Hi Bruno Marchal  

Man's soul, being a monad, includes the physical man, as
the physical man must remain associated to its monad.

But man-and-his-monad is not an actor, it is a puppet of the 
supreme monad.

So there is but one actor, the Supreme monad. 
Which is why we give thanks before a meal.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
11/5/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-11-04, 08:36:10 
Subject: Re: heraclitus and leibniz on washington vs moscow 


On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:29, Roger Clough wrote: 

> Hi Bruno Marchal 
> 
> As to washington vs moscow, the man remains the same. 
> Although a man cannot stand in the same river twice, 
> his 1p or monad, his identity, remains the same. 

OK. 


> 
> The monad itself belongs to the supreme monad or 
> platonia (same 1p, same identity), because 
> although its contents keep changing, it has 
> to remain a fixed identity-- or else the supreme 
> monad would not know where to place the 
> constantly adjusted perceptions. 

More or less OK. It is a play with four actors: God, Man, the Soul. (=  
4 as the Man is a bit schizo and has two personality: a terrestrial  
and a divine one). Those can be played, in comp + classical theory of  
knowledge) by Arithmetical Truth (God), The Loebian universal Turing  
machine (Man, Bp), and Bp & p (The theatetical definition of knowledge  
applied to ideally correct machine's provability. 


> 
> Note that in Leibniz's metaphysics, the perceptions 
> of each monad are not that of an individual soul such 
> as we understand perception. An individual soul 
> sees only the phenomenol world-- from his own 
> perspective. But a monad contains all of the perceptions 
> of all the other monads in the universe, so it sees 
> the universe truly, meaning from all perspectives. 
> The term "holographic perception" comes to mind. 

Interesting. I think this or similar are still open problems. 



> 
> In this sense we are God's local sensors, for the God 
> who knows all. 

OK. This, for me, is more "salvia" than comp and logic, but so I  
*guess* you are correct. Open problem with comp. 

Bruno 


> 
> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 11/3/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-11-03, 05:18:25 
> Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On 02 Nov 2012, at 19:35, Stephen P. King wrote: 
> 
> 
> On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> 
> 
> 
> On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote: 
> 
> 
> On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> 
> [SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a  
> concrete robust physical universe". 
> 
> 
> ? 
> 
> 
> Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I  
> explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality. 
> In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum. 
> 
> Dear Bruno, 
> 
> I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you  
> still didn't understand... From: 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf 
> 
> "...what if we don? grant a concrete robust physical universe?" 
> "Actually the 8th present step will explain 
> that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the  
> notion of concrete and 
> existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power.  
> It will follow that a much 
> weaker and usual form of Ockham? razor can be used to conclude that  
> not only physics has 
> been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ?  
> matter? has been 
> ontologically reduced to ?mind? where mind is defined as the  
> object study of fundamental 
> machine psychology." 
> 
> My claim is that neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any  
> other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically  
> primitive. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither  
> and has no particular properties. 
> 
> 
> 
> How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? 
> 
> Dear Bruno, 
> 
> No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be  
> complete and consistent simultaneously, 
> 
> 
> Why not? The One is not a theory. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> thus it must stratify itself into Many. Each of the Many is claimed  
> to have aspects that when recombined cancel to neutrality. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> [SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we  
> reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds 
> 
> 
> Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I  
> just prove this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of  
> metaphysics is made into a theorem in a theory (comp). 
> 
> Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable  
> aspects of multiple sheaves of computations? 
> 
> 
> 
> This is what I have shown to be a consequence of comp. 
> 
> I agree. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> [SPK] given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or  
> derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive -  
> Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are "operating" somehow in an  
> atemporal way. We should be able to make the argument run without  
> ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 'realism'. In my  
> thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run the  
> TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My  
> problem is that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of  
> creation that we find in mythology, whether it is the Ptah of  
> ancient Egypt or the egg of Pangu or whatever other myth one might  
> like. What makes an explanation framed in the sophisticated and  
> formal language of modal logic any different? 
> 
> 
> 
> I use the self-reference logic, for obvious reason. Again, this  
> entails the sue of some modal logics, due to a *theorem* by Solovay.  
> All correct machine whose beliefs extend RA obeys to G and G*. There  
> is no choice in the matter. 
> 
> That is not changed or involved by my argument. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> [SPK] I agree 1000000000% with your point about 'miracles'. I am  
> very suspicions of "special explanations' or 'natural  
> conspiracies'. (This comes from my upbringing as a "Bible-believing  
> Fundamentalist" and eventual rejection of that literalist mental  
> straight-jacket.) As I see things, any condition or situation that  
> can be used to 'explain' some other conceptually difficult condition  
> or situation should be either universal in that they apply anywhere  
> and anytime 
> 
> 
> But even in your theory anywhere and anytime must be defined by  
> something more primitive, given that you agree that physics cannot  
> be the fundamental theory, given that the physical reality is not  
> primitive. 
> 
> The concepts of "where" and "when" (positions in a space-time)  
> would seem to be rendered meaningless if there is no space-time (or  
> observers/measurements to define it), no? OH, BTW, I don't think  
> that we disagree that "physics cannot be the fundamental theory".  
> Physics requires measurements/observations to be meaningful. Where I  
> agree with you is in your considerations of 1p and observer  
> indeterminacy. Where you and I disagree is on the question of  
> resources. Resources are required for computations to "run" so there  
> has to be the availability of resources involved in *any*  
> consideration of computations. Ignoring these considerations by only  
> considering computations as Platonic objects is wrong, IMHO. 
> You seem to be OK with computations as purely timeless objects  
> (in Platonia) that are such that somehow we finite entities can  
> create physical objects that can implement (in their dynamical  
> functions) instances of such, while I claim that computations are  
> equivalence classes of functions that physical systems can implement  
> *and* abstract objects. I see these two views as two poles of a  
> spectrum. There is a lot more detail in my considerations that I do  
> not have time to go into at this time... 
> 
> My Theory of comp: Sheaves of Computations/arithmetic - define ->  
> particular physical states *and* sheaves of physical states - allow -  
> > particular computations. They are mutually supervenient, neither  
> is ontologically primitive. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Comp is just the (theological) belief that I can survive with a  
> digital brain. The rest is logic. 
> 
> I disagree, it is must more than that. It includes also the  
> belief that there is an "I"... 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Both emerge from a property neutral ground. 
> 
> 
> I have no idea what you mean by this. 
> 
> Read Russell. He is the one that convinced me of neutral monism. 
> 
> 
> 
> I read Russell. Never found something that non sensical. If the  
> basic object have no properties, I don't see how anything can emerge  
> from it. You have to explain your point, not to refer to the  
> literature. 
> 
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> --  
> Onward! 
> 
> Stephen 
> 
> 
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> 
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
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