On 27 Nov 2012, at 11:55, Roger Clough wrote:

## Advertising

Hi Bruno MarchalI am not a mathematician, my background is in physical science(metallurgy)and of laboratory results therein. So I have a problem keeping up.But Ithink I can say this:Ultimately, IMHO any math or mental abstractions based on thefleshly brainhave to be also true for the fleshly brain. The problem is perhapsthat the fleshly brain is in <>, the abstractions in []. I supposethat logicallyone could use <>[]p.

`Hmm... You are too quick here. I can see the idea though, but to`

`answer this precisely would be long, and premature.`

I don't know how one could do this, so to begin with, one could keep operating as usual, by assuming that comp and monads both apply to all brain activity.

`I think that the monads might be just the number, but seen relatively`

`to some universal number, and so they are programs. the supreme monads`

`is then played by the universal number. You need a universal system to`

`start, and arithmetic is handy for that, conceptually.`

And in addition, IMHO if you want to also use Leibniz's monads,these must alsobe associated to appropriate parts of the fleshly brain.

`The fleshy brain is associate with infinities of computations. It`

`includes all the different computations going thorugh your mind state,`

`but that you cannot distinguish from you 1p view. There is an infinity`

`of such computations in arithmetic.`

A simple formof this would be to at first use a functional account of the brain,and the tripartite brainmodel (bdi, or belief, desire, intention). Later on, there can bemore than one of eachtype according to what neuroscience tells us. Magnetic resonanceimagingcould be used to label each functionally different brain area ofb,d, and i.So you have a Venn diagram of three circles with the fleshly brainas thecentral circle with some overlap on either side with comp andmonadology.

