On 24 Nov 2012, at 19:52, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Nov 24, 2012 at 4:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote

>> Position is a very poor way to establish personal identity,

> UDA has been build so that we can understand how the laws of physics amerge from arithmetic (or anything Turing complete) without the notion of personal identity. [...] All you need is being clear on step 1, that is the fact that you survive in the usual sense

That makes no sense. How can survival not be related to personal identity?

Amnesic can survive. but your question is irrelevant as we both have already agree that the H-man survives in bit W and M. They have both the right to say they are the H-man. You should try to take into account the previews replies.

> You keep contradicting points on which we have already agree. The H-man survives the duplication, in both M and W.

Yes I thought we were in agreement on that point too, so why did you say "They are not identical. One body is reconstituted in W, and the other in M"?

The prediction asked in H is about what they will see after opening the door of the reconstitution boxes, of course.
Stop playing stupid.

> You can note the "and", as this is said from a third party pov.

I repeat my challenge, please give an example of 2 brains that are identical in form and operation from the third party point of view but different from the first party point of view, from anybody or anything's first, second or N'th party point of view.

You asked me this 10 times already, and I have always answer the same thing: two identical brain leads to the same first person experience, but the same first person experience can be brought by different brain. I think we agree. You just forget that the prediction is asked on the first person feeling obtained after the self-localization OF COURSE.

> both the M-man and the W-man were not able to predict before (in H) which of M and W they would personally confirmed.

That is untrue. "They" refers to the Washington man and the Moscow man and the Helsinki man correctly predicted that the Washington man would see Washington and the Moscow man would see Moscow.

The question is asked to the H-man, and concerns what the H-man (who survive in both city by comp) will experience.

What more could you want, that's not a rhetorical question I really want to know, what more could you want?

> In fact how do you even know what position you or your copy are in?

> By using a gps, or by asking someone on the street, or simply by recognizing the city.

Bruno, come on, you can do better than that! If you saw a reading on a GPS that your exact copy did not then the brain of the 2 of you are no longer exact from a third party perspective, a physical change of some sort had to have been created in your brain to form a memory of that GPS reading that was not made by your twin, a change that could be detected by any third party if he examined the two brains closely enough.

Yes, the change is that they look around to see in which city they feel to be. Without this the question has no sense.

>> If you instantly exchange the position of you and a identical copy of you inside identical rooms in Washington and Moscow neither you nor the copy will notice the slightest difference.

> The question asked in Helsinki concerns the result of the future self-localization, that is after they open the boxes.

But consider what would happen before they open the boxes. Bruno Marchal is exactly duplicated and one copy materializes in Washington and the other in Moscow but both are inside identical boxes. If the position of the two were then instantaneously exchanged Bruno Marchal could not tell the difference and even "you" could not tell the difference using any definition of "you" that can be thought of. What's more even a third party, even the very universe itself would not change one bit if you instantaneously exchanged those 2 identical things. If objectively it makes no difference and subjectively it makes no difference then it's safe to say it just makes no difference, and insofar as a position of a consciousness is meaningful "you" are in Washington AND "you" are in Moscow.

That is exactly what is used in UDA. very good. That is why in step seven you will have to accept that YOU are distributed infinitely in the UD. This is not a problem for step 3 for the reason that I repeated above for the nth time. On the contrary, what you say here is a key for the sequel.

When "you" open the box one of "you" will see Washington and turn into the Washington man and one of "you" will see Moscow and turn into the Moscow man.


And both will be the Helsinki man


and both will retain a equal right to use the title "you" yet neither will be each other because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.

Exactly, and that is why the Helsinki guy cannot be sure if he will experience seeing W or M. You just explain the indeterminacy, which is not paradoxical because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED INDEED.

>> Well he's the guy who was turned into the the Washington man by the environment and before that he was the guy who was not turned into the the Washington man by the environment. I don't know how you expect to get more specific than that.

> OK, but this does not answer the question asked. you are still denying the obvious fact that both the W-man, and the M-man were unable to predict in Helsinki which of Washington and Moscow they would feel to be in after pushing on the button.

That doesn't make any sense. There was no W-man or M-man in Helsinki so obviously they couldn't do any predicting because they didn't exist then, seeing Washington and Moscow turned them into the W-man and the M-man.

You just agreed above (and before) that the W-man and the W-man have the right to say he is the H-man. So they keep in mind the prediction they did in H, and both the W-man and the H-man refutes your W & M prediction because both see only one city among W and M. You are refuted by your own premises here.


  John K Clark

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