On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 11:42 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > Richard, > > On 10 Dec 2012, at 16:17, Richard Ruquist wrote: > >> Roger Bruno, >> How is consciousness related to god? >> It seems like the beginning of an infinite god regression. > > > God = Truth (Plato). OK? With the CTM, arithmetical truth is enough (and a > tiny provable part is enough for the ontology). > > I would say that consciousness is a form of knowledge. > Knowledge intersects belief and truth. (It is a private undefinable notion, > with CTM). > The knower in you is the "inner God", which is God restricted by the > universal window of your brain/body. > > I don't know if God (truth) is conscious, but without God (truth) I doubt I > could be conscious, even if most of the content of my consciousness is wrong > (except on the indubitable fixed point, and perhaops the sharablke oart of > math, arithmetic, perhaps). > > I have no certainties, and that is why I use the arithmetical translation of > Plotinus in such conversation, with > God = Arithmetical Truth > Believable = (sigma_1) provable = universal (Löbian) machine > Knowable = the same, but true (unlike proved) = the inner god = the > universal soul > intelligible matter = the same as 'believable", but together with > consistence > sensible matter = the same as intelligible matter, but as true > > That gives eight modalities, as they divided by incompleteness (except God > and the Soul). > > If Gödel's incompleteness theorem was wrong, all those modalities would > collapse. Despite the modalities extension is the same set of arithmetical > propositions, the machine cannot knows that, and this change drastically the > logic of the modalities. > Roughly speaking, "God" obeys classical logic, the "Universal Soul" obeys > intuitionist logic, and the two matters obeys (different) quantum logics, > perhaps even linear (with some luck!) > Bruno, thanks. That helps alot. In case you have not already guessed I am trying to marry CTM, string theory and monadology/Indra'sJewels, in order to improve my paper on incompletenes/consciousness: http://vixra.org/pdf/1101.0044v1.pdf
> > >> Richard >> >> On Mon, Dec 10, 2012 at 9:56 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 10 Dec 2012, at 14:33, Roger Clough wrote: >>> >>> Hi Stephen P. King >>> >>> God is what/who is looking through the supreme monad, >>> not the supreme monad itself. >>> >>> >>> Nice! >>> >>> Even closer to CTM(*): >>> >>> God is what/who is looking through the supreme monads, >>> not any supreme monad itself. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> (*) Alias comp, digital mechanism, .... CTM is for Computationalist >>> Theory >>> of Mind, and the "yes doctor" + Church thesis is among the weakest >>> assumptions. CTM acronym might be better than "comp" to avoid confusion >>> with >>> computationalist physicalism (digital physics, DP) which is sometimes >>> confused with comp. I have often explain why Digital Physics is >>> self-contradictory (or made us into zombie, eliminate consciousness and >>> first person). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >>> 12/10/2012 >>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >>> >>> >>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>> From: Stephen P. King >>> Receiver: everything-list >>> Time: 2012-12-09, 13:05:26 >>> Subject: Re: Avoiding the use of the word God >>> >>> On 12/9/2012 7:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>>> >>>> Roger, >>>> The monads are collectively god >>> >>> >>> Dear Roger and Richard, >>> >>> This is what I have come to believe about Monads as well. They are >>> collectively God, they do not have an absolute hierarchy. Their relation >>> is more like what we see in a neural network >>> >>>> That's is likely what Newton would believe >>>> and most likely what Liebnitz really believed in >>>> but was afraid to express. >>>> Richard >>>> >>>> On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 7:43 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Richard Ruquist >>>>> >>>>> Newton believed in numbers but was still a christian. >>>>> >>>>> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >>>>> 12/9/2012 >>>>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Onward! >>> >>> Stephen >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
