On 16 Dec 2012, at 19:53, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Dec 16, 2012 at 7:34 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> it's true that after the duplication there will be 2 first person Bruno Marchal points of view, but the problem is that before the duplication there is only one first person point of view at it is here the question is asked about the future state of "you" and demands are made for one and only one answer.

> Of course, as the guy is duplicated, and the question is about a future first person points of view,

That is incorrect and I'm surprised at such a elementary error in logic.




This is rhetoric.





The question is about a PRESENT first person point of view about what that person guesses a FUTURE first person point of view will be.

That is not necessary. On the contrary, given the 3p meta-definition of 1p (content of the diary taken with in the annihilation box), the guess, and its solution (P = 1/2) makes sense at the 3p level.




> which is single

With the stipulation that there can be one and only one correct answer, and that is also a error.

Well, if you have a better answer. Keep in mind that you have to convince the majority of your copies, by the definition, and the protocol. You last answer ("W & M") was refuted by all copies. P(M) = 1 and P(W) = 1 are refuted for all copies except 2. Etc.






>> John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of personal pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long time now, and yet those who disagree with John Clark continue to use those pronouns as frequently as ever, it seems that those people just cannot help themselves.

> If you read the post you can see that I have no more use pronouns for a whole. I use "H-man, W-man, M-man,

The few times that was attempted it did not work because Bruno Marchal does not know who the Helsinki Man is.

So if I use pronoun, you don't get it, and if I use H-man, etc. you don't get it, when all what counts in the reasoning is the 1-3 distinction.



About half the time Bruno Marchal implicitly defines the Helsinki Man the same way John Clark does, as anybody who remembers being the Helsinki Man; in which case the probability of the Helsinki Man seeing Washington in the future is 100%.


This is just obviously wrong. It is correct in the 3p picture, but the question was about the 1p picture. By definition, you must anticipate that the copy in Moscow, will keep "P(W) = 1" in his memory, and when comparing to the result of the experience (opening the box), will say I (me, the H-man, or the HM-man) remember P(W) = 1, yet I am not in W, so I was wrong to have bet on W when I was in Helsinki.

You keep describing the 3p view, and not the future 1p view, which you know exisrs, by the comp assumption, and is an experience of being unique and entire in ONE city, as you did already agree.





But the other half of the time Bruno Marchal implicitly defines the Helsinki Man as someone who is currently experiencing Helsinki;

Not at all. It is the same man.



in which case the probability of the Helsinki Man seeing Washington in the future (or anything else for that matter) is 0% because in the future nobody will be experiencing Helsinki anymore.

?




These definitions and not congruent, and if that wasn't bad enough under neither definition is the probability 50%.


>> And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person points of view "you" should put feet into

> Wong. I told you: all of them.

Good, then the probability Bruno Marchal will see Washington is 100% and the probability Bruno Marchal will see Moscow is 100%.

The proba is on the 1p, not on where the 1p will be. W and M refers to the 1-p experience itself, not on their localisation. As such, as you have already agree, W and M are exclusive incompatible experience. So you have P(W)+P(M) = 1, in this protocol. But with "your theory" P(W) +P(M) = 2.

Bruno







> You get stuck in the easy part of the derivation.

If that was the part of the proof that was the clearest and most obviously true then I'm very glad I didn't try to read more.

  John K Clark



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