On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:17, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/3/2012 5:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The arithmetical property of numbers are innate to the numbers,
logic and the laws we assume.
Dear Bruno,
How? How are properties innate? This idea makes no sense to me,
it never has as it does not allow for any explanation of
apprehension of properties in my consideration... The only
explanation of properties that makes sense to me is that of Leibniz:
Properties are given by relations. We might think of objects as
"bundles of properties" but this is problematic as it implies that
properties are objects themselves. I think of properties similar to
what Leibniz did: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/substance/#DesSpiLei
"Leibniz's substances, however, are the bearers of change (criterion
(iv)) in a very different way from Aristotle's individual
substances. An Aristotelian individual possesses some properties
essentially and some accidentally. The accidental properties of an
object are ones that can be gained and lost over time, and which it
might never have possessed at all: its essential properties are the
only ones it had to possess and which it possesses throughout its
existence. The situation is different for Leibniz's monads—which is
the name he gives to individual substances, created or uncreated (so
God is a monad). Whereas, for Aristotle, the properties that an
object has to possess and those that it possesses throughout its
existence coincide, they do not do so for Leibniz. That is, for
Leibniz, even the properties that an object possesses only for a
part of its existence are essential to it. Every monad bears each of
its properties as part of its nature, so if it were to have been
different in any respect, it would have been a different entity.
Furthermore, there is a sense in which all monads are exactly
similar to each other, for they all reflect the whole world. They
each do so, however, from a different perspective.
For God, so to speak, turns on all sides and considers in all ways
the general system of phenomena which he has found it good to
produce…And he considers all the faces of the world in all possible
ways…the result of each view of the universe, as looked at from a
certain position, is…a substance which expresses the universe in
conformity with that view. (1998: 66)
So each monad reflects the whole system, but with its own
perspective emphasized. If a monad is at place p at time t, it will
contain all the features of the universe at all times, but with
those relating to its own time and place most vividly, and others
fading out roughly in accordance with temporal and spatial distance.
Because there is a continuum of perspectives on reality, there is an
infinite number of these substances. Nevertheless, there is internal
change in the monads, because the respect in which its content is
vivid varies with time and with action. Indeed, the passage of time
just is the change in which of the monad's contents are most vivid."
The difference in my thinking to that of Leibniz is that a monad
is never "at place p at time t" (location is defined solely interns
of mutuality of perspectives) and monads are only "substances" in
that they are eternal. I find it best to drop the idea of substance
altogether as it can be completely defined in terms of invariances.
After I wrote the above I can see how you would think of
properties as being innate,
I meant independent of us. Not innate in the sense of psychology.
but I see this as just a mental crutch that you are using to not
think too deeply about the concept of property.
I garee with what Leibiz said, and what Frege and the logicians have
done with it.
The situation is the same for your difficulty with my hypothesis of
meaning. We learn to associate meanings to words so that words are
more than just combinations of letters, but this is just the
internalization of the associations and relations within our
thinking process.
You are too much unclear, for me. I can agree and disagree. As long as
you don't present your theory it is hard to find out what you mean.
Bruno
--
Onward!
Stephen
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