On 11/12/2012 2:53 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


2012/11/11 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>>

    On 11/11/2012 11:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

    On 10 Nov 2012, at 17:44, meekerdb wrote:

    On 11/9/2012 3:26 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
        It seems to me that we automatically get a 'fixed identity'
    when we consider each observer's 1p to be defined by a bundle
    or sheaf of an infinite number of computations. The chooser of
    A and of B is one and the same if and only if the computational
    bundle that make the choice of A also make the choice of B.
    What you are considering is just an example of my definition of
    reality.

    But what makes the bundle or sheaf stay together?  As
    computations why don't they quickly diverge?  That's the
    question I was raising in the Moscow/Washington thought
    experiment.  We know the M-man and the W-man diverge because
    they experience different things.  But they experience different
    things because their physical eyes/skin/ears... are in
    differenct physical places?  And those experiences form two
    different sheafs of computation that have a lot in common within
    each and differences between them.  But there is no
computational explanation of why that should be so. Computationally there could be just one sheaf including the
    M-man and the W-man just as the drone pilot has a sheaf that
    includes Florida and Afghanistan.  So the argument for comp
    seems to rely on physics.






    No, it can't. It has to rely on the infinitely many computations
    which exists once you postulate one Turing universal
    realm. So physics has to emerged from the first plural
    indeterminacy. Plural means that when I diverge, a similar
    proportion of copies of you, too, so that we share the
    indeterminacy. Then we must seen it when looking close enough,
    and that is confirmed by QM (without collapse).

    If you attribute the physical to one universal machine, but with
    comp that "one" universal machine, if it exists must be justified
    by being the unique solution to the comp measure problem.

    Bruno

    Dear Bruno,

         Why do you only consider a single universal machine and only
    one solution to the comp measure problem?


That's not what Bruno said. He said that if you "want" a unique UTM to be the generator of the appearance of the physical universe, then that specific UTM should be justified by being the unique solution to the comp measure problem.

He does not says that a unique UTM is the generator of the appearance of the physical universe, on the contrary. It's an answer to Brent inquiry "Computationally there could be just one sheaf including...".

Quentin

Ah! Right, OK. Thank you for the correction. I was thinking of the sheaf is a completely different sense. It seems to me that each Observer moment would involve infinitely many computations...

--
Onward!

Stephen

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