On 19 Dec 2012, at 17:19, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Dec 17, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>>> the question is about a future first person points of view,

>> That is incorrect and I'm surprised at such a elementary error in logic.

> This is rhetoric.

No, in fact it is vitally important.

>> The question is about a PRESENT first person point of view about what that person guesses a FUTURE first person point of view will be.

> That is not necessary.

Of course it is. You are asking about the present first person point of view of someone,

NO. read the question: it is about a future first personal event.

in this case the Helsinki Man of right now. It doesn't matter if the answer is true, it doesn't matter if some hypothetical future versions agree with the Helsinki Man of right now or not,

Only that matter.

all that matters is that the Helsinki man said what the Helsinki Man believed to be true.

About his future experience. You change the questions; and avoid it by all means. That is what we can see.

Bruno Marchal has said, and John Clark agrees, that both the Moscow Man and the Washington Man are the Helsinki Man, and so assuming that the Helsinki Man believed the same thing and is rational, then the conclusion is obvious, the Helsinki Man will say that the Helsinki man will see Washington AND Moscow.

In the 3p view, but the question is about the future 1p view, in which case " Washington AND Moscow" is obviously excluded.

> Keep in mind that you have to convince the majority of your copies

No, and that is exactly the point! I don't have to convince the copies about anything and I don't even have to prove that what the Helsinki Man said was correct (although I happen to think it was, but that's not important), I only have to prove (and I have) that is what the Helsinki man would say if the Helsinki Man was rational and believed as John Clark and Bruno Marchal do that the Helsinki Man survives because the Washington Man survives and because the Moscow Man survives.

But with exclusive first person experiences, and that is what all is about.

For example: suppose the Washington Man said the Helsinki Man's prediction in the past about a hypothetical first person point of view that would occur in the future turned out to be wrong, would that mean that the Washington man would no longer feel in his gut that he was the Helsinki Man? Of course not! That's why to follow a chain of identity the way to go is from the present to the past not from the present to the future.

But we have to do prediction to confirm or refute a theory on reality, which is the present case.

The Helsinki Man doesn't know what sort of person the Helsinki Man will become,

That's the point.

but the Washington Man knows what sort of person the Washington Man was.


>>> If you read the post you can see that I have no more use pronouns for a whole. I use "H-man, W-man, M-man,

>> The few times that was attempted it did not work because Bruno Marchal does not know who the Helsinki Man is.

> So if I use pronoun, you don't get it, and if I use H-man, etc. you don't get it

Either "you" or "the H-Man" would work fine provided their implicit meaning remained constant throughout the argument, but instead its all over the map. .

> all what counts in the reasoning is the 1-3 distinction.

All that counts is that it is clear which person's first person's view is being referred to, there are after all lots of first person views.

>> About half the time Bruno Marchal implicitly defines the Helsinki Man the same way John Clark does, as anybody who remembers being the Helsinki Man; in which case the probability of the Helsinki Man seeing Washington in the future is 100%.

> This is just obviously wrong. It is correct in the 3p picture, but the question was about the 1p picture.

And that's the problem right there, THERE IS NO "THE" 1P PICTURE, THERE IS ONLY "A" 1P PICTURE!

And? This changes nothing, as the it is unique, and the H-man knows this in advance. So it is "a" among two in the 3p picture, and "the", among two, in the 1p picture. It is not weird as it is only an indetermination on the person result after a self-duplication. the math are easy to do, once you follow the protocol and read the definition of 1p and 3p.

> You keep describing the 3p view, and not the future 1p view

That's because there actually is a "the 3p view" and there is only one of those, but there is no unique "the future 1p view".

Indeed, that's part of the point. As Quentin said, we have the same in the MWI.

There are 2 people, one in Washington and one in Moscow and they both have "a" 1p view, or at least the Helsinki Man of right now can hypothesize that in the future there will be such views.

Indeed, and that such views are incompatible.

>> the other half of the time Bruno Marchal implicitly defines the Helsinki Man as someone who is currently experiencing Helsinki; in which case the probability of the Helsinki Man seeing Washington in the future (or anything else for that matter) is 0% because in the future nobody will be experiencing Helsinki anymore.

> ?

What word didn't you understand?

It is the argument which seems to be weird, and just not address the question.

> W and M refers to the 1-p experience itself,

And neither of those people did Bruno Marchal ask any questions of, Bruno Marchal posed a question to the Helsinki man and at that time neither the W or the M man existed, so I think it's safe to say that at the time those people simply had no opinion on the matter.

You forget again that it is the h-man who survives, and that it is the H-man who is indeterminate about the W and M experience. Obviously, once the experience is done, both can say if he see W or if he see M, and confirm the probability evaluated in H.

> you have already agree, W and M are exclusive incompatible experience.

Yes, but both remember being the Helsinki Man, so although different both ARE the Helsinki Man,

Exactly, and that is why the question makes sense.

so if Rational and asked "what city will the Helsinki Man see" the Helsinki Man would respond "Moscow AND Washington".

If he was asked on the 3p view after the duplication. But he was asked about its future 1p view, and he knows they will be exclusive.

And then Bruno Marchal will say that John Clark is confusing the 1p and the 3p, and then John Clark will say that at the time the question was asked the two pees produce identical answers because at the time there was only one person to ask questions of, and the only rational answer to the question that one person could give is "Moscow AND Washington"

> So you have P(W)+P(M) = 1, in this protocol. But with "your theory" P(W)+P(M) = 2.

So according to your logic if the probability that my name is "John" is 100% and the probability that my name is "Clark" is 100% then the probability that my name is "John Clark" is 200%. Hmm, that logic doesn't seem to work very well.

Your name is "Clark" is just not an exclusive event with respect to your name is "John", but W and M are first person *exclusive* events.



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