On 11/11/2012 11:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Nov 2012, at 17:44, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/9/2012 3:26 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
It seems to me that we automatically get a 'fixed identity' when
we consider each observer's 1p to be defined by a bundle or sheaf of
an infinite number of computations. The chooser of A and of B is one
and the same if and only if the computational bundle that make the
choice of A also make the choice of B. What you are considering is
just an example of my definition of reality.
But what makes the bundle or sheaf stay together? As computations
why don't they quickly diverge? That's the question I was raising in
the Moscow/Washington thought experiment. We know the M-man and the
W-man diverge because they experience different things. But they
experience different things because their physical eyes/skin/ears...
are in differenct physical places? And those experiences form two
different sheafs of computation that have a lot in common within each
and differences between them. But there is no computational
explanation of why that should be so. Computationally there could be
just one sheaf including the M-man and the W-man just as the drone
pilot has a sheaf that includes Florida and Afghanistan. So the
argument for comp seems to rely on physics.
No, it can't. It has to rely on the infinitely many computations which
exists once you postulate one Turing universal
realm. So physics has to emerged from the first plural indeterminacy.
Plural means that when I diverge, a similar proportion of copies of
you, too, so that we share the indeterminacy. Then we must seen it
when looking close enough, and that is confirmed by QM (without collapse).
If you attribute the physical to one universal machine, but with comp
that "one" universal machine, if it exists must be justified by being
the unique solution to the comp measure problem.
Why do you only consider a single universal machine and only one
solution to the comp measure problem? Do you not see that this implies
that the "one" is solipsistic? What if only many local approximations to
the ideal are possible? Let not the perfect be the enemy of the possible!
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