On 26 Dec 2012, at 16:17, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
It all boils down to this: is something that is mathematically true
necessarily physically true ?
I cannot even understand what that could mean.
I don't think that any mathematical truth is ever physically true. It
is a category error (a point where I agree with Bill)
I don't think there is a general notion of "mathematical truth", nor
do I think there is a primitive notion of "physical truth".
Assuming comp, we do have, by a sort of miracle, a rather clear notion
of truth: arithmetical truth. It is quasi definable, and everybody
seems to agree on the elementary base (except sunday philosophers).
Assuming comp, and assuming there is no logical flaw in UDA, we can
bet on truth = arithmetical truth, and then derive, in the UDA way,
and using the canonical self-reference logic, the witnessing of the
existence of a rich psychology, and theology, including physics and
cosmogonies.
But physics is described as the theory predicting result of
observation, and observation is described by the interaction of a
universal machine relatively to its most probable universal
neighborhood.
Given that the basic reality is arithmetic, it is not astonishing that
the physical has mathematical aspect.
It is even normal, here, that the psychological and theological hide
their mathematical aspect, as they are not completely available to us
from our perspective.
This question can be restated as "are mathematical truth and
pragmatic truth
the same ?"
The truth that your government tries to hide to you: 1 + 1 = 2.
The pragmatic truth: 1 + 1 = 2 + taxes.
IMHO No, because theory can be wrong but what works works.
Which reminds me what Charles said on the FOR, or FOAR, list:
In theory, practice and theory fit well.
In practice, they don't.
The problem is that, in practice, we have only theories, and when you
say 'what works works,' you are just betting on your oldest theories
which have never been disconfirmed by experience (like the ground can
support me).
(Of course, "you" are (1p) betting from your ultimate ineffable
undoubtable (but hidden from the public) conscious lever).
So we can only propose, publicly, but even to ourselves on any matter,
theories, and we can only live the "pragmatic", which is itself the
result of billions years, if not much longer complex universal machine
histories in arithmetic. And we can only measure the imbalance between
what we live and what we theorize (even theorizing on what we have
theorized unconsciously in some possible past).
Keep in mind this theory protects the person from any reductionism,
and is eventually far closer to Plato, Plotinus, and perhaps Descartes
and Leibniz than to Aristotle, Metaphysical Naturalism, Physicalism,
Weak Materialism, which is unfortunately often presented as the
rationalist position. Today, we have theories and facts which makes
Plato more rational than Aristotle, imo, for the big picture.
And then the Church Turing thesis, or Emil Post law, rehabilitates the
more Pythagorean form of (Neo)Platonism.
If you don't like Number, you can use Word instead. The primitive
ontology needs only to be Turing complete, equivalently, capable of
proving all true sigma_1 sentences, as I am sure you and everybody
can. That will already contains the computation involving more rich
observers, not only sigma_1 complete, but Löbian, which means that
they can know that they are Turing universal, and that they can get
the "frightening" consequences (no prevention against crashing,
looping, dreaming, hallucinating, etc. DBf, in G*.
The physical becomes the border of the number's observability (=
bettable prediction for measurement) ability.
Arithmetic is an Indra net of universal entities not only reflecting
each others, but interacting in all possible ways. Universal numbers
can put masks and stop recognizing themselves, getting sleepy for
awhile. This often makes shit happens more than usually and this can
grow up to awaken them, momentarily, sometimes only relatively, etc.
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/26/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-26, 05:30:24
Subject: Re: Ten top-of-my-head arguments against multiverses
On 25 Dec 2012, at 15:34, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Brian Tenneson
Tegmark has many many good ideas, but I am not a believer in
multiverses,
which only a strict mechanistic 19th century type can believe.
Multiverses defy reason. Just off the top of head:
1) For one reason because of Occam's razor: it is a needless
complication,
and the universe (or its Creator) does not do needless things,
because IMHO the universe is purposeful.
I disagree. The multiverse is just the literal reading of the SWE.
To get 1 universe from the SWE you need to add a complication in the
form of a collapse or a reduction principle. Occam asks us to chose
the simpler theory, not the simpler ontology.
Note that with comp we get both. The theory is the laws of + and *,
and the ontology is the standard model of arithmetic: (N, +, *).
But then in the 1p plural and singular we get the many dreams from
which multiverses or quasi-multiverses emerge.
2) "Purposeful" meaning that Aristotle's end causes are needed for a
final collapse, as they are for life, which is not mechanistic.
3) As in life/mind/consciousness/intelligence, which are also
purposeful.
4) In order for there to be multiple universes, there would
have to be multiple platonic Ones. But there can only be one One.
Not really. The ONE is "known" to let the multiple emanates from
"him/her/it".
The one remains one, but from inside and/or machine's epistemology
you get the many internal views.
5) Multiverses are mechanistic and so in spacetime, but consciouss
life
and all that other good stuff are outside of spacetime. Would the
minds of multiverses be mashed together ? And all particular lifes
would have to terminate at the same time.
6) There is no non-Boltzmann physics which is required for a final
collapse.
Time has to begin to travel backwards as things reorganize,
in which case the final collapse should be a reflection of the
initial creation.
That would be cool.
7) But each universes being differemnt, they would not be expected to
all terminate at the same time.
8) One might conjecture also that the presence of life,
consciousness and
intelligence (which are all individual, personal, subjective) are not
mechanical and so cannot be part of a multiverse. It's each man
for himself. Along these lines, because of natural selection and
different worlds not being all the same, evolution would not occur
in parallel.
9) Besides, there are alternate possibilities for a quantum wave
collapse.
I have not yet find one, and besides, this would contradict the comp
hypothesis.
10) In a related matter, one of the multiverse sites cited William
James
as a proponent. Because of his pragmatism, his multiverses arise
because there is no fixed general in pragmatism for each particular.
There are as many generals (additional universes) as you can think of.
These obviously would not be parallel.
Parallel worlds are not really parallel. It is only a manner of
speaking.
The "real" structure is still unknown and is plausibly rather complex.
Bruno
[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/25/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Brian Tenneson
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-24, 13:11:46
Subject: Re: Fw: the world as mathematical. was pythagoras right
after all ?
What do you think of Tegmark's version of a mathematical Platoia?
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/6WzRUmWbHY0J
.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
