On 14 Dec 2012, at 22:44, Stephen P. King wrote:

## Advertising

On 12/14/2012 5:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 13 Dec 2012, at 16:50, Richard Ruquist wrote:On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 5:35 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:My prejudice is that the projection from dreams of the mind isto aunique physical universe rather than every possible one.On the contrary. It leads to many-dreams, and it is an openquestion if thisleads to a multiverse, or a multi-multiverse, or a multi-multi-multiverse,etc.Is CTM capable of such a projection even if it is not Occam?CTM predicts it a priori. And it is OCCAM, in the sense that itis thesimplest conceptual theory (just addition and multiplication ofnon negativeintegers).Bruno, I presume here you mean that CTM predicts many dreams apriori.OK. Many dreams, and the feeling to belong to only one dream/reality.Dear Bruno,You still do not see that to 'make sense' (yes, Craig's term!)of what you are saying, we have to take a complementary view. On onehand we have the imaginary "god's view" where All is One,

With the CTM, arithmetic is enough. I don't think it is imaginary.

and on the other hand we have the finite observer's actual view of"there are many that I can see".

That is what is made precise in the TOE *derived* from the CTM.

Is the projection to one SWI universe and/or multiple MWI universes also predicted a priori?Yes. From the first person perspective. It predicts also the traceof the "many" (dreams/realities/worlds) once we look below our compsubstitution level.The projection is no magic: it is like in the Moscow/Washingtonduplication. Once the copies open the reconstitution boxes, theycan only observe Moscow OR Washington---exclusive OR.My concern is that consciousness is predicted at the many dreams stage before projection and that consciousness could decide (a risky term) on a single SWI physical universe with quantum probability.Well, CTM predicts this, but with the CTM probabilities, which arenot yet well computed. If they differ from the QM probabilities,this would make CTM in difficulties.Does not this cry out for a discussion of the differencesbetween probabilities and actualities?

`Not just a discussion, but an entire mathematical treatment, which has`

`been done.`

In other words, the realm of "many dreams" contains all possible eigenfunctions at various amplitudes. But in my view, if alleigenfunctions become real in different physical worlds, theamplitudeinformation is lost despite Deutsch's "measure" argument. That is, amplitude information is only conserved as frequency of events in a single physical world integrated over many trials. For Deutsch's argument to be correct the same "many worlds" eigenfunctions mustexist in every universe of the multiverse, which in my mind makestheMWI multiverse an illusion.The "many-worlds" eigenfunctions can be addressed with thefrequency operator of Graham, Preskill, and are indeed the same inall universe, even in the Harry Potter universe.Are not Harry Potter properties, properties that are mutuallyinconsistent?

Not necessarily.

QM is invariant in the multiverse.What does this mean, exactly?

`That the SWE and the Born rules applies everywhere, even in the Harry`

`Potter universes, where it seems to not apply.`

Even if I find myself in a Harry Potter universe where I saw abillions particle in the 1/sqrt(2)(up + down) all the time beingup, I have to bet on 1/2 for the next one.One thing that I would like to point out. We should not assume'perfect information' of the ensemble of universes! Statistics areoften interpreted as if the sample is a perfect representation ofthe ensemble. I see this as assuming a 'god's eye view' of all ofthe members of the ensemble that can: 1) simultaneously access allof the members and 2) compare them to each other instantly. Thisidea is a complete fantasy!

Not in the CTM where you can use the math to make it precise.

Everett already show that such relative probabilities does notdepend on the choice of the basis, nor on my "place" in themultiverse.I strongly disagree with this statement! Everett showed theexact opposite; that relative probabilities completely depend of thechoice of basis and framing.

`Prove? This is contrary to what Everett said, and I have try to`

`contradict him on this, eventually he is right. Deustch tought like`

`you but has eventually change its mind. There are no prefer basis, and`

`with the CTM there are not even a prefer ontological theory.`

The main message of QM, how ever you may wish to interpret it isthat there does not exist a preferred basis.

That's my point. Especially without collapse.

There are very strong number theoretic arguments that the every ideaof a relative measure cannot exist in the absence of the selectionof a particular basis and framing (aka 'point of view').

`Of course, that is why the state is relative, but you can describe the`

`coupling observer+object in any base.`

Bruno

With CTM you can say that the multiverse is an illusion: only (N,+, *) is real, and the multiverse itself is a construct of the mindof numbers to figure out the local arithmetical reality. But thenthe moon is also an illusion.Sure, it is an illusion, but it an illusion that we can allagree upon and thus behave as if it where not.There might also be clusters of different multiverses. We are onlyat the beginning of the exploration of arithmetic.Indeed! You need to consider the idea that arithmetic can encodemultiverses that are not composable into single Booleanrepresentations. Have you any experience with the work that isrequired to "debug" a computer program? Given the set of allpossible computer programs, how does one consider whether or not apair of programs are bisimilar?"In theoretical computer science a bisimulation is a binary relationbetween state transition systems, associating systems which behavein the same way in the sense that one system simulates the other andvice-versa. Intuitively two systems are bisimilar if they match eachother's moves. In this sense, each of the systems cannot bedistinguished from the other by an observer."http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bisimulation -- Onward! Stephen --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.