On Wed, Dec 26, 2012 at 2:06 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 26 Dec 2012, at 16:17, Roger Clough wrote: > >> Hi Bruno Marchal >> >> It all boils down to this: is something that is mathematically true >> necessarily physically true ? > > > I cannot even understand what that could mean. > > I don't think that any mathematical truth is ever physically true. It is a > category error (a point where I agree with Bill) > > I don't think there is a general notion of "mathematical truth", nor do I > think there is a primitive notion of "physical truth". > > Assuming comp, we do have, by a sort of miracle, a rather clear notion of > truth: arithmetical truth. It is quasi definable, and everybody seems to > agree on the elementary base (except sunday philosophers). > > Assuming comp, and assuming there is no logical flaw in UDA, we can bet on > truth = arithmetical truth, and then derive, in the UDA way, and using the > canonical self-reference logic, the witnessing of the existence of a rich > psychology, and theology, including physics and cosmogonies. > > But physics is described as the theory predicting result of observation, and > observation is described by the interaction of a universal machine > relatively to its most probable universal neighborhood. > > Given that the basic reality is arithmetic, it is not astonishing that the > physical has mathematical aspect. > > It is even normal, here, that the psychological and theological hide their > mathematical aspect, as they are not completely available to us from our > perspective. > > > > > >> This question can be restated as "are mathematical truth and pragmatic >> truth >> the same ?" > > > The truth that your government tries to hide to you: 1 + 1 = 2. > > The pragmatic truth: 1 + 1 = 2 + taxes. > > > > > >> IMHO No, because theory can be wrong but what works works. > > > Which reminds me what Charles said on the FOR, or FOAR, list: > > In theory, practice and theory fit well. > In practice, they don't. > > The problem is that, in practice, we have only theories, and when you say > 'what works works,' you are just betting on your oldest theories which have > never been disconfirmed by experience (like the ground can support me). > (Of course, "you" are (1p) betting from your ultimate ineffable undoubtable > (but hidden from the public) conscious lever). > > So we can only propose, publicly, but even to ourselves on any matter, > theories, and we can only live the "pragmatic", which is itself the result > of billions years, if not much longer complex universal machine histories in > arithmetic. And we can only measure the imbalance between what we live and > what we theorize (even theorizing on what we have theorized unconsciously in > some possible past). > > Keep in mind this theory protects the person from any reductionism, and is > eventually far closer to Plato, Plotinus, and perhaps Descartes and Leibniz > than to Aristotle, Metaphysical Naturalism, Physicalism, Weak Materialism, > which is unfortunately often presented as the rationalist position. Today, > we have theories and facts which makes Plato more rational than Aristotle, > imo, for the big picture. > > And then the Church Turing thesis, or Emil Post law, rehabilitates the more > Pythagorean form of (Neo)Platonism. > > If you don't like Number, you can use Word instead. The primitive ontology > needs only to be Turing complete, equivalently, capable of proving all true > sigma_1 sentences, as I am sure you and everybody can. That will already > contains the computation involving more rich observers, not only sigma_1 > complete, but Löbian, which means that they can know that they are Turing > universal, and that they can get the "frightening" consequences (no > prevention against crashing, looping, dreaming, hallucinating, etc. DBf, in > G*. > > The physical becomes the border of the number's observability (= bettable > prediction for measurement) ability. > > Arithmetic is an Indra net of universal entities not only reflecting each > others, but interacting in all possible ways.
Bruno, you are getting closer to string theory than I have noticed before now. Richard Universal numbers can put > masks and stop recognizing themselves, getting sleepy for awhile. This often > makes shit happens more than usually and this can grow up to awaken them, > momentarily, sometimes only relatively, etc. > > Bruno > > > > >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 12/26/2012 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Bruno Marchal >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-12-26, 05:30:24 >> Subject: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses >> >> >> >> >> On 25 Dec 2012, at 15:34, Roger Clough wrote: >> >> >> Hi Brian Tenneson >> >> Tegmark has many many good ideas, but I am not a believer in multiverses, >> which only a strict mechanistic 19th century type can believe. >> >> Multiverses defy reason. Just off the top of head: >> >> 1) For one reason because of Occam's razor: it is a needless complication, >> and the universe (or its Creator) does not do needless things, >> because IMHO the universe is purposeful. >> >> >> I disagree. The multiverse is just the literal reading of the SWE. To get >> 1 universe from the SWE you need to add a complication in the form of a >> collapse or a reduction principle. Occam asks us to chose the simpler >> theory, not the simpler ontology. >> Note that with comp we get both. The theory is the laws of + and *, and >> the ontology is the standard model of arithmetic: (N, +, *). >> But then in the 1p plural and singular we get the many dreams from which >> multiverses or quasi-multiverses emerge. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> 2) "Purposeful" meaning that Aristotle's end causes are needed for a >> final collapse, as they are for life, which is not mechanistic. >> >> 3) As in life/mind/consciousness/intelligence, which are also purposeful. >> >> 4) In order for there to be multiple universes, there would >> have to be multiple platonic Ones. But there can only be one One. >> >> >> >> >> Not really. The ONE is "known" to let the multiple emanates from >> "him/her/it". >> The one remains one, but from inside and/or machine's epistemology you get >> the many internal views. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> 5) Multiverses are mechanistic and so in spacetime, but consciouss life >> and all that other good stuff are outside of spacetime. Would the >> minds of multiverses be mashed together ? And all particular lifes >> would have to terminate at the same time. >> >> 6) There is no non-Boltzmann physics which is required for a final >> collapse. >> Time has to begin to travel backwards as things reorganize, >> in which case the final collapse should be a reflection of the initial >> creation. >> That would be cool. >> >> 7) But each universes being differemnt, they would not be expected to >> all terminate at the same time. >> >> 8) One might conjecture also that the presence of life, consciousness and >> intelligence (which are all individual, personal, subjective) are not >> mechanical and so cannot be part of a multiverse. It's each man >> for himself. Along these lines, because of natural selection and >> different worlds not being all the same, evolution would not occur >> in parallel. >> >> 9) Besides, there are alternate possibilities for a quantum wave collapse. >> >> >> I have not yet find one, and besides, this would contradict the comp >> hypothesis. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> 10) In a related matter, one of the multiverse sites cited William James >> as a proponent. Because of his pragmatism, his multiverses arise >> because there is no fixed general in pragmatism for each particular. >> There are as many generals (additional universes) as you can think of. >> These obviously would not be parallel. >> >> >> Parallel worlds are not really parallel. It is only a manner of speaking. >> The "real" structure is still unknown and is plausibly rather complex. >> >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] >> 12/25/2012 >> >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Brian Tenneson >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2012-12-24, 13:11:46 >> Subject: Re: Fw: the world as mathematical. was pythagoras right after all >> ? >> >> >> What do you think of Tegmark's version of a mathematical Platoia? >> >> >> >> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/6WzRUmWbHY0J. >> >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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