But you did imply that string theory was physical. Not true. On Tue, Dec 25, 2012 at 4:00 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: > Hi Richard Ruquist > > Read what I said below again. I never said that the quantum > world is physical, quite the reverse. > > Not to worry, I have made similar mistakes, > especially my inverted interpretation of the gini > index. > > > [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] > 12/25/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Richard Ruquist > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-12-24, 12:07:36 > Subject: Re: Fw: the world as mathematical. was pythagoras right after all ? > > Roger, > > Quantum mechanics is not physical nor is string theory. > How the physical world comes from the quantum world is a matter of > conjecture called interpretations. > Richard > > On Mon, Dec 24, 2012 at 11:49 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: >> My idea below is no doubt off-base, but >> suggests the following idea. >> >> As I understand quantum mechanics, it >> uses only quantum (mathematical) fields, >> so, at least as far as I can understand, the >> physical (not the mental) universe is >> a mathematical construction (perhaps of >> strings in quantum form). >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 12/24/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Roger Clough >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-12-24, 09:35:00 >> Subject: Arithmetic as true constructions of a fictional leggo set >> >> >> Hi Bruno Marchal >> >> It helps me if I can understand arithmetic as true >> constructions of a fictional leggo set. >> >> From what you say, the natural numbers and + and * (nn+*). >> are not a priori members of Platonia (if indeed that makes >> sense anyway). They can simply be invoked and used >> as needed, as long as they don't produce contradictions. >> That being the case, don't you need to add =, - , and >> / to the Leggo set ? Then we have (nn+-*/=). >> >> I wonder if somebody could derive string theory from this set. >> Then we might say that the universe is an arithmetic construction. >> Probably an absurd idea. >> >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 12/24/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Bruno Marchal >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-12-23, 09:17:09 >> Subject: Re: Can the physical brain possibly store our memories ? No. >> >> >> >> >> On 22 Dec 2012, at 17:05, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> >> Hi Bruno, >> >> On Thu, Dec 20, 2012 at 1:01 PM, Roger Clough wrote: >> >> >> >>> The infinite set of natural numbers is not stored on anything, >> >> >> Which causes no problem because there is not a infinite number of anything >> in the observable universe, probably not even points in space. >> >> >> >> Perhaps, we don't know. >> It causes no problem because natural numbers does not have to be stored a >> priori. Only when universal machine want to use them. >> >> >> >> >> Why do the natural numbers exist? >> >> >> >> >> We cannot know that. >> >> >> Precisely, if you assume the natural numbers, you can prove that you >> cannot derived the existence of the natural number and their + and * laws, >> in *any* theory which does not assume them, or does not assume something >> equivalent. >> >> >> That is why it is a good reason to start with them (or equivalent). >> >> >> Somehow, the natural numbers, with addition and multiplication, are >> necessarily "mysterious". >> >> >> With the natural numbers and + and *, you can prove the existence of all >> universal machines, and vice versa, if you assume any other universal system >> (like the combinators K, S (K K), (K S), ...) you can prove the existence of >> the natural numbers and their laws. >> >> >> We have to assume at least one universal system, and I chose arithmetic >> because it is the simpler one. The problem is that the proof of its >> universality will be difficult, but at least it can be found in good >> mathematical logic textbook, like Mendelson or Kleene, etc. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
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