On 11 Feb 2013, at 17:52, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Feb 11, 2013 at 10:03 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
wrote:
>> If Bob is behind a door that will reveal Moscow and Bill is
behind a door that will reveal Washington then the probability that
Bob and Bill will open a door and see Moscow and Washington is 100%.
> "Bob and Bill will open a door and see Moscow and Washington" is
very ambiguous.
If Bob and Bill DID open a door
I understand.
and if Bob and Bill DID see Moscow and Washington
Do you mean that
a) both Bob and Bill see both cities, Moscow and Washington, at once?
or do you mean that
b) Bob saw once city and Bill the other?
then my prediction was correct
If you meant a) above, then comp is incorrect, as it supposed some
telepathy.
If you meant b) then both Bob and Bill will refute the statement "W
and M" (with their first person meaning already exposed).
if they don't then it wasn't, and there is nothing ambiguous in
that. The result was that Bob and Bill DID open a door and Bob and
Bill DID see Moscow and Washington, so the prediction was correct.
>> If Bob and Bill are absolutely identical the probability that
Bob-Bill will see Moscow and Washington remains at 100%.
> Bob-Bill will refute this once he, whoever he is, will open the
door.
No, it remained true that Bob and Bill opened a door and saw Moscow
and Washington. I could have added in my prediction that the guy who
didn't see Washington will be the guy who didn't see Washington, but
it seemed silly to do so.
The point with computationalism is that Bob and Bill have only once
body and soul in Helsinki, but then differentiated into two persons
having exclusive experience (seeing W and seeing M). None of them will
note in the diary "I see W and M". And the unique guy in Helsinki
knows that he will surivive, assuming comp, and that he will in any
case surivive as either Bob, or Bill, not as being the two person at
once.
> You keep mixing the 3-view on the 1-views,
And you keep thinking there is such a thing as "THE" first person
view,
Yes, as it is the content of the diary of the guy I am asking the
question "where do you feel you are?". And the W-guy look in his diary
where ha did put the result of his self-localization, and see W, and
answer me W, and the other does the same and tell me "M", and none
told me, I am in both M and W, as none got that first person result.
*THE* first person view is the content of the diary, of each persons
resulting from the duplication.
You keep playing with words, as everything is well defined in the paper.
Bruno
and that might be a OK approximation in a world without duplicating
machines but not in a world that has them; there is only A first
person view and one view is every bit as legitimate as another. And
the only thing that turns one first person view into another first
person view is what they view, so all you're saying is that the guy
who sees Washington will be the guy who sees Washington which is too
flimsy to build a philosophy on.
John K Clark
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