On 17 Jan 2013, at 19:05, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/17/2013 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Jan 2013, at 23:45, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/16/2013 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Jan 2013, at 13:13, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Specific properties, at least down here, are needed
if you accept Leibniz' dictum that identical entities cannot
exist in this contingent world, for they would have the same
identity.
I'm inclined to say that that is also true in Platonia,
which would be a disaster, for you could not say 1 = 1.
A saving grace might be that one of those 1's is before,
and the other, after the equal sign. That is, the numbers
are distinguished by context.
I agree with all what you say here. Tell this to Stephen.
Note that we are distinguished by context too.
Bruno
Hi,
There is no context or figure-ground relation at the primitive
level as such would be a distinction that makes no difference. To
who or what would such matter? Even consciousness cannot be
primitive, as it is distinct from non-consciousness.. Property
neutrality is a necessary condition for ontological primitivity.
The principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (of Leibniz) is
exactly what I base my claim upon. In the absence of an agent to
affect distinctions or to have a bias of a point of view, all
properties vanish.
That is solipsism, and you have to assume a basic consciousness,
which is what I search an explanation for. Also, it contradicts
comp. Also, without assumeing something Turing universal, you will
not been able to have computers in your reality, so a theory which
assumes not elementary properties to its basic object will be mud
unable to explain where the consciousness of the distinction come
from.
Dear Bruno,
I am discussing ontology, there is no such a process as Turing or
'realities' or objects yet at such a level. All is abstracted away
by the consideration of cancellation of properties. Let me just ask
you: Did the basic idea of the book, The Theory of Nothing by
Russell Standish, make sense to you? He is arguing for the same
basic idea, IMHO.
An expression like "cancellation of properties" needs already many
things to make sense.
You refer to paper which use the axiomatic method all the times, but
you don't want to use it in philosophy, which, I think, doesn't help.
Contingency is, at best, all that can be claimed, thus my proposal
that existence is necessary possiblity.
Existence of what.
Anything.
That's the object of inquiry.
"Necessary" and "possible" cannot be primitive term either. Which
modal logics? When use alone without further ado, it means the
modal logic is S5 (the system implicit in Leibniz). But S5 is the
only one standard modal logic having no arithmetical interpretation.
Wrong level. How is S5 implicit in Leibniz? Could you explain this?
With Kripke:
<>p, that is "possibly p", is true in the world alpha if p is true in
at least one world accessible from alpha.
[]p, that is "necessary p", is true in the world alpha if p is true
in all the worlds accessible from alpha.
The alethic usual sense of "metaphysically possible" and
"metaphysically necessary" can be be given by making all worlds
accessible to each other, or more simply, by dropping the
accessibility relation:
<>p, that is "possibly p", is true in the world alpha if p is true in
at least one world.
[]p, that is "necessary p", is true in the world alpha if p is true
in all the worlds.
In that case you can verify that, independently of the truth value of
p, the following propositions are true in all worlds:
[](p->q) -> ([]p -> []q)
[]p -> p
[]p -> [][]p
<>p -> []<>p
(p -> []<>p can be derived). You get the system S5, and reciprocally
S5 (that is the formula above + the necessitation rule (p/ []p), and
classical propositional calculus) is complete for all formula true
(whatever values taken by the propositional variable) in all worlds.
To sump up, in Leibniz or Aristotle all worlds are presumed to
accessible from each others (which makes sense from a highly abstract
metaphysical view). In Kripke, or in other semantics, worlds (states,
whatever) get special relations with other worlds (accessibility,
proximity, etc.).
Bruno
When we consider the nature of ontological primitives and
understand that we are considering what must occur in the
situation where there is no special or preternatural agent to
distinguish a 1 from a 2, for example, then it follows that even
the property of being a number becomes degenerate.
Then what you say make sense in a primitively physical universe,
but you need to say "no" to the doctor to be coherent.
Wrong level.
--
Onward!
Stephen
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