On 12/14/2012 5:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Dec 2012, at 16:50, Richard Ruquist wrote:
On Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 5:35 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
My prejudice is that the projection from dreams of the mind is to a
unique physical universe rather than every possible one.
On the contrary. It leads to many-dreams, and it is an open question
if this
leads to a multiverse, or a multi-multiverse, or a
multi-multi-multiverse,
etc.
Is CTM
capable of such a projection even if it is not Occam?
CTM predicts it a priori. And it is OCCAM, in the sense that it is the
simplest conceptual theory (just addition and multiplication of non
negative
integers).
Bruno, I presume here you mean that CTM predicts many dreams a priori.
OK. Many dreams, and the feeling to belong to only one dream/reality.
Dear Bruno,
You still do not see that to 'make sense' (yes, Craig's term!) of
what you are saying, we have to take a complementary view. On one hand
we have the imaginary "god's view" where /All is One/, and on the other
hand we have the finite observer's actual view of "there are many that I
can see".
Is the projection to one SWI universe and/or multiple MWI universes
also predicted a priori?
Yes. From the first person perspective. It predicts also the trace of
the "many" (dreams/realities/worlds) once we look below our comp
substitution level.
The projection is no magic: it is like in the Moscow/Washington
duplication. Once the copies open the reconstitution boxes, they can
only observe Moscow OR Washington---exclusive OR.
My concern is that consciousness is
predicted at the many dreams stage before projection and that
consciousness could decide (a risky term) on a single SWI physical
universe with quantum probability.
Well, CTM predicts this, but with the CTM probabilities, which are not
yet well computed. If they differ from the QM probabilities, this
would make CTM in difficulties.
Does not this cry out for a discussion of the differences between
probabilities and actualities?
In other words, the realm of "many dreams" contains all possible
eigenfunctions at various amplitudes. But in my view, if all
eigenfunctions become real in different physical worlds, the amplitude
information is lost despite Deutsch's "measure" argument. That is,
amplitude information is only conserved as frequency of events in a
single physical world integrated over many trials. For Deutsch's
argument to be correct the same "many worlds" eigenfunctions must
exist in every universe of the multiverse, which in my mind makes the
MWI multiverse an illusion.
The "many-worlds" eigenfunctions can be addressed with the frequency
operator of Graham, Preskill, and are indeed the same in all universe,
even in the Harry Potter universe.
Are not Harry Potter properties, properties that are mutually
inconsistent?
QM is invariant in the multiverse.
What does this mean, exactly?
Even if I find myself in a Harry Potter universe where I saw a
billions particle in the 1/sqrt(2)(up + down) all the time being up, I
have to bet on 1/2 for the next one.
One thing that I would like to point out. We should not assume
'perfect information' of the ensemble of universes! Statistics are often
interpreted as if the sample is a perfect representation of the
ensemble. I see this as assuming a 'god's eye view' of all of the
members of the ensemble that can: 1) simultaneously access all of the
members and 2) compare them to each other instantly. This idea is a
complete fantasy!
Everett already show that such relative probabilities does not depend
on the choice of the basis, nor on my "place" in the multiverse.
I strongly disagree with this statement! Everett showed the exact
opposite; that relative probabilities completely depend of the choice of
basis and framing. The main message of QM, how ever you may wish to
interpret it is that there does not exist a preferred basis. There are
very strong number theoretic arguments that the every idea of a relative
measure cannot exist in the absence of the selection of a particular
basis and framing (aka 'point of view').
With CTM you can say that the multiverse is an illusion: only (N, +,
*) is real, and the multiverse itself is a construct of the mind of
numbers to figure out the local arithmetical reality. But then the
moon is also an illusion.
Sure, it is an illusion, but it an illusion that we can all agree
upon and thus behave as if it where not.
There might also be clusters of different multiverses. We are only at
the beginning of the exploration of arithmetic.
Indeed! You need to consider the idea that arithmetic can encode
multiverses that are not composable into single Boolean representations.
Have you any experience with the work that is required to "debug" a
computer program? Given the set of all possible computer programs, how
does one consider whether or not a pair of programs are bisimilar?
"Intheoretical computer science
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theoretical_computer_science>a*bisimulation*is
abinary relation
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary_relation>betweenstate transition
systems <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_transition_system>,
associating systems which behave in the same way in the sense that one
system simulates the other and vice-versa. Intuitively two systems
are*bisimilar*if they match each other's moves. In this sense, each of
the systems cannot be distinguished from the other by an observer."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bisimulation
--
Onward!
Stephen
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