On 1/21/2013 9:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Jan 2013, at 18:34, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/20/2013 7:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Jan 2013, at 00:15, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/18/2013 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 17 Jan 2013, at 19:05, Stephen P. King wrote:
Dear Bruno,
I am discussing ontology, there is no such a process as Turing
or 'realities' or objects yet at such a level. All is abstracted
away by the consideration of cancellation of properties. Let me
just ask you: Did the basic idea of the book, The Theory of
Nothing by Russell Standish, make sense to you? He is arguing for
the same basic idea, IMHO.
An expression like "cancellation of properties" needs already many
things to make sense.
Dear Bruno,
Baby steps. The concept that Russell Standish discusses in his
book, that is denoted by the word "Nothing": Do you accept that
this word points to a concept?
Yes. But there are as many "nothing" notion than "thing" notion. It
makes sense only when we define the things we are talking about.
Dear Bruno,
There is one overarching concept in Russell Standish 's book that
is denoted by the word Nothing:
But it is a meta notion.
Hi Bruno,
Of course it is a meta-notion! I am wrestling with metaphysics
after all! I am interested in the philosophical notions that underpin
mathematics and physics.
It is equivalent with "everything".
Sure. The point is that unless there is a selective bias on that
collection of Everything, we cannot claim that Everything has any
particular properties to the exclusion of other possible properties. We
are forced to say that Everything has *all possible* properties
simultaneously or, equivalently as Prof. Standish shows, that it has no
properties at all.
It is the main thema of this list. Assuming everything is conceptually
clearer than assuming any particular things.
Comp provides only a mathematical instantiation of such approach, like
Everett-QM on physical reality.
And that makes it just one of many possible ways to obtain
ontological theories that one can build coherent explanations upon. ;-)
"There is a mathematical equivalence between the
Everything, as represented by this collection of all
possible descriptions and Nothing, a state of
no information."
You see.
But to make this precise you have to be clear of the things you assume
(sets, or numbers, or ...). + their elementary properties without
which you can do nothing.
Correct, and we cannot ignore the role of change in our "doings".
This "state of no information" is equivalent to my concept of the
ontologically primitive: that which has no particular properties at all.
I see words without meaning, or with too much meaning.
Try harder! Guess some meaning and see if it 'works'.
Thus is not not a number nor matter nor any particular at all; it is
the neutral ground. But this discussion is taking the assumption of a
well founded or reductive ontology which I argue against except as a
special case. Additionally, you consider a static and changeless
ontology whereas I consider a process ontology, like that of
Heraclitus, Bergson and A.N. whitehead.
Which makes no sense with comp. Just to define comp you have to
assume, postulate, posit the numbers and their elementary properties.
Sure, but that works within the domain of human discourse. We
formulate explanations for each other and ourselves, this does not
require that our explanation be anything more than "just so' stories
that we comfort each other with.
You refer to paper which use the axiomatic method all the times,
but you don't want to use it in philosophy, which, I think,
doesn't help.
You seem to not understand a simple idea that is axiomatic for
me. I am trying to understand why this is. Do you understand the
thesis of Russell Standish's book and the concept of "Nothing" he
describes?
Sure no problem. It is not always enough clearcut, as Russell did
acknowledge, as to see if it is coherent with comp and its reversal,
but that can evolve.
I see the evolution as multileveled, flattening everything into a
single level is causes only confusions.
This is just unfair, as the logic of self-reference (and UDA before)
explains how the levels of reality emerges from arithmetic.
OK, well can the same self-referencial logic be used to eliminate the
idea that there is a irriducible ontological ground that has some
particular properties associated with it? We can expand and contract
non-well founded logical structures as needed. ;-) The infinite regress
that so vexes ordinary logics becomes the flexibility that allows
self-referential structures to not depend on any particular configuration.
Number ---> universal machine ---> universal machine mind (--->
physical realities).
