On 17 Jan 2013, at 00:18, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/16/2013 10:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Jan 2013, at 00:11, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/15/2013 8:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Jan 2013, at 20:14, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/13/2013 2:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 1/13/2013 12:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
OK. My point is that if we assume computationalism it is
necessarily so, and constructively so, so making that
We have the logical entaiment:
Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams
-> physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human
It is a generalization of "natural selection" operating from
arithmetical truth, and in which the physical reality is
itself the result of a self-selection events (the global first
This generalizes both Darwin and Everett, somehow.
But you stop one step too soon.
Arithmetic -> computations -> consciousness -> sharable dreams -
> physical reality/matter -> human biology -> human
consciousness -> arithmetic.
That there is something fundamental is unscientific dogma.
I agree with Brent but would refine the point to say that 'that
there is something fundamental that has particular properties is
A dogma is only something that you cannot doubt or question.
Now something fundamental without properties is just meaningless.
In my opinion. How could anything emerge from something without
I am amazed at your inability to understand this very simple
idea. It is just the generalization of what we see in the additive
identity in arithmetic, X - X = 0.
You need to assume properties to get X - X = 0. Or you need to
assume that X - X = 0, which will be an elementary property.
Yes, at our level we must assume an a priori background of
differentiated property bundles (objects), this is just so that we
can communicate with each other.
Glad to hear so.
Have you not understood the idea that Russell Standish discusses
in his book? The Nothing, that is the main idea in his book is a
great example of the concept that I am using. When one imagines a
substance that has *all possible properties*, there would always
be properties within such that are equal and opposite to others
such that they cancel each other out resulting in a neutral
condition. This idea also occurs in numbers, where we to consider
all of the positive numbers cancelling with the negative numbers
I use the process philosophy view of ontology and epistemology,
but the same cancellation effects holds there as well; all
processes have anti-processes that would cancel them.
You have not been able to explain this, up to now.
I will keep trying, but you need to consider that you have some
kind of mental block such that the idea is invisible to you, or
something. It is so utterly simple: Objects or processes cannot be
considered to have specific and definite properties if there does
not exist a means to distinguish those properties. Thus to be
coherent in out ontological theories, we cannot assume that our
primitives have specific properties innately. All properties are
the result of the act of distinguishing, so this action is
necessarily the most primitive.
That is solipsism.
Certainly! That is not a disqualification. Any entity that has no
ability to know anything other than itself, is by definition
solipsistic. The question that is relevant here is whether or not
such an entity can come to be able to bet that its existence is not
alone. I cannot know what it is like to be Bruno nor you can know
what it is like to be Stephen, but there is sufficient overlap
between our "dreams" to construct a measure of similarity and
difference between us. This is a local condition, not a global
OK. But above leads to doctrinal solipsism.
This is consciousness at its most primitive, the action of
distinguishing. I think that subconsciously you assume that the
result of consciousness is prior to the existence of consciousness
and thus imagine that numbers have specific properties innately.
I have no idea what could be like a theory which is not assuming
This is ontology, not symbolic logic. I am arguing in a different
You are mystifying "ontology". That's bad philosophy.
If you assume consciousness at the start (which might make sense in
some non-comp theory) you have to assume for consciousness that it
has the elementary property to make distinction (and this is
already more than arithmetic).
This is inconsistent in a ontological theory as I have pointed
One might try to justify this reasoning by appeals to the idea of
well foundedness and regularity, but as Zuckerman, Kaufmann and
others have pointed out, consciousness requires non-well
foundedness - self-reference - and so the appeal to well
foundedness is maybe an intentional blindness.
Self-reference is well handled by the numbers, through the
recursion theorem (or simply D"x" = "x"x""). If you use set theory,
you are definitely using a much rich ontology than the one needed
for comp, and you are definitely assuming elementary properties
contradicting your claim.
Representationally, numbers do the job well, but I am trying to
get 'under' the numbers. I see numbers as a derivative of actions,
not as ontological primitives, but they can be used, retroactively,
to represent knowledge and relations. This is simply because as
representations, numbers can represent themselves; unlike matter...
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