On 17 Jan 2013, at 00:18, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 1/16/2013 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Jan 2013, at 00:11, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 1/15/2013 8:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Jan 2013, at 20:14, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 1/13/2013 2:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/13/2013 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. My point is that if we assume computationalism it is necessarily so, and constructively so, so making that hypothesis testable.

We have the logical entaiment:

Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams -> physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness.

It is a generalization of "natural selection" operating from arithmetical truth, and in which the physical reality is itself the result of a self-selection events (the global first person indeterminacy).

This generalizes both Darwin and Everett, somehow.

But you stop one step too soon.

Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams - > physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human consciousness -> arithmetic.

That there is something fundamental is unscientific dogma.



I agree with Brent but would refine the point to say that 'that there is something fundamental that has particular properties is unscientific dogma'.

A dogma is only something that you cannot doubt or question.

Now something fundamental without properties is just meaningless. In my opinion. How could anything emerge from something without any properties?

Dear Bruno,

I am amazed at your inability to understand this very simple idea. It is just the generalization of what we see in the additive identity in arithmetic, X - X = 0.

You need to assume properties to get X - X = 0. Or you need to assume that X - X = 0, which will be an elementary property.

Dear Bruno,

Yes, at our level we must assume an a priori background of differentiated property bundles (objects), this is just so that we can communicate with each other.

Glad to hear so.

Have you not understood the idea that Russell Standish discusses in his book? The Nothing, that is the main idea in his book is a great example of the concept that I am using. When one imagines a substance that has *all possible properties*, there would always be properties within such that are equal and opposite to others such that they cancel each other out resulting in a neutral condition. This idea also occurs in numbers, where we to consider all of the positive numbers cancelling with the negative numbers to zero. I use the process philosophy view of ontology and epistemology, but the same cancellation effects holds there as well; all processes have anti-processes that would cancel them.

You have not been able to explain this, up to now.

I will keep trying, but you need to consider that you have some kind of mental block such that the idea is invisible to you, or something. It is so utterly simple: Objects or processes cannot be considered to have specific and definite properties if there does not exist a means to distinguish those properties. Thus to be coherent in out ontological theories, we cannot assume that our primitives have specific properties innately. All properties are the result of the act of distinguishing, so this action is necessarily the most primitive.

That is solipsism.

Certainly! That is not a disqualification. Any entity that has no ability to know anything other than itself, is by definition solipsistic. The question that is relevant here is whether or not such an entity can come to be able to bet that its existence is not alone. I cannot know what it is like to be Bruno nor you can know what it is like to be Stephen, but there is sufficient overlap between our "dreams" to construct a measure of similarity and difference between us. This is a local condition, not a global imposition.

OK. But above leads to doctrinal solipsism.

This is consciousness at its most primitive, the action of distinguishing. I think that subconsciously you assume that the result of consciousness is prior to the existence of consciousness and thus imagine that numbers have specific properties innately.

I have no idea what could be like a theory which is not assuming elementary properties.

This is ontology, not symbolic logic. I am arguing in a different category.

You are mystifying "ontology". That's bad philosophy.

If you assume consciousness at the start (which might make sense in some non-comp theory) you have to assume for consciousness that it has the elementary property to make distinction (and this is already more than arithmetic).

This is inconsistent in a ontological theory as I have pointed out before.

One might try to justify this reasoning by appeals to the idea of well foundedness and regularity, but as Zuckerman, Kaufmann and others have pointed out, consciousness requires non-well foundedness - self-reference - and so the appeal to well foundedness is maybe an intentional blindness.

Self-reference is well handled by the numbers, through the recursion theorem (or simply D"x" = "x"x""). If you use set theory, you are definitely using a much rich ontology than the one needed for comp, and you are definitely assuming elementary properties contradicting your claim.

Representationally, numbers do the job well, but I am trying to get 'under' the numbers. I see numbers as a derivative of actions, not as ontological primitives, but they can be used, retroactively, to represent knowledge and relations. This is simply because as representations, numbers can represent themselves; unlike matter...




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