On 08 Jan 2013, at 20:42, meekerdb wrote:

On 1/8/2013 10:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 07 Jan 2013, at 23:57, meekerdb wrote:

In Bruno's theory both mind and matter are products of computation. I think it will turn out, as you say, that they are mutually necessary.


At *our level* I grant that they are both necessary.
But this does not mean they are necessarily necessary at all level.
Indeed, with computationalism (in cognitive science) both mind and matter are necessarily NOT necessary at the fundamental level.

How could a universal Turing machine distinguish an emulation of its neighborhood (including itself) by arithmetic, and that emulation done by a "concrete physical machine". This does not make sense (and that's what the MGA is supposed to show, somehow).

When the physical is just a certain computation,

That the digital physics idea. Comp makes it wrong. The physical is a number hallucination bearing in part on the first person indeterminacy, and in part on infinities of computations.



then however that computation is realized instantiates the physical.

This never happens. No computation can simulate anything physical, unless partially.



The UTM can't distinguish the emulation because the emulation really is instantiating the physical (although it may also be necessary that mind be instantiated also).


No computation can emulate a mind or matter. Mind and matter are more global first person view of the arithmetical reality seen from inside.

Bruno




Brent

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