Hi Bruno Marchal Man's soul, being a monad, includes the physical man, as the physical man must remain associated to its monad.
But man-and-his-monad is not an actor, it is a puppet of the supreme monad. So there is but one actor, the Supreme monad. Which is why we give thanks before a meal. Roger Clough, [email protected] 11/5/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-04, 08:36:10 Subject: Re: heraclitus and leibniz on washington vs moscow On 03 Nov 2012, at 12:29, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Bruno Marchal > > As to washington vs moscow, the man remains the same. > Although a man cannot stand in the same river twice, > his 1p or monad, his identity, remains the same. OK. > > The monad itself belongs to the supreme monad or > platonia (same 1p, same identity), because > although its contents keep changing, it has > to remain a fixed identity-- or else the supreme > monad would not know where to place the > constantly adjusted perceptions. More or less OK. It is a play with four actors: God, Man, the Soul. (= 4 as the Man is a bit schizo and has two personality: a terrestrial and a divine one). Those can be played, in comp + classical theory of knowledge) by Arithmetical Truth (God), The Loebian universal Turing machine (Man, Bp), and Bp & p (The theatetical definition of knowledge applied to ideally correct machine's provability. > > Note that in Leibniz's metaphysics, the perceptions > of each monad are not that of an individual soul such > as we understand perception. An individual soul > sees only the phenomenol world-- from his own > perspective. But a monad contains all of the perceptions > of all the other monads in the universe, so it sees > the universe truly, meaning from all perspectives. > The term "holographic perception" comes to mind. Interesting. I think this or similar are still open problems. > > In this sense we are God's local sensors, for the God > who knows all. OK. This, for me, is more "salvia" than comp and logic, but so I *guess* you are correct. Open problem with comp. Bruno > > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > 11/3/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-11-03, 05:18:25 > Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm > > > > > On 02 Nov 2012, at 19:35, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > On 11/2/2012 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 01 Nov 2012, at 21:21, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > [SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a > concrete robust physical universe". > > > ? > > > Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I > explicitly do assume a primitive physical reality. > In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum. > > Dear Bruno, > > I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you > still didn't understand... From: > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf > > "...what if we don? grant a concrete robust physical universe?" > "Actually the 8th present step will explain > that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the > notion of concrete and > existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power. > It will follow that a much > weaker and usual form of Ockham? razor can be used to conclude that > not only physics has > been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ? > matter? has been > ontologically reduced to ?mind? where mind is defined as the > object study of fundamental > machine psychology." > > My claim is that neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any > other object that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically > primitive. Both must emerge from a neutral ground that is neither > and has no particular properties. > > > > How can anything emerge from something having non properties? Magic? > > Dear Bruno, > > No, necessity. The totality of existence, the One, cannot be > complete and consistent simultaneously, > > > Why not? The One is not a theory. > > > > > > > thus it must stratify itself into Many. Each of the Many is claimed > to have aspects that when recombined cancel to neutrality. > > > > > > > > > > > [SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we > reject the very idea of the existence of physical worlds > > > Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I > just prove this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of > metaphysics is made into a theorem in a theory (comp). > > Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable > aspects of multiple sheaves of computations? > > > > This is what I have shown to be a consequence of comp. > > I agree. > > > > > > > > > > > > > [SPK] given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or > derived from irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - > Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, *} that are "operating" somehow in an > atemporal way. We should be able to make the argument run without > ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 'realism'. In my > thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run the > TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My > problem is that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of > creation that we find in mythology, whether it is the Ptah of > ancient Egypt or the egg of Pangu or whatever other myth one might > like. What makes an explanation framed in the sophisticated and > formal language of modal logic any different? > > > > I use the self-reference logic, for obvious reason. Again, this > entails the sue of some modal logics, due to a *theorem* by Solovay. > All correct machine whose beliefs extend RA obeys to G and G*. There > is no choice in the matter. > > That is not changed or involved by my argument. > > > > > > [SPK] I agree 1000000000% with your point about 'miracles'. I am > very suspicions of "special explanations' or 'natural > conspiracies'. (This comes from my upbringing as a "Bible-believing > Fundamentalist" and eventual rejection of that literalist mental > straight-jacket.) As I see things, any condition or situation that > can be used to 'explain' some other conceptually difficult condition > or situation should be either universal in that they apply anywhere > and anytime > > > But even in your theory anywhere and anytime must be defined by > something more primitive, given that you agree that physics cannot > be the fundamental theory, given that the physical reality is not > primitive. > > The concepts of "where" and "when" (positions in a space-time) > would seem to be rendered meaningless if there is no space-time (or > observers/measurements to define it), no? OH, BTW, I don't think > that we disagree that "physics cannot be the fundamental theory". > Physics requires measurements/observations to be meaningful. Where I > agree with you is in your considerations of 1p and observer > indeterminacy. Where you and I disagree is on the question of > resources. Resources are required for computations to "run" so there > has to be the availability of resources involved in *any* > consideration of computations. Ignoring these considerations by only > considering computations as Platonic objects is wrong, IMHO. > You seem to be OK with computations as purely timeless objects > (in Platonia) that are such that somehow we finite entities can > create physical objects that can implement (in their dynamical > functions) instances of such, while I claim that computations are > equivalence classes of functions that physical systems can implement > *and* abstract objects. I see these two views as two poles of a > spectrum. There is a lot more detail in my considerations that I do > not have time to go into at this time... > > My Theory of comp: Sheaves of Computations/arithmetic - define -> > particular physical states *and* sheaves of physical states - allow - > > particular computations. They are mutually supervenient, neither > is ontologically primitive. > > > > > > Comp is just the (theological) belief that I can survive with a > digital brain. The rest is logic. > > I disagree, it is must more than that. It includes also the > belief that there is an "I"... > > > > > > > > > Both emerge from a property neutral ground. > > > I have no idea what you mean by this. > > Read Russell. He is the one that convinced me of neutral monism. > > > > I read Russell. Never found something that non sensical. If the > basic object have no properties, I don't see how anything can emerge > from it. You have to explain your point, not to refer to the > literature. > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected] > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected] > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
