# Re: Where's the fixed identity in turing machines and comp ?

```2012/11/11 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>

>  On 11/11/2012 11:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>  On 10 Nov 2012, at 17:44, meekerdb wrote:
>
>  On 11/9/2012 3:26 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
>     It seems to me that we automatically get a 'fixed identity' when we
> consider each observer's 1p to be defined by a bundle or sheaf of an
> infinite number of computations. The chooser of A and of B is one and the
> same if and only if the computational bundle that make the choice of A also
> make the choice of B. What you are considering is just an example of my
> definition of reality.
>
>
> But what makes the bundle or sheaf stay together?  As computations why
> don't they quickly diverge?  That's the question I was raising in the
> Moscow/Washington thought experiment.  We know the M-man and the W-man
> diverge because they experience different things.  But they experience
> different things because their physical eyes/skin/ears... are in differenct
> physical places?  And those experiences form two different sheafs of
> computation that have a lot in common within each and differences between
> them.  But there is no computational explanation of why that should be so.
> Computationally there could be just one sheaf including the M-man and the
> W-man just as the drone pilot has a sheaf that includes Florida and
> Afghanistan.  So the argument for comp seems to rely on physics.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  No, it can't. It has to rely on the infinitely many computations which
> exists once you postulate one Turing universal
> realm. So physics has to emerged from the first plural indeterminacy.
> Plural means that when I diverge, a similar proportion of copies of you,
> too, so that we share the indeterminacy. Then we must seen it when looking
> close enough, and that is confirmed by QM (without collapse).
>
>  If you attribute the physical to one universal machine, but with comp
> that "one" universal machine, if it exists must be justified by being the
> unique solution to the comp measure problem.
>
>  Bruno
>
>  Dear Bruno,
>
>      Why do you only consider a single universal machine and only one
> solution to the comp measure problem?
>```
```
That's not what Bruno said. He said that if you "want" a unique UTM to be
the generator of the appearance of the physical universe, then that
specific UTM should be justified by being the unique solution to the comp
measure problem.

He does not says that a unique UTM is the generator of the appearance of
the physical universe, on the contrary. It's an answer to Brent
inquiry "Computationally
there could be just one sheaf including...".

Quentin

> Do you not see that this implies that the "one" is solipsistic? What if
> only many local approximations to the ideal are possible? Let not the
> perfect be the enemy of the possible!
>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
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