On 1/17/2013 7:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Jan 2013, at 23:45, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/16/2013 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 16 Jan 2013, at 13:13, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Specific properties, at least down here, are needed
if you accept Leibniz' dictum that identical entities cannot
exist in this contingent world, for they would have the same identity.
I'm inclined to say that that is also true in Platonia,
which would be a disaster, for you could not say 1 = 1.
A saving grace might be that one of those 1's is before,
and the other, after the equal sign. That is, the numbers
are distinguished by context.
I agree with all what you say here. Tell this to Stephen.
Note that we are distinguished by context too.
There is no context or figure-ground relation at the primitive
level as such would be a distinction that makes no difference. To who
or what would such matter? Even consciousness cannot be primitive, as
it is distinct from non-consciousness.. Property neutrality is a
necessary condition for ontological primitivity.
The principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (of Leibniz) is
exactly what I base my claim upon. In the absence of an agent to
affect distinctions or to have a bias of a point of view, all
That is solipsism, and you have to assume a basic consciousness, which
is what I search an explanation for. Also, it contradicts comp. Also,
without assumeing something Turing universal, you will not been able
to have computers in your reality, so a theory which assumes not
elementary properties to its basic object will be mud unable to
explain where the consciousness of the distinction come from.
I am discussing ontology, there is no such a process as Turing or
'realities' or objects yet at such a level. All is abstracted away by
the consideration of cancellation of properties. Let me just ask you:
Did the basic idea of the book, The Theory of Nothing by Russell
Standish, make sense to you? He is arguing for the same basic idea, IMHO.
Contingency is, at best, all that can be claimed, thus my proposal
that existence is necessary possiblity.
Existence of what.
"Necessary" and "possible" cannot be primitive term either. Which
modal logics? When use alone without further ado, it means the modal
logic is S5 (the system implicit in Leibniz). But S5 is the only one
standard modal logic having no arithmetical interpretation.
Wrong level. How is S5 implicit in Leibniz? Could you explain this?
When we consider the nature of ontological primitives and understand
that we are considering what must occur in the situation where there
is no special or preternatural agent to distinguish a 1 from a 2, for
example, then it follows that even the property of being a number
Then what you say make sense in a primitively physical universe, but
you need to say "no" to the doctor to be coherent.
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