On 11 Nov 2012, at 23:43, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/11/2012 11:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 10 Nov 2012, at 17:44, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/9/2012 3:26 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
It seems to me that we automatically get a 'fixed identity'
when we consider each observer's 1p to be defined by a bundle or
sheaf of an infinite number of computations. The chooser of A and
of B is one and the same if and only if the computational bundle
that make the choice of A also make the choice of B. What you are
considering is just an example of my definition of reality.
But what makes the bundle or sheaf stay together? As computations
why don't they quickly diverge? That's the question I was raising
in the Moscow/Washington thought experiment. We know
the M-man and the W-man diverge because they experience different
things. But they experience different things because their
physical eyes/skin/ears... are in differenct physical places? And
those experiences form two different sheafs of computation that
have a lot in common within each and differences between them.
But there is no computational explanation of why that should be
so. Computationally there could be just one sheaf including the M-
man and the W-man just as the drone pilot has a sheaf that
includes Florida and Afghanistan. So the argument for comp seems
to rely on physics.
No, it can't. It has to rely on the infinitely many computations
which exists once you postulate one Turing universal
realm. So physics has to emerged from the first plural
indeterminacy. Plural means that when I diverge, a similar
proportion of copies of you, too, so that we share the
indeterminacy. Then we must seen it when looking close enough, and
that is confirmed by QM (without collapse).
If you attribute the physical to one universal machine, but with
comp that "one" universal machine, if it exists must be justified
by being the unique solution to the comp measure problem.
Bruno
Dear Bruno,
Why do you only consider a single universal machine and only
one solution to the comp measure problem?
I do not. I said IF, and then explain that which one has to be
justified by the competition between an infinity of one, and then,
this can be justified by any of one, looking inward deep enough.
Bruno
Do you not see that this implies that the "one" is solipsistic? What
if only many local approximations to the ideal are possible? Let not
the perfect be the enemy of the possible!
--
Onward!
Stephen
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