On 1/21/2013 9:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Jan 2013, at 18:34, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 1/20/2013 7:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Jan 2013, at 00:15, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 1/18/2013 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Jan 2013, at 19:05, Stephen P. King wrote:

Dear Bruno,

I am discussing ontology, there is no such a process as Turing or 'realities' or objects yet at such a level. All is abstracted away by the consideration of cancellation of properties. Let me just ask you: Did the basic idea of the book, The Theory of Nothing by Russell Standish, make sense to you? He is arguing for the same basic idea, IMHO.

An expression like "cancellation of properties" needs already many things to make sense.

Dear Bruno,

Baby steps. The concept that Russell Standish discusses in his book, that is denoted by the word "Nothing": Do you accept that this word points to a concept?

Yes. But there are as many "nothing" notion than "thing" notion. It makes sense only when we define the things we are talking about.

Dear Bruno,

There is one overarching concept in Russell Standish 's book that is denoted by the word Nothing:

But it is a meta notion.

Hi Bruno,

Of course it is a meta-notion! I am wrestling with metaphysics after all! I am interested in the philosophical notions that underpin mathematics and physics.

It is equivalent with "everything".

Sure. The point is that unless there is a selective bias on that collection of Everything, we cannot claim that Everything has any particular properties to the exclusion of other possible properties. We are forced to say that Everything has *all possible* properties simultaneously or, equivalently as Prof. Standish shows, that it has no properties at all.

It is the main thema of this list. Assuming everything is conceptually clearer than assuming any particular things. Comp provides only a mathematical instantiation of such approach, like Everett-QM on physical reality.

And that makes it just one of many possible ways to obtain ontological theories that one can build coherent explanations upon. ;-)

"There is a mathematical equivalence between the
Everything, as represented by this collection of all
possible descriptions and Nothing, a state of
no information."

You see.
But to make this precise you have to be clear of the things you assume (sets, or numbers, or ...). + their elementary properties without which you can do nothing.

    Correct, and we cannot ignore the role of change in our "doings".

This "state of no information" is equivalent to my concept of the ontologically primitive: that which has no particular properties at all.

I see words without meaning, or with too much meaning.

    Try harder! Guess some meaning and see if it 'works'.

Thus is not not a number nor matter nor any particular at all; it is the neutral ground. But this discussion is taking the assumption of a well founded or reductive ontology which I argue against except as a special case. Additionally, you consider a static and changeless ontology whereas I consider a process ontology, like that of Heraclitus, Bergson and A.N. whitehead.

Which makes no sense with comp. Just to define comp you have to assume, postulate, posit the numbers and their elementary properties.

Sure, but that works within the domain of human discourse. We formulate explanations for each other and ourselves, this does not require that our explanation be anything more than "just so' stories that we comfort each other with.

You refer to paper which use the axiomatic method all the times, but you don't want to use it in philosophy, which, I think, doesn't help.

You seem to not understand a simple idea that is axiomatic for me. I am trying to understand why this is. Do you understand the thesis of Russell Standish's book and the concept of "Nothing" he describes?

Sure no problem. It is not always enough clearcut, as Russell did acknowledge, as to see if it is coherent with comp and its reversal, but that can evolve.

I see the evolution as multileveled, flattening everything into a single level is causes only confusions.

This is just unfair, as the logic of self-reference (and UDA before) explains how the levels of reality emerges from arithmetic.

OK, well can the same self-referencial logic be used to eliminate the idea that there is a irriducible ontological ground that has some particular properties associated with it? We can expand and contract non-well founded logical structures as needed. ;-) The infinite regress that so vexes ordinary logics becomes the flexibility that allows self-referential structures to not depend on any particular configuration.

Number ---> universal machine ---> universal machine mind (---> physical realities).
Dear Bruno,

I see these as aspects of a cyclical relation of a process that generates physical realities. The relation is non-monotonic as well except of special cases such as what you consider.

Universal Machine Mind ==> Instances of physical realities
   |              ^
   |                 \
   |                     \
   |                         \
   V                            \
Number ---> Universal Machine

All of these aspects co-exist with each other and none is more ontologically primitive than the rest.

OK, like prime number exists at the same level of the natural numbers. But they emerge through definitions that the numbers cannot avoid when looking at themselves, so it is misleading to make them assumed. Only the definition is proposed.

But you ignore the very process that is implied by your words "...they emerge through definitions that the numbers cannot avoid when looking at themselves..". Looking is an action equivalent, I claim, to the computation of a simulation of the content of what it is like to experience that "looking". Can a number alone be a computer? Not if it can't be implemented physically! A number is merely a representaqtion, such can do many things, but they cannot be something that persists yet changes in time. Physical objects have 'persistence in time'. Numbers, only exist, they have no time or change associated with them.

I can sum up your point by: I will not build a scientific theory.

You would be wrong. my theory predicts a few concrete things! No ghosts, white rabbits or zombies, for one thing.

"Necessary" and "possible" cannot be primitive term either. Which modal logics? When use alone without further ado, it means the modal logic is S5 (the system implicit in Leibniz). But S5 is the only one standard modal logic having no arithmetical interpretation.

 Wrong level. How is S5 implicit in Leibniz? Could you explain this?

With Kripke:

<>p, that is "possibly p", is true in the world alpha if p is true in at least one world accessible from alpha. []p, that is "necessary p", is true in the world alpha if p is true in all the worlds accessible from alpha.

The alethic usual sense of "metaphysically possible" and "metaphysically necessary" can be be given by making all worlds accessible to each other, or more simply, by dropping the accessibility relation:

<>p, that is "possibly p", is true in the world alpha if p is true in at least one world. []p, that is "necessary p", is true in the world alpha if p is true in all the worlds.

In that case you can verify that, independently of the truth value of p, the following propositions are true in all worlds:

[](p->q) -> ([]p -> []q)
[]p -> p
[]p -> [][]p
<>p -> []<>p

(p -> []<>p can be derived). You get the system S5, and reciprocally S5 (that is the formula above + the necessitation rule (p/ []p), and classical propositional calculus) is complete for all formula true (whatever values taken by the propositional variable) in all worlds.

To sump up, in Leibniz or Aristotle all worlds are presumed to accessible from each others (which makes sense from a highly abstract metaphysical view). In Kripke, or in other semantics, worlds (states, whatever) get special relations with other worlds (accessibility, proximity, etc.).

Good, we agree on those concepts, but we need to get back to the impasse we have over the concept of Nothing (which I am equating to the neutral ontological primitive) and my argument against your claim that numbers can be ontological primitives.

I will let Russell agree or not with this. I have just no clue what you mean by the "neutral ontological primitive", as you oppose it to numbers, it cannot even make sense once we accept that our brain works like a machine.

Numbers have particular properties even as a category, they are different from colors, for example. Thus this disqualifies them to be ontologically fundamental.

There is no theory at all with a neutral ontology in your sense. Not one.

This extensive article http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/ must be just a figment of many people's imagination...

Once you oppose a philosophical idea to a scientific discovery, you put yourself in a non defensible position, and you do bad press for your ideas, and for "philosophy". You do the same mistake as Goethe and Bergson, somehow.

   OK, but the same advice applies to you as well!

I don't do literary philosophy.

    I do not do literary philosophy either.

Everything I say can be verified (and has been verified by numerous people, some taking a long time to do so, which is normal as the second part is technically demanding).

Good! So I might wonder why the physical existence of those people seems to be denied in your claims of immaterial Arithmeticism. They are all just dreams that exist with no explanation at all!



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