On 11/10/2012 9:58 AM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/10/2012 11:44 AM, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/9/2012 3:26 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
It seems to me that we automatically get a 'fixed identity' when we consider each
observer's 1p to be defined by a bundle or sheaf of an infinite number of
computations. The chooser of A and of B is one and the same if and only if the
computational bundle that make the choice of A also make the choice of B. What you are
considering is just an example of my definition of reality.
But what makes the bundle or sheaf stay together?
Good question! AFAIK, the bundle is 'held together' by the fact that the
computations are equivalent or 'fungible' to each other on or at the bundle.
As computations why don't they quickly diverge?
That is a possibility. Almost all would diverge if we are considering a wide sample
of computational strings. The measure of the similarity or level of substitution is
involved. The bundle is just those 'places' in the strings that are equivalent between
strings. This seems to imply that the 1p is not stable or persistent in most measures.
That's the question I was raising in the Moscow/Washington thought experiment. We
know the M-man and the W-man diverge because they experience different things.
But they experience different things because their physical eyes/skin/ears... are in
differenct physical places?
We have to consider the computational aspects that define those 'physical
And those experiences form two different sheafs of computation that have a lot in
common within each and differences between them.
Right! This is the concurrency problem that I keep making a fuss about.
But there is no computational explanation of why that should be so.
The question is: Can a 'computational string' code for the interactions between
computational strings? I have seem many arguments on both sides. It is an open question,
Computationally there could be just one sheaf including the M-man and the W-man just
as the drone pilot has a sheaf that includes Florida and Afghanistan. So the argument
for comp seems to rely on physics.
Yeah, it does seem to. I am interested in Bruno's take on this question.
You did point out that the attention of the drone pilot cannot simultaneously focus
its attention on information from both Florida and Afghanistan simultaneously. How would
you characterize the reasons why? This is just another form of the divergence question
above. No? It seems to me that some form of topological continuity is involved.
It's easy to answer from a physics standpoint - his brain only has finite resources, so
whatever constitutes 'focusing on Afghanistan' uses the resources that are needed for
'focusing on Florida' and so he can't focus on both at once. But he can't focus on his
desk and his monitor at the same time either.
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