/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-11-04, 08:36:10 > Subject: Re: heraclitus and leibniz on washington vs moscow > > > On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:29, Roger Clough wrote: > >> Hi Bruno Marchal >> >> As to washington vs moscow, the man remains the same. >> Although a man cannot stand in the same river twice, >> his 1p or monad, his identity, remains the same. > > OK. > > >> >> The monad itself belongs to the supreme monad or >> platonia (same 1p, same identity), because >> although its contents keep changing, it has >> to remain a fixed identity-- or else the supreme >> monad would not know where to place the >> constantly adjusted perceptions. > > More or less OK. It is a play with four actors: God, Man, the Soul. (= > 4 as the Man is a bit schizo and has two personality: a terrestrial > and a divine one). Those can be played, in comp + classical theory of > knowledge) by Arithmetical Truth (God), The Loebian universal Turing > machine (Man, Bp), and Bp & p (The theatetical definition of knowledge > applied to ideally correct machine's provability. > > >> >> Note that in Leibniz's metaphysics, the perceptions >> of each monad are not that of an individual soul such >> as we understand perception. An individual soul >> sees only the phenomenol world-- from his own >> perspective. But a monad contains all of the perceptions >> of all the other monads in the universe, so it sees >> the universe truly, meaning from all perspectives. >> The term "holographic perception" comes to mind. > > Interesting. I think this or similar are still open problems. > > > >> >> In this sense we are God's local sensors, for the God >> who knows all. > > OK. This, for me, is more "salvia" than comp and logic, but so I > *guess* you are correct. Open problem with comp. > > Bruno > > >> >> >> >> Roger Clough, [email protected] >> 11/3/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Bruno Marchal >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-11-03, 05:18:25 >> Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm >> >> >> >> >> On 02 Nov 2012, at 19:35, Stephen P. King wrote: >> >> >> On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> >> On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote: >> >> >> On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> [SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a >> concrete robust physical universe". >> >> >> ? >> >> >> Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I >> explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality. >> In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum. >> >> Dear Bruno, >> >> I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you >> still didn't understand... From: >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf >> >> "...what if we don? grant a concrete robust physical universe?" >> "Actually the 8th present step will explain >> that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the >> notion of concrete and >> existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power. >> It will follow that a much >> weaker and usual form of Ockham? razor can be used to conclude that >> not only physics has >> been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ? >> matter? has been >> ontologically reduced to ?mind? where mind is defined as the >> object study of fundamental >> machine psychology." >> >> My claim is that neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any >> other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically >> primitive. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither >> and has no particular properties. >> >> >> >> How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? >> >> Dear Bruno, >> >> No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be >> complete and consistent simultaneously, >> >> >> Why not? The One is not a theory. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> thus it must stratify itself into Many. Each of the Many is claimed >> to have aspects that when recombined cancel to neutrality. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> [SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we >> reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds >> >> >> Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I >> just prove this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of >> metaphysics is made into a theorem in a theory (comp). >> >> Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable >> aspects of multiple sheaves of computations? >> >> >> >> This is what I have shown to be a consequence of comp. >> >> I agree. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> [SPK] given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or >> derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - >> Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are "operating" somehow in an >> atemporal way. We should be able to make the argument run without >> ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 'realism'. In my >> thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run the >> TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My >> problem is that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of >> creation that we find in mythology, whether it is the Ptah of >> ancient Egypt or the egg of Pangu or whatever other myth one might >> like. What makes an explanation framed in the sophisticated and >> formal language of modal logic any different? >> >> >> >> I use the self-reference logic, for obvious reason. Again, this >> entails the sue of some modal logics, due to a *theorem* by Solovay. >> All correct machine whose beliefs extend RA obeys to G and G*. There >> is no choice in the matter. >> >> That is not changed or involved by my argument. >> >> >> >> >> >> [SPK] I agree 1000000000% with your point about 'miracles'. I am >> very suspicions of "special explanations' or 'natural >> conspiracies'. (This comes from my upbringing as a "Bible-believing >> Fundamentalist" and eventual rejection of that literalist mental >> straight-jacket.) As I see things, any condition or situation that >> can be used to 'explain' some other conceptually difficult condition >> or situation should be either universal in that they apply anywhere >> and anytime >> >> >> But even in your theory anywhere and anytime must be defined by >> something more primitive, given that you agree that physics cannot >> be the fundamental theory, given that the physical reality is not >> primitive. >> >> The concepts of "where" and "when" (positions in a space-time) >> would seem to be rendered meaningless if there is no space-time (or >> observers/measurements to define it), no? OH, BTW, I don't think >> that we disagree that "physics cannot be the fundamental theory". >> Physics requires measurements/observations to be meaningful. Where I >> agree with you is in your considerations of 1p and observer >> indeterminacy. Where you and I disagree is on the question of >> resources. Resources are required for computations to "run" so there >> has to be the availability of resources involved in *any* >> consideration of computations. Ignoring these considerations by only >> considering computations as Platonic objects is wrong, IMHO. >> You seem to be OK with computations as purely timeless objects >> (in Platonia) that are such that somehow we finite entities can >> create physical objects that can implement (in their dynamical >> functions) instances of such, while I claim that computations are >> equivalence classes of functions that physical systems can implement >> *and* abstract objects. I see these two views as two poles of a >> spectrum. There is a lot more detail in my considerations that I do >> not have time to go into at this time... >> >> My Theory of comp: Sheaves of Computations/arithmetic - define -> >> particular physical states *and* sheaves of physical states - allow - >> > particular computations. They are mutually supervenient, neither >> is ontologically primitive. >> >> >> >> >> >> Comp is just the (theological) belief that I can survive with a >> digital brain. The rest is logic. >> >> I disagree, it is must more than that. It includes also the >> belief that there is an "I"... >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Both emerge from a property neutral ground. >> >> >> I have no idea what you mean by this. >> >> Read Russell. He is the one that convinced me of neutral monism. >> >> >> >> I read Russell. Never found something that non sensical. If the >> basic object have no properties, I don't see how anything can emerge >> from it. You have to explain your point, not to refer to the >> literature. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Onward! >> >> Stephen >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected] >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> . >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected] >> . >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >> . >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