Dear Bruno,
I see these as aspects of a cyclical relation of a process that
generates physical realities. The relation is non-monotonic as well
except of special cases such as what you consider.
Universal Machine Mind ==> Instances of physical realities
| ^
| \
| \
| \
V \
Number ---> Universal Machine
All of these aspects co-exist with each other and none is more
ontologically primitive than the rest.
OK, like prime number exists at the same level of the natural numbers.
But they emerge through definitions that the numbers cannot avoid when
looking at themselves, so it is misleading to make them assumed. Only
the definition is proposed.
But you ignore the very process that is implied by your words
"...they emerge through definitions that the numbers cannot avoid when
looking at themselves..". Looking is an action equivalent, I claim, to
the computation of a simulation of the content of what it is like to
experience that "looking". Can a number alone be a computer? Not if it
can't be implemented physically! A number is merely a representaqtion,
such can do many things, but they cannot be something that persists yet
changes in time. Physical objects have 'persistence in time'. Numbers,
only exist, they have no time or change associated with them.
I can sum up your point by: I will not build a scientific theory.
You would be wrong. my theory predicts a few concrete things! No
ghosts, white rabbits or zombies, for one thing.
"Necessary" and "possible" cannot be primitive term either.
Which modal logics? When use alone without further ado, it means
the modal logic is S5 (the system implicit in Leibniz). But S5
is the only one standard modal logic having no arithmetical
interpretation.
Wrong level. How is S5 implicit in Leibniz? Could you explain this?
With Kripke:
<>p, that is "possibly p", is true in the world alpha if p is true
in at least one world accessible from alpha.
[]p, that is "necessary p", is true in the world alpha if p is
true in all the worlds accessible from alpha.
The alethic usual sense of "metaphysically possible" and
"metaphysically necessary" can be be given by making all worlds
accessible to each other, or more simply, by dropping the
accessibility relation:
<>p, that is "possibly p", is true in the world alpha if p is true
in at least one world.
[]p, that is "necessary p", is true in the world alpha if p is
true in all the worlds.
In that case you can verify that, independently of the truth value
of p, the following propositions are true in all worlds:
[](p->q) -> ([]p -> []q)
[]p -> p
[]p -> [][]p
<>p -> []<>p
(p -> []<>p can be derived). You get the system S5, and
reciprocally S5 (that is the formula above + the necessitation
rule (p/ []p), and classical propositional calculus) is complete
for all formula true (whatever values taken by the propositional
variable) in all worlds.
To sump up, in Leibniz or Aristotle all worlds are presumed to
accessible from each others (which makes sense from a highly
abstract metaphysical view). In Kripke, or in other semantics,
worlds (states, whatever) get special relations with other worlds
(accessibility, proximity, etc.).
Good, we agree on those concepts, but we need to get back to the
impasse we have over the concept of Nothing (which I am equating to
the neutral ontological primitive) and my argument against your
claim that numbers can be ontological primitives.
I will let Russell agree or not with this. I have just no clue what
you mean by the "neutral ontological primitive", as you oppose it to
numbers, it cannot even make sense once we accept that our brain
works like a machine.
Numbers have particular properties even as a category, they are
different from colors, for example. Thus this disqualifies them to be
ontologically fundamental.
There is no theory at all with a neutral ontology in your sense. Not one.
This extensive article
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/ must be just a figment
of many people's imagination...
Once you oppose a philosophical idea to a scientific discovery, you
put yourself in a non defensible position, and you do bad press for
your ideas, and for "philosophy". You do the same mistake as Goethe
and Bergson, somehow.
OK, but the same advice applies to you as well!
?
I don't do literary philosophy.
I do not do literary philosophy either.
Everything I say can be verified (and has been verified by numerous
people, some taking a long time to do so, which is normal as the
second part is technically demanding).
Good! So I might wonder why the physical existence of those people
seems to be denied in your claims of immaterial Arithmeticism. They are
all just dreams that exist with no explanation at all!
--
Onward!
Stephen
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