Hi Richard Ruquist  

There is not really any problem between free will and 
pre-determinism as long as the men did what they wanted to do. 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Richard Ruquist  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-05, 07:31:59 
Subject: Re: The supreme monad is the only actor, the only agent 


On Mon, Nov 5, 2012 at 7:06 AM, Roger Clough  wrote: 
> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> Man's soul, being a monad, includes the physical man, as 
> the physical man must remain associated to its monad. 
> 
> But man-and-his-monad is not an actor, it is a puppet of the 
> supreme monad. 

You seem to be claiming that men do not have free will 
and that it is not because of predeterminism. 


> 
> So there is but one actor, the Supreme monad. 
> Which is why we give thanks before a meal. 
> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 11/5/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-11-04, 08:36:10 
> Subject: Re: heraclitus and leibniz on washington vs moscow 
> 
> 
> On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:29, Roger Clough wrote: 
> 
>> Hi Bruno Marchal 
>> 
>> As to washington vs moscow, the man remains the same. 
>> Although a man cannot stand in the same river twice, 
>> his 1p or monad, his identity, remains the same. 
> 
> OK. 
> 
> 
>> 
>> The monad itself belongs to the supreme monad or 
>> platonia (same 1p, same identity), because 
>> although its contents keep changing, it has 
>> to remain a fixed identity-- or else the supreme 
>> monad would not know where to place the 
>> constantly adjusted perceptions. 
> 
> More or less OK. It is a play with four actors: God, Man, the Soul. (= 
> 4 as the Man is a bit schizo and has two personality: a terrestrial 
> and a divine one). Those can be played, in comp + classical theory of 
> knowledge) by Arithmetical Truth (God), The Loebian universal Turing 
> machine (Man, Bp), and Bp & p (The theatetical definition of knowledge 
> applied to ideally correct machine's provability. 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Note that in Leibniz's metaphysics, the perceptions 
>> of each monad are not that of an individual soul such 
>> as we understand perception. An individual soul 
>> sees only the phenomenol world-- from his own 
>> perspective. But a monad contains all of the perceptions 
>> of all the other monads in the universe, so it sees 
>> the universe truly, meaning from all perspectives. 
>> The term "holographic perception" comes to mind. 
> 
> Interesting. I think this or similar are still open problems. 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> In this sense we are God's local sensors, for the God 
>> who knows all. 
> 
> OK. This, for me, is more "salvia" than comp and logic, but so I 
> *guess* you are correct. Open problem with comp. 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
>> 11/3/2012 
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>> 
>> 
>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>> From: Bruno Marchal 
>> Receiver: everything-list 
>> Time: 2012-11-03, 05:18:25 
>> Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 02 Nov 2012, at 19:35, Stephen P. King wrote: 
>> 
>> 
>> On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote: 
>> 
>> 
>> On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>> 
>> [SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a 
>> concrete robust physical universe". 
>> 
>> 
>> ? 
>> 
>> 
>> Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I 
>> explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality. 
>> In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum. 
>> 
>> Dear Bruno, 
>> 
>> I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you 
>> still didn't understand... From: 
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf 
>> 
>> "...what if we don? grant a concrete robust physical universe?" 
>> "Actually the 8th present step will explain 
>> that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the 
>> notion of concrete and 
>> existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power. 
>> It will follow that a much 
>> weaker and usual form of Ockham? razor can be used to conclude that 
>> not only physics has 
>> been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ? 
>> matter? has been 
>> ontologically reduced to ?mind? where mind is defined as the 
>> object study of fundamental 
>> machine psychology." 
>> 
>> My claim is that neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any 
>> other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically 
>> primitive. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither 
>> and has no particular properties. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? 
>> 
>> Dear Bruno, 
>> 
>> No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be 
>> complete and consistent simultaneously, 
>> 
>> 
>> Why not? The One is not a theory. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> thus it must stratify itself into Many. Each of the Many is claimed 
>> to have aspects that when recombined cancel to neutrality. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> [SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we 
>> reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds 
>> 
>> 
>> Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I 
>> just prove this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of 
>> metaphysics is made into a theorem in a theory (comp). 
>> 
>> Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable 
>> aspects of multiple sheaves of computations? 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> This is what I have shown to be a consequence of comp. 
>> 
>> I agree. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> [SPK] given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or 
>> derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - 
>> Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are "operating" somehow in an 
>> atemporal way. We should be able to make the argument run without 
>> ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 'realism'. In my 
>> thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run the 
>> TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My 
>> problem is that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of 
>> creation that we find in mythology, whether it is the Ptah of 
>> ancient Egypt or the egg of Pangu or whatever other myth one might 
>> like. What makes an explanation framed in the sophisticated and 
>> formal language of modal logic any different? 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I use the self-reference logic, for obvious reason. Again, this 
>> entails the sue of some modal logics, due to a *theorem* by Solovay. 
>> All correct machine whose beliefs extend RA obeys to G and G*. There 
>> is no choice in the matter. 
>> 
>> That is not changed or involved by my argument. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> [SPK] I agree 1000000000% with your point about 'miracles'. I am 
>> very suspicions of "special explanations' or 'natural 
>> conspiracies'. (This comes from my upbringing as a "Bible-believing 
>> Fundamentalist" and eventual rejection of that literalist mental 
>> straight-jacket.) As I see things, any condition or situation that 
>> can be used to 'explain' some other conceptually difficult condition 
>> or situation should be either universal in that they apply anywhere 
>> and anytime 
>> 
>> 
>> But even in your theory anywhere and anytime must be defined by 
>> something more primitive, given that you agree that physics cannot 
>> be the fundamental theory, given that the physical reality is not 
>> primitive. 
>> 
>> The concepts of "where" and "when" (positions in a space-time) 
>> would seem to be rendered meaningless if there is no space-time (or 
>> observers/measurements to define it), no? OH, BTW, I don't think 
>> that we disagree that "physics cannot be the fundamental theory". 
>> Physics requires measurements/observations to be meaningful. Where I 
>> agree with you is in your considerations of 1p and observer 
>> indeterminacy. Where you and I disagree is on the question of 
>> resources. Resources are required for computations to "run" so there 
>> has to be the availability of resources involved in *any* 
>> consideration of computations. Ignoring these considerations by only 
>> considering computations as Platonic objects is wrong, IMHO. 
>> You seem to be OK with computations as purely timeless objects 
>> (in Platonia) that are such that somehow we finite entities can 
>> create physical objects that can implement (in their dynamical 
>> functions) instances of such, while I claim that computations are 
>> equivalence classes of functions that physical systems can implement 
>> *and* abstract objects. I see these two views as two poles of a 
>> spectrum. There is a lot more detail in my considerations that I do 
>> not have time to go into at this time... 
>> 
>> My Theory of comp: Sheaves of Computations/arithmetic - define -> 
>> particular physical states *and* sheaves of physical states - allow - 
>> > particular computations. They are mutually supervenient, neither 
>> is ontologically primitive. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Comp is just the (theological) belief that I can survive with a 
>> digital brain. The rest is logic. 
>> 
>> I disagree, it is must more than that. It includes also the 
>> belief that there is an "I"... 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Both emerge from a property neutral ground. 
>> 
>> 
>> I have no idea what you mean by this. 
>> 
>> Read Russell. He is the one that convinced me of neutral monism. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I read Russell. Never found something that non sensical. If the 
>> basic object have no properties, I don't see how anything can emerge 
>> from it. You have to explain your point, not to refer to the 
>> literature. 
>> 
>> 
>> Bruno 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> -- 
>> Onward! 
>> 
>> Stephen 
>> 
>> 
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>> 
>> 
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>> 
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> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
> 
> 
> 
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