`I reason from comp, and then look how make sense of what we can`

`observe. here you are too fuzzy, and probably have not yet see that`

`"fleshy" is an emergent pattern in the dream of the numbers, not`

`something existing in some primitive reality. That's the point of`

`reasoning assuming comp.`

Bruno

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 11/27/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-11-23, 11:54:57Subject: Re: Nothing happens in the Universe of the EverettInterpretationOn 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:How exactly does the comparison occur?By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation(the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linearpositive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmeticalquantization, which exists already.How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who isinvolved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast apair of logics?The logic exists, because, by UDA, when translated in arithmetic,makes a relative physical certainty into a true Sigma_1 sentence,which has to be provable, and consistent. So the observability withmeasure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, with p arithmeticalsigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical reality has tobe redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by thequantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makespossible to reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logicinto arithmetic.Comparison is used in the everyday sense. Just look if we get thequantum propositions, new one, different one, etc.Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in anequiprobable way.?Does not comp require all possible 1p to exist?Comp makes all possible 1p existing in arithmetic, from the possiblearithmetical pov.There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems thatwe cannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see inthe (so-called) anthropic principle: each observer willnecessarily find itself in a world what has laws compatible withits existence. It seems to me that the observational actitself is a breaking of the perfect symmetry of equiprobabilityof possible worlds.?But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p.I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchangebetween Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:"Russell Standish: The predictions can easily depend of the'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give asimple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure thespin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer Bdecides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction.Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis,and Observer B will see it aligned with the y axis. Bothobservations are correct in the first person picture of thatobserver. A "person" with the third person perspective, seesobservers A and B as inhabiting separate `worlds' of amultiverse, each with appropriate measure that can be computedfrom Quantum Mechanics.Jacques Mallah: On the contrary, this is a textbook example ofthe way I said it works. The theory predicts some measuredistribution of observers; an individual observer sees anobservation drawn from that distribution. There are no differentsets of predictions for different pictures, just the measuredistribution and the sample from it.Russell Standish: It sounds to me like you don't think theprediction changes according to what the observer chooses toobserve? An electron cannot have its spin aligned with the x axisand the y axis at the same time. Once the experimenter has chosenwhich direction to measure the spin, the history of thatparticular is observer is constrained by that fact, and thepredictions of QM altered accordingly. This is true both in MWIand the Copenhagen interpretation, and is the "spooky" nature ofQM. I used to think that QM gave predictions in terms ofdistributions, and that because one didn't see isolatedparticles, rather ensembles of such particles, I didn't see aproblem. The properties of an ensemble are well defined. However,the ability of experimenters to isolate a single particle, suchas a photon, or an atom, means we have to take this "spookiness"seriously."The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notionof a 'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p ofobservers in separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, forexample, A and B have observables that mutually commute and thushave some chance of being mutually consistent and capable ofbeing integrated into a single narrative. I think that thisproblem is being overlooked because the problem of Satisfiabilityis being ignored.?I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion ofa physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell, .... canconsider... Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp?? ? ?Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why thephysical reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, andhow it emerges from + and * (in the "number base"). It is indeeda first person plural product, with the persons being all Lbian machines, etc.I am coming at the idea of a 'physical reality' as anemergent structure and not some pre-defined ordering.Good.Comp gives the complete algorithm to extract bodies and physicallaws, making comp testable, even if that is technically difficult,I claim that it is not even technically difficult; it isimpossible for the simple reason that there does not exist aunique Boolean algebra for all possible 1p.? (I agree such BA does not exist, but this is exactly what weneed to find a measure theorem à-la Gleason). We need asufficiently good quantum logic, and up to now the comp quantumlogic fits rather well.Gleason's theorem is interesting: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gleason%27s_theorem"For a Hilbert space of dimension 3 or greater, the only possiblemeasure of the probability of the state associated with aparticular linear subspace a of the Hilbert space will have theform Tr(μ(a) W), the trace of the operator product of theprojection operator μ(a) and the density matrix W for the system."We sidestep the problem of how we define the transition frompure states to density matrices. Andrew's discussion might be seenas addressing this...OK.Why? Because it cannot be proven to be satisfiable(aka globallyself-consistent) by any finite sequence of algorithms.Completeness and consistency for such cannot be assumed a priori.?Do you ever address the question of satisfiability?Which satisfiability? I use it all the time. p->p is satisfiable byall interpretation, and this is used all the time. I do not use thecomplexity of satisfiability, as if this needed to be used, it hasto be justified by the modal logic extracted from self-reference.but up to now, it fits remarkably, and that would not have beenthe case without QM. That would not have the case if "p->[]<>p"was not a theorem of the Z1* logics (matter).Your reasoning is correct only because you are assuming theimpossible to be true a priori: that there exists a solution tothe Satisfiability problemIt exists. "Satisfability" is non tractable, not insoluble. Thefirst persons don't care "waiting exponential time" by theinvariance of first person experience on delays.Of course, but an infinite BA requires eternity (infinitelymany steps) to solve its satisfiability problem.But no machine ever need to do that (and can't). The BA might beinfinite, but not the proposition, unless you are using infinitarylogic, which does not play a big role in comp up to now.I am not claiming non-solubility; I am pointing out that thecomputation of satisfiability must run to obtain a solution,The 1p depends on truth, not on proof.otherwise it is false to claim that the solution is accessible.The UD does "prove", or arithemtic proves, all the true sigma_1sentences, which is enough for the computations to be emulated. thenthe 1p are distirubuted non constructively on that, independently ofthe complexity of the proofs. Without this, no measure problem.And with no measure problem, you lost the reduction of physics tocomputer science.It is a profound mistake to claim that the existence of the largestprime number defines the exact sequence of numerals that wouldenumerate that prime number.You need to decide in which base you write it, and then it isdefined. But we don't need this.Similarly, the mere possibility of satisfiability of a BASatisfiability concerns sentences, not BA.cannot be used to argue about the particular distribution ofpropositions of the BA.You are considering first persons in the eternal and idealcase, but that does not connect omniscient machines to finite humanbrains.The connection is explained by the UDA.This is the challenge to Plato and Parmenides, how do we bridgebetween the Realm of Truth and the world of appearances?By the realtion between machines' belief and reality. With comp,today, we can use the work of Tarski and others.We could make claims forever but showing a proof requires physicaleffort.And time, money, if not a sense of public relation. But that isrelevant at some meta-meta-level.There are no shortcuts to knowledge. You seem to be OK with theidea that knowledge can obtain 'for free'.Free of physics, yes. Free of math? No. You need to postulate enoughto get Turing universality.Perhaps I am mistaken, but it seems that you are assuming theimpossible to be real.I don't. Unless you come back with the idea that 1+1=2 requires aphysical world, or thing like that.*and* that it is accessible for any finitely expressible logicalstructure.It is accessible, but then I don't see at all the relevance of this.Please explain how it is accessible.You were using the term. I am the one asking the question here. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.