On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 12:39 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Sun, Feb 3, 2013  Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> > What I find most surprising about John's position is that he can use
>> "I" in the same sense you mean in the UDA when referring to many-worlds
>> thought experiments, but he refuses to use it in that same sense when it
>> comes to duplication in the UDA.
> After a experiment has been completed the Many World's Interpretation can
> give some people, including me, a intuitive feel of what just happened,

The analogous experiment in the UDA is pressing the button and seeing what
City you now find yourself.  (Don't bother replying to this unless you make
some new realization; we've gone over this a dozen times already.)

> as opposed to just crunching the numbers. However when it comes to
> prediction Many Worlds is no better than Copenhagen and Copenhagen did come
> first; and that's why Many Worlds is not the dominant explanation in the
> scientific community, although it's popularity is increasing.

Many worlds requires that gravity be quantized, where the CI does not
(according to http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html).
 So I would say MW is a theory and not an interpretation.  Also, I
of no good explanation of why quantum computers should work under
single-universe interpretations.  In any case, your undermining of
many-worlds is only a red herring for the real problem, which is this:

You've agreed there is a single definite result (even in MW) after making
some measurement.  Despite the fact that according to MW there were
multiple results and you were duplicated.  You then say there is no single
result in Bruno's experiment because "you have been duplicated."  There is
an inconsistency somewhere in there.

> However Bruno in his pee pee proof claims to have discovered something new
> about prediction but he is wrong about that.

Third person indeterminacy is not what he claims as some new prediction.
 It is only a building block to see how arithmetical realism can explain
the appearance of the physical universe.  Of course you would not know this
because you abandoned the proof at step 3 out of the 8.

>   And to make matters worse Bruno is pushing on a string, he's trying to
> establish a chain of identity from the present to the future and that's
> never going to work, you've got to do it from the present to the past.

Reverse causality experiments in QM has shown that your existence is
consistent with multiple pastes as well.  In any case, this is not a
problem if you accepted the survival with a digital substitution of your
brain which was an explicitly assumption before any steps of the proof.  If
you reject this assumption, it is not a flaw of the proof, you just don't
believe in the computational theory of mind.

> I don't know what my future identity will be, maybe tomorrow I'll become a
> rodeo clown, maybe I'll be elected Pope, maybe I'll be dead I just don't
> know, but I know who I was yesterday.

Even that is not a given.



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