On 20 Dec 2012, at 22:18, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Dec 20, 2012 at 5:30 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>> You are asking about the present first person point of view of
> NO. read the question: it is about a future first personal event.
That is totally false! The Helsinki man is informing you about his
PRESENT first person state of mind, he may be preoccupied trying to
guess about what his future state of mind could be but that doesn't
change the fact that you cannot communicate with the future Helsinki
man you can only ask questions to the present Helsinki man and
regardless of the subject of his thoughts he can only tell you about
his present state of mind.
>> Bruno Marchal has said, and John Clark agrees, that both the
Moscow Man and the Washington Man are the Helsinki Man, and so
assuming that the Helsinki Man believed the same thing and is
rational, then the conclusion is obvious, the Helsinki Man will say
that the Helsinki man will see Washington AND Moscow.
>In the 3p view,
Yes, and as I've said before if 2 things are identical in the 3p
they are certainly identical in the 1p, although the reverse is not
> but the question is about the future 1p view
In a world with duplicating chambers there is no such thing as "the"
future 1p view.
Of course there is. There are two such future 1-view. The 1-view of
the M-man, and the 1-view of the W-man. If they don't exist, you would
die, and comp is false. The use "the" is just an emphasis on the fact
that, although there are two such view, they are felt unique by the
>> For example: suppose the Washington Man said the Helsinki Man's
prediction in the past about a hypothetical first person point of
view that would occur in the future turned out to be wrong, would
that mean that the Washington man would no longer feel in his gut
that he was the Helsinki Man? Of course not! That's why to follow a
chain of identity the way to go is from the present to the past not
from the present to the future.
>But we have to do prediction to confirm or refute a theory on
reality, which is the present case.
Not with personal identity we don't! If you are like me and most
people you have made predictions about what you will do that turn
out to be wrong, but incorrect or not when that happens you still
feel like you were the one that made the prediction.
Exactly, and that is why if you predict W and M, both will rightly
admit having been wrong.
>>> This is just obviously wrong. It is correct in the 3p picture,
but the question was about the 1p picture.
>> And that's the problem right there, THERE IS NO "THE" 1P
PICTURE, THERE IS ONLY "A" 1P PICTURE!
And so in a world with duplicating machines asking about "the"
future 1p picture is as silly as asking how long is a piece of
string because it depends on the string.
Then QM without collapse is refuted at once.
> It is not weird as it is only an indetermination on the person
result after a self-duplication. the math are easy to do,
It's not just the math, everything about it is easy; the one that
sees Washington is the Washington Man and the Washington Man is the
one who sees Washington. What more do you want to know about it?
What more is there to know?
The technic to predict the future when we are multiplied, like in QM-
without-collapse, or in arithmetic.
>> both remember being the Helsinki Man, so although different both
ARE the Helsinki Man,
> Exactly, and that is why the question makes sense.
So does the answer, the Helsinki man will see both cities.
In the 3p view, that's correct, but fail to answer the question asked.
> If he was asked on the 3p view after the duplication.
Apparently asking somebody something "on the 3p" is supposed to be
different than just asking somebody, but I have no idea how.
Take the QS as example: the most probable 3p outcome is the guy died.
The most probable experimenter 1p outcome, is "I stay alive". When
self-multiplication exist, the 1p and 3p difference play a big role,
in both comp and Everett QM.
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