On 10 Feb 2013, at 18:54, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Feb 10, 2013  AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>> All the probabilities need to add up to 100% or it's nonsense,

> making your "W and M" prediction into nonsense.

If Bob is behind a door that will reveal Moscow and Bill is behind a door that will reveal Washington then the probability that Bob and Bill will open a door and see Moscow and Washington is 100%.

"Bob and Bill will open a door and see Moscow and Washington" is very ambiguous.




If Bob and Bill are absolutely identical the probability that Bob- Bill will see Moscow and Washington remains at 100%.

Bob-Bill will refute this once he, whoever he is, will open the door. He will see only W, or M, as both bob-bill will recognize. You keep mixing the 3-view on the 1-views, with each particular 1- views on the 1-view, on which the prediction was bearing.



If Bob-Bill changes his name to John K Clark the probabilities will still not change.

Indeed. But it 50%, not 100%, as both John K Clark will recognize (making abstraction of John Clark's bad faith, of course).



> And this miss the point that the act of prediction is asked to the guy in Helsinki.

The point is that prediction works great at establishing or falsifying scientific theories

Indeed. So why not compare the prediction of comp and the prediction of physics?



but that is NOT how we get our feeling of a unbroken chain of personal identity, you and I make incorrect predictions every day but we don't loose our sense of self as a result. It is made only from the present into the past, trying to push identity into the future works about as well as pushing on a string.

Prediction are always on future events, and always involve a future first person verification. Physicists have to assume (implicitly or not) some brain mind identity for this being able to work. You have already agreed that such identity is not correct, as two identical computer in two places can support a unique mind. UDA shows that such identity cannot work, in no circumstances.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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