On 24 Nov 2012, at 19:52, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Nov 24, 2012 at 4:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote
>> Position is a very poor way to establish personal identity,
> UDA has been build so that we can understand how the laws of
physics amerge from arithmetic (or anything Turing complete) without
the notion of personal identity. [...] All you need is being clear
on step 1, that is the fact that you survive in the usual sense
That makes no sense. How can survival not be related to personal
identity?
Amnesic can survive. but your question is irrelevant as we both have
already agree that the H-man survives in bit W and M. They have both
the right to say they are the H-man. You should try to take into
account the previews replies.
> You keep contradicting points on which we have already agree. The
H-man survives the duplication, in both M and W.
Yes I thought we were in agreement on that point too, so why did you
say "They are not identical. One body is reconstituted in W, and the
other in M"?
The prediction asked in H is about what they will see after opening
the door of the reconstitution boxes, of course.
Stop playing stupid.
> You can note the "and", as this is said from a third party pov.
I repeat my challenge, please give an example of 2 brains that are
identical in form and operation from the third party point of view
but different from the first party point of view, from anybody or
anything's first, second or N'th party point of view.
You asked me this 10 times already, and I have always answer the same
thing: two identical brain leads to the same first person experience,
but the same first person experience can be brought by different
brain. I think we agree. You just forget that the prediction is asked
on the first person feeling obtained after the self-localization OF
COURSE.
> both the M-man and the W-man were not able to predict before (in
H) which of M and W they would personally confirmed.
That is untrue. "They" refers to the Washington man and the Moscow
man and the Helsinki man correctly predicted that the Washington man
would see Washington and the Moscow man would see Moscow.
The question is asked to the H-man, and concerns what the H-man (who
survive in both city by comp) will experience.
What more could you want, that's not a rhetorical question I really
want to know, what more could you want?
> In fact how do you even know what position you or your copy are in?
> By using a gps, or by asking someone on the street, or simply by
recognizing the city.
Bruno, come on, you can do better than that! If you saw a reading on
a GPS that your exact copy did not then the brain of the 2 of you
are no longer exact from a third party perspective, a physical
change of some sort had to have been created in your brain to form a
memory of that GPS reading that was not made by your twin, a change
that could be detected by any third party if he examined the two
brains closely enough.
Yes, the change is that they look around to see in which city they
feel to be. Without this the question has no sense.
>> If you instantly exchange the position of you and a identical
copy of you inside identical rooms in Washington and Moscow neither
you nor the copy will notice the slightest difference.
> The question asked in Helsinki concerns the result of the future
self-localization, that is after they open the boxes.
But consider what would happen before they open the boxes. Bruno
Marchal is exactly duplicated and one copy materializes in
Washington and the other in Moscow but both are inside identical
boxes. If the position of the two were then instantaneously
exchanged Bruno Marchal could not tell the difference and even "you"
could not tell the difference using any definition of "you" that can
be thought of. What's more even a third party, even the very
universe itself would not change one bit if you instantaneously
exchanged those 2 identical things. If objectively it makes no
difference and subjectively it makes no difference then it's safe to
say it just makes no difference, and insofar as a position of a
consciousness is meaningful "you" are in Washington AND "you" are in
Moscow.
That is exactly what is used in UDA. very good. That is why in step
seven you will have to accept that YOU are distributed infinitely in
the UD.
This is not a problem for step 3 for the reason that I repeated above
for the nth time. On the contrary, what you say here is a key for the
sequel.
When "you" open the box one of "you" will see Washington and turn
into the Washington man and one of "you" will see Moscow and turn
into the Moscow man.
Exactly.
And both will be the Helsinki man
Exactly.
and both will retain a equal right to use the title "you" yet
neither will be each other because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
Exactly, and that is why the Helsinki guy cannot be sure if he will
experience seeing W or M. You just explain the indeterminacy, which is
not paradoxical because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED INDEED.
>> Well he's the guy who was turned into the the Washington man by
the environment and before that he was the guy who was not turned
into the the Washington man by the environment. I don't know how you
expect to get more specific than that.
> OK, but this does not answer the question asked. you are still
denying the obvious fact that both the W-man, and the M-man were
unable to predict in Helsinki which of Washington and Moscow they
would feel to be in after pushing on the button.
That doesn't make any sense. There was no W-man or M-man in Helsinki
so obviously they couldn't do any predicting because they didn't
exist then, seeing Washington and Moscow turned them into the W-man
and the M-man.
You just agreed above (and before) that the W-man and the W-man have
the right to say he is the H-man. So they keep in mind the prediction
they did in H, and both the W-man and the H-man refutes your W & M
prediction because both see only one city among W and M. You are
refuted by your own premises here.
Bruno
John K Clark
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