# Re: HOW YOU CAN BECOME A LIBERAL THEOLOGIAN IN JUST 4 STEPS.

On 11 Feb 2013, at 17:52, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Feb 11, 2013 at 10:03 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>> If Bob is behind a door that will reveal Moscow and Bill is behind a door that will reveal Washington then the probability that Bob and Bill will open a door and see Moscow and Washington is 100%.

> "Bob and Bill will open a door and see Moscow and Washington" is very ambiguous.

If Bob and Bill DID open a door

I understand.

and if Bob and Bill DID see Moscow and Washington

Do you mean that
a) both Bob and Bill see both cities, Moscow and Washington, at once?
or do you mean that
b) Bob saw once city and Bill the other?

then my prediction was correct

If you meant a) above, then comp is incorrect, as it supposed some telepathy. If you meant b) then both Bob and Bill will refute the statement "W and M" (with their first person meaning already exposed).

if they don't then it wasn't, and there is nothing ambiguous in that. The result was that Bob and Bill DID open a door and Bob and Bill DID see Moscow and Washington, so the prediction was correct.
>> If Bob and Bill are absolutely identical the probability that Bob-Bill will see Moscow and Washington remains at 100%.

> Bob-Bill will refute this once he, whoever he is, will open the door.

No, it remained true that Bob and Bill opened a door and saw Moscow and Washington. I could have added in my prediction that the guy who didn't see Washington will be the guy who didn't see Washington, but it seemed silly to do so.

The point with computationalism is that Bob and Bill have only once body and soul in Helsinki, but then differentiated into two persons having exclusive experience (seeing W and seeing M). None of them will note in the diary "I see W and M". And the unique guy in Helsinki knows that he will surivive, assuming comp, and that he will in any case surivive as either Bob, or Bill, not as being the two person at once.

> You keep mixing the 3-view on the 1-views,

And you keep thinking there is such a thing as "THE" first person view,

Yes, as it is the content of the diary of the guy I am asking the question "where do you feel you are?". And the W-guy look in his diary where ha did put the result of his self-localization, and see W, and answer me W, and the other does the same and tell me "M", and none told me, I am in both M and W, as none got that first person result. *THE* first person view is the content of the diary, of each persons resulting from the duplication.

You keep playing with words, as everything is well defined in the paper.

Bruno

and that might be a OK approximation in a world without duplicating machines but not in a world that has them; there is only A first person view and one view is every bit as legitimate as another. And the only thing that turns one first person view into another first person view is what they view, so all you're saying is that the guy who sees Washington will be the guy who sees Washington which is too flimsy to build a philosophy on.

John K Clark

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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