On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 16 Jan 2013, at 13:13, Roger Clough wrote: > >> Hi Bruno Marchal >> >> Specific properties, at least down here, are needed >> if you accept Leibniz' dictum that identical entities cannot >> exist in this contingent world, for they would have the same identity.
Indeed. I conjecture that every single monad is distinct given the vast string landscape of monad possibilities. Distinctness appears to be more primative than the monad. Richard >> >> I'm inclined to say that that is also true in Platonia, >> which would be a disaster, for you could not say 1 = 1. >> A saving grace might be that one of those 1's is before, >> and the other, after the equal sign. That is, the numbers >> are distinguished by context. > > > I agree with all what you say here. Tell this to Stephen. > Note that we are distinguished by context too. > > Bruno > > >> >> >> [Roger Clough], [[email protected]] >> 1/16/2013 >> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> From: Bruno Marchal >> Receiver: everything-list >> Time: 2013-01-15, 08:51:12 >> Subject: Re: Math-> Computation-> Mind -> Geometry -> Space -> Matter >> >> >> On 13 Jan 2013, at 20:14, Stephen P. King wrote: >> >>> On 1/13/2013 2:02 PM, meekerdb wrote: >>>> >>>> On 1/13/2013 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> OK. My point is that if we assume computationalism it is >>>>> necessarily so, and constructively so, so making that hypothesis >>>>> testable. >>>>> >>>>> We have the logical entaiment: >>>>> >>>>> Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams -> >>>>> physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness. >>>>> >>>>> It is a generalization of "natural selection" operating from >>>>> arithmetical truth, and in which the physical reality is itself >>>>> the result of a self-selection events (the global first person >>>>> indeterminacy). >>>>> >>>>> This generalizes both Darwin and Everett, somehow. >>>> >>>> >>>> But you stop one step too soon. >>>> >>>> Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams -> >>>> physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness -> >>>> arithmetic. >>>> >>>> That there is something fundamental is unscientific dogma. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I agree with Brent but would refine the point to say that 'that >>> there is something fundamental that has particular properties is >>> unscientific dogma'. >> >> >> A dogma is only something that you cannot doubt or question. >> >> Now something fundamental without properties is just meaningless. In >> my opinion. How could anything emerge from something without any >> properties? >> >> You have not been able to explain this, up to now. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> -- Onward! >>> >>> Stephen >>> >>> >>> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> [email protected] >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> Groups "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
