On 11/27/2012 8:04 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

        > So I think the point of this is that the continuity of identity relies
        entirely on the memory of the two clones - their shared memories of the 
        man.  There is no other sense in which they can be considered 'the same'

    Until the environment changes one but not the other there may be 2 bodies 
and 2
    brains but there is only one mind, but when one remember something the 
other doesn't
    they differentiate, but as long as they still remember being the Helsinki 
man they
    both are the Helsinki man.

Yes but both feels unique, they have a unique POV be it W or M. We start from one unique POV and we get two unique POV, we never get one POV that encompass W and M. The indeterminacy is if you take the W guy, he was the H guy, he pushed the button and then he is the W guy and not the M guy, he couldn't have know he would be when he was the H guy that he would end at W, same thing in M if you replace the W by M. There is a probability 1/2 of being the W guy or the M guy in this protocol. It is a valid question to ask what is the probabilty. Imagine the same experiment in MWI setup and you play loto, the probability to win is 1/175000000000, that means 1/175000000000 of next you will win and 174999999999 will not... I don't see why you relunctantly accept probability calculus and the question within the comp frame and you accept it in the MWI... it seems to me you should reject both.

I neither accept nor reject them - but I don't accept either, I just consider 


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