On 07 Jan 2013, at 23:57, meekerdb wrote:
In Bruno's theory both mind and matter are products of computation.
I think it will turn out, as you say, that they are mutually
At *our level* I grant that they are both necessary.
But this does not mean they are necessarily necessary at all level.
Indeed, with computationalism (in cognitive science) both mind and
matter are necessarily NOT necessary at the fundamental level.
How could a universal Turing machine distinguish an emulation of its
neighborhood (including itself) by arithmetic, and that emulation done
by a "concrete physical machine".
This does not make sense (and that's what the MGA is supposed to show,
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at