On 16 Dec 2012, at 19:53, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Dec 16, 2012 at 7:34 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> it's true that after the duplication there will be 2 first
person Bruno Marchal points of view, but the problem is that before
the duplication there is only one first person point of view at it
is here the question is asked about the future state of "you" and
demands are made for one and only one answer.
> Of course, as the guy is duplicated, and the question is about a
future first person points of view,
That is incorrect and I'm surprised at such a elementary error in
logic.
This is rhetoric.
The question is about a PRESENT first person point of view about
what that person guesses a FUTURE first person point of view will be.
That is not necessary. On the contrary, given the 3p meta-definition
of 1p (content of the diary taken with in the annihilation box), the
guess, and its solution (P = 1/2) makes sense at the 3p level.
> which is single
With the stipulation that there can be one and only one correct
answer, and that is also a error.
Well, if you have a better answer. Keep in mind that you have to
convince the majority of your copies, by the definition, and the
protocol. You last answer ("W & M") was refuted by all copies. P(M) =
1 and P(W) = 1 are refuted for all copies except 2. Etc.
>> John Clark has been complaining about the unfettered use of
personal pronouns in a world with duplicating chambers for a long
time now, and yet those who disagree with John Clark continue to
use those pronouns as frequently as ever, it seems that those
people just cannot help themselves.
> If you read the post you can see that I have no more use pronouns
for a whole. I use "H-man, W-man, M-man,
The few times that was attempted it did not work because Bruno
Marchal does not know who the Helsinki Man is.
So if I use pronoun, you don't get it, and if I use H-man, etc. you
don't get it, when all what counts in the reasoning is the 1-3
distinction.
About half the time Bruno Marchal implicitly defines the Helsinki
Man the same way John Clark does, as anybody who remembers being the
Helsinki Man; in which case the probability of the Helsinki Man
seeing Washington in the future is 100%.
This is just obviously wrong. It is correct in the 3p picture, but the
question was about the 1p picture. By definition, you must anticipate
that the copy in Moscow, will keep "P(W) = 1" in his memory, and when
comparing to the result of the experience (opening the box), will say
I (me, the H-man, or the HM-man) remember P(W) = 1, yet I am not in W,
so I was wrong to have bet on W when I was in Helsinki.
You keep describing the 3p view, and not the future 1p view, which you
know exisrs, by the comp assumption, and is an experience of being
unique and entire in ONE city, as you did already agree.
But the other half of the time Bruno Marchal implicitly defines the
Helsinki Man as someone who is currently experiencing Helsinki;
Not at all. It is the same man.
in which case the probability of the Helsinki Man seeing Washington
in the future (or anything else for that matter) is 0% because in
the future nobody will be experiencing Helsinki anymore.
?
These definitions and not congruent, and if that wasn't bad enough
under neither definition is the probability 50%.
>> And Bruno Marchal never explains which of those two first person
points of view "you" should put feet into
> Wong. I told you: all of them.
Good, then the probability Bruno Marchal will see Washington is 100%
and the probability Bruno Marchal will see Moscow is 100%.
The proba is on the 1p, not on where the 1p will be. W and M refers to
the 1-p experience itself, not on their localisation. As such, as you
have already agree, W and M are exclusive incompatible experience. So
you have P(W)+P(M) = 1, in this protocol. But with "your theory" P(W)
+P(M) = 2.
Bruno
> You get stuck in the easy part of the derivation.
If that was the part of the proof that was the clearest and most
obviously true then I'm very glad I didn't try to read more.
John K Clark
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