On 10 Nov 2012, at 17:44, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/9/2012 3:26 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
It seems to me that we automatically get a 'fixed identity'
when we consider each observer's 1p to be defined by a bundle or
sheaf of an infinite number of computations. The chooser of A and
of B is one and the same if and only if the computational bundle
that make the choice of A also make the choice of B. What you are
considering is just an example of my definition of reality.
But what makes the bundle or sheaf stay together? As computations
why don't they quickly diverge? That's the question I was raising
in the Moscow/Washington thought experiment. We know the M-man and
the W-man diverge because they experience different things. But
they experience different things because their physical eyes/skin/
ears... are in differenct physical places? And those experiences
form two different sheafs of computation that have a lot in common
within each and differences between them. But there is no
computational explanation of why that should be so. Computationally
there could be just one sheaf including the M-man and the W-man just
as the drone pilot has a sheaf that includes Florida and
Afghanistan. So the argument for comp seems to rely on physics.
No, it can't. It has to rely on the infinitely many computations which
exists once you postulate one Turing universal
realm. So physics has to emerged from the first plural indeterminacy.
Plural means that when I diverge, a similar proportion of copies of
you, too, so that we share the indeterminacy. Then we must seen it
when looking close enough, and that is confirmed by QM (without
collapse).
If you attribute the physical to one universal machine, but with comp
that "one" universal machine, if it exists must be justified by being
the unique solution to the comp measure problem.
Bruno
Brent
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